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ABSTRACT: 
This research sought to identify the key success factors associated with industrial 
brownfields site redevelopment projects in urban areas of South Africa.  Nine such 
success factors were identified from international and local literature. 
Through documentary research, three brownfield case studies in Johannesburg were 
investigated.  These included the Newtown Cultural Precinct, the Egoli Gas site and 
the AECI Modderfontein site. Commonalities includes location within the urban edge, 
original industrial land use, and the redevelopment intent of the landowners.  Aspects 
differing among the sites include distance from the inner city, size, the certainty of 
contamination and redevelopment success.  Based on the findings of the three case 
studies, the nine success factors were refined.  
The factors are no or low contamination, brownfields policy maturity, certainty 
regarding liability for remediation, risk-based land use options, favourable market 
conditions, quick funding access with rapid statutory approvals, readily available 
municipal services and transport infrastructure, and strong political and community 
support. The case study findings provide indications towards generalisation for 
success factors that may apply to future brownfields projects. 
Further research required includes a larger database of brownfields redevelopment 
case studies to be developed for South African, in order to further test associated 
success factors. 
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1. Introduction 
A brownfield site is a property that has previously been developed, as opposed to a 
greenfield, or undeveloped site. Most brownfield definitions agree on the inclusion of 
old or derelict industrial or commercial sites, its location inside the urban edge, and 
the possibility of contamination (USEPA 2015; CABERNET 2006; Adams et al. 
2010).   
The uncertainty regarding contamination and stigma attached to brownfield sites 
often cause them to lie fallow, taking up valuable space within urban areas.  This 
wasted space contributes to urban sprawl as primary negative impact (Adelaja et al. 
2010; Amekudzi & Fomunung 2004; Rall & Haase 2011; Schadler et al. 2011). Other 
effects include a reduction in public health (Berman & Forrester 2013; Litt et al. 
2002), an increase in crime, and a general decline in community vitality and property 
values (Accordino & Johnson 2002; Leigh & Coffin 2005). 
The realisation of brownfields as a problem started in the 1980s, followed by the 
practice of remediation in the 1990s, and the redevelopment of these sites since the 
early 2000s.  In both the urban planning and environmental science/engineering 
areas, important aspects include land-use, policy development, risk, liability, decision 
analysis and sustainability. 
The United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Europe are leading thinkers in 
the realm of contaminated land remediation and brownfields redevelopment. 
Significant industrial activity and space constraints in these countries have resulted 
in high property values in the major urban centres. This has, in turn, encouraged 
progressive brownfields legislation and policies and in these countries. 
These laws and policies allow for the redevelopment of brownfields by mainly the 
private sector, despite barriers like uncertainty regarding liability, lack of funding, or 
limited second land use options (De Sousa 2001; Vanheusden 2007; Ren et al. 
2015). There are thus many international examples of successful redevelopment 
projects from which can be learnt. 
In South Africa, the legal framework for contaminated land changed in May 2014, 
when Section 8 of the National Environmental Management: Waste Act (2008) 
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“NEMWA” came into effect. This section deals with identification and remediation of 
contaminated land (Kvalsig 2014).  According to the Adams model (2010) the policy 
framework in South Africa is still focused on the identification and remediation of 
contaminated land.  It lacks policies that enables brownfields redevelopment, 
especially relief from liability for second-use property developers. Authorities have 
allowed property developers greenfield development on urban fringes, and green-
buildings ratings, without sufficient pressure to redevelop brownfields (Seeliger & 
Turok 2015). 
The international body of knowledge may, therefore, provide some guidance for 
South Africa’s newly defined contaminated land management system and the 
potential development of a brownfields regime. This research report identifies the 
common success factors for brownfields redevelopment projects in an urban context, 
and tests their application against three case studies in South Africa. 
1.1. Negative effects of undeveloped brownfields 
1.1.1. Urban sprawl 
The negative effects of urban sprawl include loss of natural land, air quality, 
increased energy usage and cost of infrastructure provision, and social impacts 
(Johnson 2001; European Environment Agency 2006).   In terms of land, natural 
habitat and related biodiversity on urban fringes is rapidly lost and fragmented.  This 
takes place through urbanisation and its secondary edge effect impacts (Laurance et 
al. 2007; Porensky & Young 2013). Brownfields that remain undeveloped contribute 
to this loss of natural land outside urban areas. 
Social impacts of urban sprawl include increased distance from job opportunities, 
lacking social infrastructure and increased social segregation (European 
Environment Agency 2006, Fitchett 2014). 
1.1.2. Neighbourhood decline 
Brownfields areas are often associated with overall neighbourhood decline. Proven 
ancillary impacts include a decrease in property values and an escalation of crime 
(Carroll & Eger 2006; Mihaescu & Vom Hofe 2012). After the successful 
redevelopment of brownfields, property ownership and value have been shown to 
improve and crime reduced (Bacot & O’Dell 2006; Berman & Forrester 2013). 
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1.1.3. Public health and environmental justice 
The health impacts of highly contaminated Superfund1 sites (the worst hazardous 
waste sites in the US requiring central government intervention) are well 
documented (Lybarger et al. 1998; Austin et al. 2011; Gensburg et al. 2009; 
Chatham-Stephens et al. 2013; Kielb et al. 2010). Sites with known contamination 
may affect public health. There are statistical and spatial links between increased 
mortality caused by respiratory illness and cancers in communities affected by 
concentrated groupings of historic brownfields. It calls for a coordinated approach 
between the urban planning and public health aspects of brownfields redevelopment 
(Litt et al. 2002).   
Increased incidence of illness close to contaminated sites is one of the origins of the 
environmental justice movement (Pellow 2004; Schlosberg 2007; Bullard & Johnson 
2000).  This movement, started in Warren County in 1982, highlights the fact that 
low-income citizens in many countries are exposed to unsafe polluting industries and 
sites, active and closed, that their more affluent counterparts are not (Bullard & 
Johnson 2000; Pastor et al. 2001; Eckerd & Keeler 2012a; Litt et al. 2002).   
Sufficient evidence suggest that by the end of the 1990s, low-income communities 
had had to face greater health and safety risks in their workplace and communities 
than high-income communities (Bullard & Johnson 2000; Eckerd & Keeler 2012b).  
According to one estimate, contaminated sites were the source of disease burden in 
20% of cases in developing nations (Blacksmith Institute n.d.; Chatham-Stephens et 
al. 2013). 
 
1.2. Redevelopment of brownfields 
Remediating and redeveloping brownfields helps to combat the negative impacts 
described above. This includes consolidation of the built urban form, preservation of 
natural habitat and open spaces, community revitalisation and improvement in 
                                               
1In the US, contamination cases such as Love Canal and Valley of the Drums in the late 1970s 
caused the central government to promulgate the Comprehensive Environmental Response and 
Liabilities Act (CERCLA) in 1980, which became known as the Superfund (De Souza 2001). 
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property value and crime rates (Dorsey 2003; Lange & McNeil 2004; Wedding & 
Crawford-Brown 2007; Steiner 2014; Bacot & O’Dell 2006; Berman & Forrester 
2013). Understanding the redevelopment of brownfields is therefore an important 
part of a sustainable urban future as originally envisaged in 1987 when “Our 
Common Future” was published by the United Nations World Commission for 
Environment and Development (Brundtland 1987). 
A correlation can be drawn in the UK between environmental concern for the scale of 
greenfields development and government interest in brownfield redevelopment. As a 
result, by 2000, a policy target was set to provide 60% of new housing on previously 
developed land. By 2004, 50 - 70% of new housing projects were already being 
undertaken on previously developed land in urban areas (Adams et al. 2010, pp.96–
97). 
Brownfields development is one of the few initiatives that benefit both public health 
and environment both in the core and the edge of the city, as it reduced 
environmental pressure on the urban edge, and betters unused city centre industrial 
areas (Greenberg et al. 2001). 
1.2.1. Current knowledge on brownfields remediation and redevelopment 
Policy and knowledge development 
At the onset of brownfields redevelopment in the late 1990s, the original focus was 
on identifying investment decisions and barriers to redevelopment (Yount & Meyer 
1999; McCarthy 2002; Accordino & Johnson 2002; De Sousa 2001). 
Some of these barriers included variability and complexity of legal 
procedures/regulation, uncertainty regarding liability for clean-up, and a lack of 
balanced funding sources (Yount & Meyer 1999; De Sousa 2001; Howland 2003a; 
Noonan & Vidich 1992; Nijkamp et al. 2002; Alberini et al. 2005). 
With regard to environmental risk assessment of brownfield sites, the “elimination of 
risk” method was previously used, meaning that no health risks should remain after 
remediation, which made the cost of clean-up very high. More recently, the 
“minimisation of risk” method to ameliorate and redevelop sites is currently being 
implemented, where remediation is done according to the end land use (typically 
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classed in industrial, commercial or residential) (Noonan & Vidich 1992; CARACAS 
& LQM 1998; Agostini et al. 2012; Zabeo et al. 2011; Luo et al. 2009).   
The implementation of the ‘minimisation of risk” methodology results in the high-risk 
areas of a site being intensively remediated and monitored, and other lower risk 
areas left as is. This decreases clean-up costs, and allows redevelopment according 
to risk zones on the property. 
Through decision analysis methods, and tools informing planning and 
implementation of clean-up efforts, risk assessments are conducted on a regional 
and site level prior to redevelopment.  This reduces the time and cost spent prior to 
clean-up measures being implemented (Pizzol et al. 2011; Schädler et al. 2012; 
Chen & Ma 2013;  Bello-Dambatta et al. 2009; Luo et al. 2009).  For example, site 
attributes such as zoning, land value, contamination risk, clean-up cost, ownership 
structure, and proximity to infrastructure will be gathered.  These attributes are then 
statistically analysed according to multi-criteria. This improves decision-making 
before the implementation of the measures needed for redevelopment. 
Since the early 2000s, redevelopment activity and the number of completed projects 
worldwide has increased significantly.  It has therefore become possible to study the 
outcome of the many projects executed in various countries in order to understand 
whether these have been successful or not (Wedding & Crawford-Brown 2007; Tonin 
2014; Frantal et al. 2013; De Sousa 2006). 
The three stage policy maturity model proposed by Adams et al. (2010) provides a 
framework within which most policy development and research regarding brownfields 
can be grouped.  These include: 
Stage 1 - understanding brownfields by definition and mapping; stage 2 
- recognising potential and securing commitment; and stage 3 - 
generating engagement with the private sector (Adams et al 2010: 76).   
Knowledge of the different stages of policy maturity to facilitate clean-up, 
redevelopment and involvement of the private sector has improved significantly 
(Adams et al. 2010; Luo et al. 2009; Spínola & Philippi 2011; Pediaditi et al. 2010; 
Hollander 2010). 
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Measuring redevelopment outcomes 
Success factors for brownfields redevelopment is a constant theme of research in 
international literature (De Sousa 2001; Nijkamp et al. 2002; Lange & McNeil 2004; 
Bacot & O’Dell 2006; Osman et al. 2015). Some of the key factors influencing 
brownfields redevelopment are level of contamination, legal compliance, uncertainty 
regarding liability, second land-use options, economy of scale of developments, 
distance from city centres and infrastructure, and funding (De Sousa 2001; Nijkamp 
et al. 2002; Yount & Meyer 1999; Lange & McNeil 2004; Amekudzi & Fomunung 
2004). Social factors such as public health and public pressure are also relevant 
(Osman et al. 2015; Litt et al. 2002). 
In order to hasten the path towards mature brownfields policies and more 
redevelopment projects in South Africa and other developing nations, it is necessary 
to appreciate and apply international lessons from developed countries. 
With the growth of sustainable development as practice (Dorsey 2003), sustainable 
remediation has become an underlying principle of brownfields remediation (Nijkamp 
et al. 2002; Vamerali et al. 2009; Brecheisen & Theis 2013; Holland 2011; Holland et 
al. 2011; USEPA 2008). The United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(USEPA) defines green remediation as: 
The practice of considering all environmental effects of remedy 
implementation and incorporating options to maximise net 
environmental benefit of clean-up actions (USEPA 2008: 1).   
Sustainable remediation considers aspects such as the energy usage and related 
carbon emissions of clean-up (USEPA 2008; Hou et al. 2014).  Related topics 
include passive instead of active treatment of contaminants through bioremediation 
(Vandenhove 2013; Shah & Braun 2004), brownfields “greening” (open space and 
related second uses) (Pediaditi et al. 2010; Siikamäki & Wernstedt 2008), and using 
contaminated sites for renewable energy projects (Jensen 2010; Adelaja et al. 2010). 
1.3. Research problem 
Common contributing factors to the success or failure of brownfield site 
redevelopment projects in South Africa are not well understood or documented 
(Potts & Cloete 2012; Theron 2010; Kadas et al. 2008; Spínola & Philippi 2011). 
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There is a lack of research output from South Africa on brownfields, when compared 
to the international body of knowledge. South Africa has a short history of managing 
contaminated land. The first Act to address contaminated land (NEMWA) was 
published in South Africa in 2008, and the associated framework document2 on 
contaminated land assessment was published in 2010. The contaminated land 
section of NEMWA was enacted in 2014 with specific regulations attached. 
Sites such as Iscor Pretoria and the erstwhile Iscor Vanderbijl (now Arcellor Mittal), 
various Transnet sites, and inner city industrial land parcels remain in need of 
remediation and redevelopment. However, there is a lack of incentives to attract the 
private sector to such redevelopments opportunities. 
 
1.4. Research question 
What are the factors that contribute to the implementation success of projects where 
industrial brownfield sites are remediated and subsequently redeveloped? 
For the purpose of this study, “brownfields redevelopment” refers to the change of 
use of a site from its original industrial purpose to a new non-industrial use. Some 
form of development is usually associated with the new use. Derelict commercial 
properties that are unused due to economic or urban planning drivers, and mining 
land use, are excluded. Brownfields outside urban areas are also excluded. 
This research aims to identify the most important factors determining the 
implementation success rate of brownfields redevelopment. It then tests the success 
factors against three local case studies, in order to improve South Africa’s 
understanding in the field. 
 
1.5. Structure of this research 
The literature review in this study considers the international and local body of 
knowledge regarding brownfield sites and their redevelopment.  From this, key 
                                               
2Framework for the Management of Contaminated Land, 2010 (Department of Environmental Affairs) 
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success factors of brownfields redevelopment projects are identified and discussed 
according to the research question as stated above. The research method, namely 
documentary research, is then described. 
The data analysis chapter presents three South African case study sites, selected 
because of certain shared features, whilst providing a representative cross-section of 
urban brownfields in South Africa. Shared features include their location within the 
urban edge of Johannesburg, original industrial land use, and the intent of the 
landowners to redevelop brownfields land. Aspects differing among the sites include 
distance from the inner city, size, the certainty of contamination and redevelopment 
success. The case studies are: 
 The 25 hectare Newtown Precinct in the city centre of Johannesburg has 
been redeveloped numerous times since the start of Johannesburg. The 
presence of contamination was not clearly established. 
 The 14 hectare Egoli Gas site is located in Cottesloe between the Universities 
of Witwatersrand and Johannesburg. The owners began conceptualising its 
redevelopment plan only in 2001, but the project has not yet been 
implemented.  The presence of contamination was clearly established. 
 The 1 600 hectare AECI Modderfontein site is about 18 km away from the city 
centre of Johannesburg. Heartland Properties started the redevelopment 
activities on unused Explosive Act buffer land in 2000. A significant portion of 
the property was recently sold to the Hong-Kong based property developer 
Zendai, currently in the process of redeveloping the land.  The presence of 
contamination was likely but not clearly established. 
Each case is contextualised, followed by a description of its data sources, and the 
presentation and analysis of data. Possible associated success factors are 
highlighted, and a preliminary analysis of each case study provided.  
The cases are then evaluated against the identified redevelopment success factors 
from the literature in the discussion chapter.  The conclusion highlights features of 
each success factor, and potential generalisation for future brownfield 
redevelopments. Future research opportunities are lastly identified. 
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2. Literature review 
The structure and purpose of this literature review is threefold.   
Firstly, the international body of knowledge regarding contaminated sites and their 
redevelopment is broadly reviewed.  This includes the various definitions, 
assessment methodologies and redevelopment of brownfield sites.  Publications in 
the field of brownfields predominate in developed economies such as Europe, the 
UK and the US. The associated research output can be considered “best practice”. 
Secondly, brownfields redevelopment in South Africa and other developing nations is 
reviewed. Policy development in especially South America is explored as a parallel 
to South Africa. Brownfields practice in these economies is not well-developed, with 
limited available publications, apart from legislative regimes of contaminated land.  
South Africa’s research output in the field is also discussed. 
Thirdly, key factors that contribute to the implementation success of brownfields 
redevelopment projects are identified and discussed according to the research 
question. 
2.1. Definitions of brownfields 
The USEPA defined brownfields as: 
Real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may 
be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant (USEPA 2015). 
Contaminated brownfield sites are generally distinguished from Superfund sites (see 
glossary), in that they have low levels of pollution and can therefore often be 
redeveloped (Local Government Environmental Assistance Network 2016). 
In the UK, greater emphasis has been placed on “derelict land” or “previously 
developed land.” Brownfields was a much later addition to the vocabulary (de Souza 
2010). The term “brownfield” was originally used simply as the opposite of 
“greenfield” (Alker et al. 2000).  A “greenfield” is a previously undeveloped property 
often on the outskirts of urban areas (Dorsey 2003).  There is no strong connection 
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in the UK between “brownfields” and “contamination” as is the case in the US and 
Canada (Adams et al. 2010). 
CABERNET’s definition of brownfields, representing a European perspective, reads: 
Sites that have been affected by the former uses of the sites and 
surrounding land; are derelict and underused; many have real or 
perceived contamination problems; are mainly in developed urban 
areas; and require intervention to bring them back to beneficial use 
(CABERNET 2006). 
This is still the most commonly used definition in Europe today. The term brownfield 
is not consistently used in Europe, but the region faces similar challenges to the US 
regarding contaminated sites, brownfields, and urban sprawl (Vanheusden 2007; 
European Environment Agency 2006; Erdem & Nassauer 2013; CARACAS & LQM 
1998).   
Potts & Cloete (2012) propose the following definition for brownfields for South 
Africa: 
A brownfield site is infill land or premises where remedial action is 
required prior to redevelopment. It may also be vacant, derelict or 
contaminated. No specific land use is attributed (Potts & Cloete 2012, 
p.395). 
The authors proposed to add infill to the general international definition, thereby 
referring to land within the urban edge. 
Most brownfield definitions agree on the inclusion of derelict industrial or commercial 
sites, their location inside the urban edge, the possibility of contamination, and some 
level of intervention required prior to development (USEPA 2015; CABERNET 2006; 
Adams et al. 2010; NICOLE Brownfield Working Group 2011). 
 
2.2. Aspects of brownfields 
2.2.1. Risk assessment 
Remedial action according to predefined standards are typically the outcome of site 
or risk assessments, which attempt to determine the risk of pollution/contamination 
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to human health and the environment. A phase one, or preliminary site assessment 
should only make use of interviews and cursory investigation; whereas phase two, or 
detailed assessments require intrusive sampling of various media, testing and 
pollution plume determination (Noonan & Vidich 1992; Ferguson et al. 1999). 
Formerly, regulators drove the elimination of risk, which often made clean-up very 
expensive.  Thinking has evolved towards minimisation or management of risk - 
focussing on high-risk areas on a site for dedicated clean-up, or encapsulation to 
prevent the spread of contamination (Ferguson et al. 1999; Hollander et al. 2010).  
Lower risk areas are then often fully redeveloped. 
Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) conducted research on the financial efficacy of the 
conservative approach of the Superfund clean-ups and the measured health benefits 
thereof. The requirement in 1986 was that the on-site risk assessment consider the 
hypothetical risk to future individual residents.  This study found that in the majority 
of 150 sample sites, a high population risk of cancer occurred in a small percentage 
of cases, and was otherwise mostly low.  It was proposed that cost of remediation 
should rather be linked to explicit benefits.  The authors also showed that blanket 
“elimination of risk” with fixed standards is perhaps not cost-effective, and that 
minimisation/management of risk methods should rather be applied. 
CARACAS conducted research regarding contaminated land risk assessment in 16 
European nations between 1996 and 1998.  Ferguson (1999) summarised the 
findings of the CARACAS research.  The findings identify the seminal contamination 
cases in various countries. Clean-up requirements imposed by these governments 
commonly included full remediation to pre-contamination conditions.   
Ferguson (1999) further wrote that the elimination of risk standards applied in the 
two decades before the research was widely regarded as technically and 
economically unfeasible, and policies moved towards fitness for use. The timing, 
application and standards from country to country varied.  For example, the Dutch 
soil screening values were first to be developed, and widely referenced 
internationally.  These were reduced in 1997 to less stringent fitness for use 
standards.  Fitness for use is also termed minimisation of risk by other authors. 
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Certain fundamental principles were common in the analysis of the 16 countries.  
These included the intention to limit future pollution, application of the polluter pays 
principle with assistance to innocent land owners, the precautionary principle, and 
the risk-based approach informing remediation activities (Ferguson 1999). 
CARACAS identified the differences between countries. These included the use of 
generic guideline values for various media, decision-support procedures for 
remediation and integration of risk assessment thinking into site designs.  Common 
issues faced were reducing the cost of addressing contamination against public 
health and business confidence parameters. 
There is alignment between Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) and Ferguson (1999) on 
the change from elimination of risk to fitness for use thinking in risk assessment and 
management around 1999.  It has since been engrained into numerous countries’ 
risk assessment standards (Luo et al. 2009). 
Conceptual site models – source-pathway-receptor 
One of the critical drivers for the degree of remediation to be undertaken is the risk 
that the contaminants pose to the surrounding environmental or human receptors. 
The conceptual site model illustrates a hypothesis of how the pollution source, the 
pathway (the environmental media in which the contaminant is transported) and the 
receptor (the environmental habitat, animal or human community at risk of being 
impacted) is linked. 
This method of risk assessment for contaminated sites was first documented in the 
late 1970s and is still applicable (Luo et al. 2009; Thomsen et al. 2016). Conceptual 
site models are commonly applied in groundwater modelling practice. 
Fields such as ecotoxicology (Hoffman et al. 2003) and bioavailability (Latawiec et al. 
2010) have recently been added to the many complex variables affecting this 
pollutant linkage concept. 
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2.2.2. Decision analysis and brownfields 
Decision analysis methods are widely used to assist decision makers with the 
uncertainties, complexities and risks associated with contaminated land (Bello-
Dambatta et al. 2009). 
Noonan and Vidich (1992) described the concern in real estate purchase of the 
possibility of contamination. If the site was known to be contaminated, a hazardous 
waste risk assessment could be undertaken as part of the land sale agreement. The 
cost of assessment was often greater than the property purchase price, and in such 
cases guidance on the need of contamination testing for purchases was required. 
The authors set out a decision tree model for deciding which level of site 
assessments should be used, based on original land use. This is an example of site-
level decision analysis with a useful decision-making matrix. 
Pollard et al. (2004) critically reviewed the evolution of decision making for 
contaminated land, from cost-focus in the 1970s to technology-centeredness in the 
1980s, risk-based decisions of the 1990s and sustainability drivers of post-2000.  
Decision-making in the new millennium was described as increasingly complex. 
Aspects such as liability, funding, community acceptance, expected success of 
various clean-ups and land use all have to be considered. The question was posed 
whether the various decision-making processes did in fact support integrated 
decision-making.   
The authors found that potential pitfalls come into play as decision tools are applied 
to brownfields. On the one hand, decision-makers can overestimate these methods’ 
ability to improve integration. On the other hand, where some pragmatists believe 
they can conclude decisions without tools, the structured analysis that tools provide 
do increase consistency and provides transparency to stakeholders.   Pollard et al. 
(2004) further referred to quick screening techniques such as the rapid appraisal 
technique, often suitable for simpler projects, and technical appraisal being required 
for more complex projects with more parameters 
The study concludes that decision-analysis adds value by making the roadmap to 
decisions transparent. Further, decisions made on a purely technical basis without 
consideration of other aspects, is unacceptable to stakeholders. A broader suite of 
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decision tools is required when moving from contaminated land into brownfields 
redevelopment, as additional parameters come into play. Pollard’s study provided a 
framework for decision-making for the redevelopment of brownfield sites (Pollard et 
al. 2004). 
A study by Bello-Dambatta et al. (2009) reviewed various decision analysis methods 
for contaminated land. The Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) was accepted as 
the overarching method that assists with complex decisions, uncertainty and many 
conflicting criteria that requires trade-offs and various alternatives. MCDA is then 
further divided into Multi-Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) and Multi-Objective 
Decision Analysis (MODA).   MADA is commonly used for problems with simple, well 
defined alternatives.  It is commonly used for contaminated land. More complex tools 
used include Multi-Attribute Value Theories (MAVT), outranking techniques and 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
The authors focused on the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) as widely used and 
growing methodology. AHP is a decision method that has been applied in thousands 
of projects for other fields, but not yet to brownfields. AHP is put forward as a 
decision making tool that is inclusive (understood by lay-people), rational, consistent 
and defensible, by simplifying complex problems and also measure inconsistency in 
decision making. More case studies are required in order to prove the statement that 
AHP is superior as decision analysis tool, but it has obvious advantages (Bello-
Dambatta et al. 2009). 
Schädler et al. (2012) wrote that the conflicting goals of maximising land value, 
minimising clean-up costs and adding to sustainable development were not easily 
brought together, and therefore large “mega” brownfields sites remain derelict. The 
paper described the compilation of an integrated assessment model that considers 
redevelopment alternatives of "mega" contaminated sites through a spatial decision 
support system (SDSS). 
This spatial decision support system is a form of MCDA. The paper evaluated all the 
required criteria to determine the best (land use, economical and sustainable) 
redevelopment options in a comprehensive decision model. The model does not 
require significant base data and statistical analysis.  It is a good example of a 
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complex modern MCDA exercise and address the aspects required as noted by 
Pollard et al. (2004). 
Decision support and analysis tools are important for brownfields regeneration 
because of the complex multi-faceted nature of these projects, in not only cost, 
method and feasibility but more recently the need to measure which options are 
more sustainable and acceptable to stakeholders. Many of these parameters are 
hard to measure and weight. Greater transparency is required to show due process 
to stakeholders and regulators alike. 
2.3. South African context and body of knowledge 
2.3.1. Relevant legislation 
The discussion below focuses on the legislation with regard to the most pertinent 
environmental media for contaminated land/brownfield sites.  These include soil, 
surface and groundwater. 
In the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, the right to a clean and 
protected environment is provided for in section 24. The prevention of pollution and 
ecological degradation through legislation and related measures are included 
(Republic of South Africa 1996). 
This principle was incorporated in Chapter 2 sustainability principles of the National 
Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act No. 107 of 1998) (NEMA) which 
indicates that pollution and environmental degradation should be avoided, and where 
this is not possible should be minimised and remedied. These sustainability 
principles address waste as well, including the avoidance, minimisation, re-use, 
recycling and disposal in a responsible manner (Republic of South Africa 1998a). 
The National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008 (Act No. 59 of 2008) was 
only promulgated in 2008. 
The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) published a framework document for 
the management of contaminated land in 2010 (DEA 2010).   This was followed by 
the publication of the “norms and standards” in 2014. 
Section 8 of NEMWA came into effect in May 2014, when Government Notice No. 
331, the National Norms and Standards for the Remediation of Contaminated Land 
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and Soil Quality was promulgated on 2 May 2014. It deals with identification and 
remediation of contaminated land. The norms and standards aimed to provide a 
uniform national approach to determining contamination status, provide clarity on the 
method and criteria for assessment, and the provision of minimum standards for 
assessment (DEA 2014). 
Soil screening values were also provided for specific land uses ranging from 
industrial to residential use. After the outcome of a site assessment report, a 
landowner may be ordered to remediate immediately, within a specific timeframe, or 
only monitor contamination, depending on the human health and environmental risk 
(Kvalsig 2014). 
Herselmann et al. (2013) conducted research to show that the methodology of using 
a single set of soil screening values for the entire South Africa was not correct. 
Different soils were shown to react differently to contaminants, and a host of other 
factors such as pH and temperature affect contamination of soils. The findings place 
a great responsibility on practitioners to conduct the correct method for soil, surface 
water and groundwater analysis, with due consideration for the local conditions of a 
site. 
Apart from the norms and standards for contaminated land, there are numerous 
other regulations in the waste management sector, including aspects such as the 
classification, disposal and design of containment barriers for waste. 
Section 21 of the National Water Act, 1998 (Act No. 36 of 1998) in South Africa 
identifies a number of water uses which need to be licensed by the Department of 
Water and Sanitation (DWS).  One of these are: 
  21 (g) disposing of waste in a manner which may detrimentally impact 
  on a water resource …” (Republic of South Africa 1998b) 
This places an onus on site owners to prevent pollution of water resources via 
leachate from waste and contaminated soil bodies, and monitoring of surface and 
groundwater resources to prove such prevention. 
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2.3.2. Urban planning policies 
In order to prevent urban sprawl, most of the metropolitan areas in South Africa’s 
planning policies promote the redevelopment of brownfield sites as part of infill 
development (Turok 2015). These policies do not address the aspect of 
contamination or pollution, as this falls within the ambit of the DEA, the provincial 
environmental authorities and the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS). 
2.3.3. Research output 
The knowledge and expertise from the mining sector is invaluable to brownfield sites 
in South Africa and may assist to provide remediation solutions for many 
contaminated properties. It is often focused on the issue of mine closure, such as the 
Rehabilitation Prioritisation Index (RPI) for asbestos mines in 2008 (Van Rensburg et 
al. 2009).   
Research output regarding brownfields regeneration is very limited in South Africa.  
Research is still exploratory (Potts & Cloete 2012) and the redevelopment of 
brownfields still a novelty (Theron 2010; Seeliger & Turok 2015). The questioning of 
the correctness of Soil Screening Values in the recently promulgated Norms and 
Standards for Contaminated Land by Herselmann et al. (2013) confirms the lack of 
knowledge and understanding. 
Theron (2010) provided an overview of the concepts of brownfields redevelopment 
from the writer's international experience. This was then used to critique the South 
African context, including two local case studies. The article indicated that South 
Africa was at the beginning of its brownfields redevelopment era, that innovation and 
experience from the private sector will be required for successful projects, that 
professional project teams must be diverse, well experienced and adaptable to 
improve chances of success. Lastly, uncertainty regarding liability from the private 
sector as well as a low interest of government to redevelop contaminated sites were 
noted as obstacles to success.   
Potts & Cloete (2012) sent questionnaires and held interviews with various 
stakeholder groups, towards developing brownfield guidelines for South Africa. 
Findings were that there was little understanding among stakeholders regarding 
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brownfields, but that private sector groups were interested in the redevelopment of 
brownfields. 
Seeliger & Turok (2015) conducted interviews with well-known developers in Cape 
Town, Johannesburg and Durban. Most developers active in these metropolitan 
areas were of the opinion that brownfields redevelopment projects are too risky, and 
preferred to work in greenfield environments, or take part in the selective green 
building movement (Seeliger & Turok 2015). Despite this, there was a niche of 
developers who have been successful.  The authors also noted that some banks 
were starting to provide loans for brownfield developments. 
2.3.4. Successful projects 
Despite the low maturity of the sector in South Africa, there have been some 
successful (privately driven) brownfield site redevelopments.    
Van Zyl (2005) provided a brief history and review of the success of the Victoria and 
Albert Waterfront in Cape Town, which was converted from a shipyard to a mixed-
use development. The area became isolated and derelict by the 1970s.  A steering 
committee was set up in 1984, and the South African Cabinet accepted the 
redevelopment proposal in 1988. Some harbour functions were retained, but 
entertainment, retail and residential uses added.  The development was found to be 
successful.  This view is re-iterated by other authors (Ferreira & Visser 2007).  Apart 
from the town planning approvals required, no environmental legislation was yet in 
place at the time, as the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regulations in 
terms of the Environment Conservation Act (1989) were only promulgated in April 
1998.  This may have simplified the approvals process. 
Theron (2010) describes the Thesen Island redevelopment in the Knysna River 
estuary. The island was originally used as a timber-processing plant. Barloworld 
purchased the island and its timber plant.  With growing community concern 
regarding contamination and pollution, and its location in an ecologically sensitive 
estuary, plans for redevelopment were the only feasible way forward.  Contaminated 
soil at the timber lay-down area and pressure tanks were excavated and removed to 
the Vissershok hazardous landfill site in Cape Town.  The redevelopment planning 
process was initiated in 1991 by Dr. Chris Mulder.  A voluntary EIA process was 
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undertaken. Due to the sensitive lagoon system, extensive planning and regulatory 
approvals were only approved in 1998. 
The Ebotse Golf Estate development on an old sand quarry in Benoni in 2007 was 
documented by Le Roux (2007).  The site included a large excavated area and a 
slimes dam with 975 000 m3 of clayey material. Town planning and EIA processes 
had to be undertaken and were both approved. Clay quarries have successfully been 
redeveloped in many cases, due to their non-polluting nature (Pearman 2009). 
 
2.4. Redevelopment of brownfields 
2.4.1. Barriers to redevelopment 
De Souza (2001) considered the obstacles faced by private developers in Canada, 
Europe and the US when engaging in brownfields.  These barriers identified include 
legal inconsistency, poor inventories of location and condition of these sites, the 
absence of standard implementable clean-up guidelines, remediation liability 
uncertainty, and poor funding options. 
De Souza’s paper (2001) found that variability in particularly the US and Europe 
were decreasing.  Governments were further setting up brownfields databases more 
often, assisting with funding for remediation and simplifying liabilities and regulations.  
This stemmed from a realisation in governments that it is impossible for them alone 
to remediate and redevelop the many sites. Authorities in all three contexts were 
thus seeking policies that reduced cost and risk for the private sector to attract its 
investment.  Instead of requiring clean-up outcomes to achieve pre-development 
conditions, the US, European and Canadian governments were moving towards less 
stringent, flexible, site-specific risk assessments. These risk assessments should be 
linked to future land use, to lower costs. 
Nijkamp et al. (2002) used a systemic approach to analyse soil remediation policy in 
the Dutch context based on 18 case studies.   Legal regulations, balanced financing 
and accountability of the current owner were found to be causes of stagnation in 
brownfields redevelopment. 
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The De Souza (2001) and Nijkamp et al. (2002) papers both highlight various 
stagnation factors to the successful redevelopment of brownfields sites; namely 
cumbersome legal requirements, lack of funding options, and remediation liability. 
McQueen (2011) analysed some of the key variables in the brownfields development 
process in a Canadian context. With regard to redevelopment barriers, it was found 
that tax incentives are often too late in the redevelopment process, and that private 
developers need grant and funding options at the onset of a redevelopment project.   
The Urban Development Zone (UDZ) scheme in South Africa was initiated in 2004, 
and offers tax-deduction incentives for development in the urban core of cities.  It is 
described in greater detail in section 2.5 below. 
Other barriers identified in South Africa were inflexibility of zoning and development 
options by local government regarding, for example, interim use or industrial-
residential combination (Potts & Cloete 2012). 
Dixon et al. (2011) found that urban regeneration policies based on the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites came under threat due to economic recession.  
More marginal sites, often smaller, longer in disuse, and often with known 
contamination, were often left unused.  This was due to their high remediation cost, 
and lowering property values (Dixon et al. 2011a, p.96).  Marginal brownfield sites 
therefore appear to be more vulnerable to poor market conditions than larger, better-
located and low-contamination brownfield sites. 
Frantal et al. (2013) investigated brownfield redevelopment projects in the Czech 
Republic. The greatest proportion of redeveloped sites had simple ownership 
structures. These findings reconfirmed those of Adams et al. (2001) where complex, 
multiple ownership of brownfield sites was found to be a barrier to redevelopment. 
2.4.2. Analysis of redevelopment outcomes 
Concerning the outcomes of brownfield redevelopment, aspects such as 
sustainability, environmental justice, and determining success or failure factors have 
been studied intensively. This contributes to understanding for future projects and the 
needs of each stakeholder involved.  Section 2.5 below focuses on the identification 
of factors that contribute to redevelopment success. 
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2.5. Key contributing factors influencing brownfields redevelopment success 
Factors influencing the outcome of brownfield redevelopment initiatives have been 
studied widely (Noonan & Vidich 1992; De Sousa 2001; Nijkamp et al. 2002; Lange 
& McNeil 2004; Amekudzi & Fomunung 2004; Bacot & O’Dell 2006; McQueen 2011; 
Dixon et al. 2011b; Osman et al. 2015). Some key factors emerge which influence 
the success of brownfields redevelopment from a range of studies undertaken.  
These factors are each discussed and analysed below. 
2.5.1. Factor one: Sites with little or no contamination are more readily redevel-
oped 
Howland (2003) investigated three case studies in Baltimore, all originally industrial 
sites, to investigate the boundary between government and privately funded 
brownfields redevelopments. 
Camden Crossing was a government-funded site with a complex clean-up plan, and 
earmarked for residential development. This redevelopment failed due to poor 
market demand, a heavily contaminated site, proposals for residential use, which 
required more intensive remediation, and the inexperience of the developers. The 
project was also delayed, resulting in local and state government administrative 
changes, and changes to remediation standards. The residential end use was 
because of lobbying by adjacent community groups with the city, instead of pure 
market analysis, which might have suggested other uses also. 
Two other sites, with low levels of contamination, were successfully redeveloped for 
industrial use by the private sector. The end-user market for these sites, namely port-
related warehousing, was consistent at the time, when compared to the fragile 
residential market of Camden Crossing. Redevelopment to the same industrial land 
use meant much cheaper remediation, and quicker acceptance and approvals from 
city officials. The developers also had strong experience in the industrial market. 
Howland (2003) concluded that sites with strong market demand and low levels of 
contamination would more likely be initiated and funded solely by the private sector 
alone. More complex clean-ups were found to require more government funding. 
Bacot & O’Dell (2006) determined useful economic and environmental criteria for 
measuring local government brownfields programs. Where increases in property 
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values, levels of private sector investment, interest in grant funding and effective 
remediation of hazardous contamination took place, the brownfields programme was 
deemed to be working. 
The authors found a positive correlation between hazardous contamination scores 
and private investment, in that the remediation of highly polluted sites was not 
possible without dedicated private sector participation.   
An inverse relationship was shown between the level of groundwater and soil 
contamination and property valuation. Sites with less contamination had a higher 
commercial value than sites with a high degree of contamination. 
Osman et al. 2015 used two national datasets (in the Czech Republic) to determine 
factors that have a significant influence on successful brownfields regeneration. 
These were the CzechInvest listing existing brownfields, and the authors’ own 
database of successfully regenerated sites (including both contaminated and 
uncontaminated brownfields. The authors found that factors such as human and 
environmental health were drivers towards the public pressure placed on landowners 
to remediate especially contaminated brownfields for redevelopment. In the study, 
the redevelopment (linked with remediation) rate of contaminated sites was more 
than 50 %, as opposed to one-third for uncontaminated sites (Osman et al. 2015, 
p.314).  Therefore, public pressure was found to be less for uncontaminated 
brownfields. 
Lange & McNeil (2004) statistically analysed data collected from two national 
surveys in the US. They concluded that factors other than environmental aspects like 
contamination and remediation have an impact on the success rates of brownfield 
redevelopment. The more successful sites appear to have adopted a risk-based 
clean-up approach (by determining clean-up criteria on the second use).   
Another example of the risk-based approach is documented by Winson-Geideman et 
al. (2004). In this study of 169 sites, about one-third of redevelopments made use of 
encapsulation (an engineered barrier between the contamination source and 
receptors), thus following the risk-based approach.  In both these cases, this 
reduced the impact of contamination level as a success factor.    
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Critique 
Howland (2003) and Bacot & O’Dell (2006) appear to have opposing findings with 
regard to private sector investment in highly contaminated sites. However, this 
contradiction merely emphasises that sites earmarked for redevelopment with high 
complexity regarding clean-up are best served by a wide range of stakeholders 
(private, state and communities). This varied input reduces risk, improves decision-
making, and gains buy-in from all stakeholders. 
Howland (2003) further proves that local government does not necessarily possess 
the technical, business knowledge or mobility of the private sector.  The strong local 
market knowledge and experience of private developers are required for 
redevelopment project. 
Although the study does not address the level of contamination, Osman (2015) 
proved that public pressure due to environmental health is a driver for brownfields 
with known contamination to be redeveloped. 
Findings of Lange & McNeil (2004) and (Winson-Geideman et al. 2004) namely that 
a risk-based approach, including encapsulation can reduce the impact of 
contamination level as a deciding factor, has long term implications. Although this 
appears to be a logical option to save cost, it would in a South African context 
require regular monitoring. Surface and groundwater up- and downstream of such an 
area would have to be monitored to ensure the pollution plume remains stable.  
These monitoring costs should be considered as long-term operational costs to 
redevelopment.   
2.5.2. Factor two: Mature brownfields management policies facilitate develop-
ment 
As nations become aware of the impact of pollution, contaminated land and the need 
for remediation/redevelopment, the need arises to devise strategies and regulate 
associated activities in the brownfields redevelopment sector (Adams et al. 2010).  In 
both developed and developing nations, the contaminated land and subsequent 
brownfields policy and clean-up requirements are a widely studied topic. Authors 
have investigated which policies work best, and compare different states or country 
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models to one another (De Sousa 2001; Kadas et al. 2008; Spínola & Philippi 2011; 
Vanheusden 2007; Luo et al. 2009).   
The three-stage policy maturity model (Adams et al. 2010) as described in section 
one above provides a framework within which most policy development and related 
research can be grouped.   
These are as follows: 
 Stage 1 - understanding brownfields 
o (1a) definition, and 
o (1b) mapping; 
 Stage 2 - recognising potential and securing commitment; and 
 Stage 3 - generating engagement with the private sector. 
Policy development in developed nations 
For developed nations, the brownfields regime is more than 25 years old (Hollander 
et al. 2010) and first used in the US in the early 1990s. These countries have 
grappled with compliance, standards and evaluation of sites and matured in thinking 
to where brownfields redevelopment is encouraged through many incentives, funding 
options and knowledge in its applications. The US, UK and Europe are the most 
prominent among these. The USEPA clean-up guidelines remain the standard to 
which all states must comply as a minimum (De Souza 2001).   
De Souza (2001) studied the Canadian context of contaminated land policy and 
compared it to US and European policy at the time. De Souza found that, contrary to 
the US, Canada has a lack of standardised and practical clean-up criteria, due to 
each state approaching brownfields in a different manner. This created complexity, 
uncertainty and variability among the different states in the character and application 
of regulations. This is so because these states have the right to adopt and amend 
the national clean-up values and guidelines generated by the Canadian Council of 
Ministers of the Environment. 
Nijkamp (2002) investigated the Dutch brownfields regime, and conducted 18 case 
studies to determine success factors for sustainable urban brownfield development.  
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It was found that onerous, impractical legal procedures may cause stagnation in the 
planning process.   
Vanheusden (2007) considered the brownfields legal regimes of the European Union 
and member country situation and compares it to that of the US. Belgium was used 
as a case study, and it was found that the US was ahead of the EU in progressive 
policy development and consistency in many aspects.   
In the European Union, each country has its own standards and laws, creating 
similar confusion to the Canadian case (De Souza, 2001). Each member state of the 
EU still has its own laws, regulations and policies, often at different stages of 
maturity based on its political history and context. As definitions and application 
regarding contaminated sites and brownfields differ among member states, a unified 
policy and approach is unlikely (Erdem & Nassauer 2013).    
Lange & McNeill (2004) analysed data from a nationwide US survey and found that 
the minimisation of risk approach, as described above reduced the time to 
occupancy when compared to the elimination of risk approach.   
McQueen (2011) analysed key variables in the development process of brownfields 
in Canada and found that stringent clean-up regulations can slow the progression of 
projects.  Whereas developers preferred risk-based clean-ups (instead of complete 
clean-ups), monitoring periods still take time.  McQueen proposed that policies 
regarding development approvals should be shortened to offset time lost for 
remediation. 
A risk-based approach, similar to the US approach, has been adopted in the UK 
(Ren et al. 2015).  Risk management, as opposed to risk elimination, was considered 
to be the more mature approach. 
Brownfields policy in the UK was found to be closely linked to sustainable 
development for the prevention of urban sprawl (Adams et al. 2010; Dixon et al. 
2011b).  Government has contributed significantly to brownfields housing projects, 
thus making it more attractive for the private sector to invest in these 
redevelopments. These initiatives were strongly linked to the unwillingness of the 
public to simply allow urban sprawl and concern for the little space left for 
development in the UK as a whole.  De Souza (2001) found that the authorities in 
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Canada were slower to change policy than comparable countries such as the UK, 
due in part to a lack of the threat of urban sprawl. 
Policy development in developing nations 
The contaminated land regime of developing nations such as Brazil and South Africa 
are still new (Kadas et al. 2008; Kvalsig 2014). Brownfields redevelopment is a 
novelty, as noted by Seeliger & Turok (2015). Research and issues relevant to the 
developed nations in the early 2000s are relevant for these developing countries 
now, and may provide applicable “lessons learnt” as they follow a similar trend of 
thinking, policy development and practice (Spínola & Philippi 2011; Kadas et al. 
2008; Mabahwi et al. 2012; Potts & Cloete 2012). 
Potts & Cloete (2012) investigated brownfields policy development in South Africa.  
On the question to respondents of what aspects should be included in a brownfields 
policy, it was indicated that tax incentives were considered an important aspect. In 
the conclusion, the writers indicated that private sector respondents interviewed did 
not prefer tax breaks as funding method.   
When considering the large amount of investment in the Johannesburg Urban 
Development Zone (UDZ), namely R9 billion (City of Johannesburg 2012), the 
provision of a tax incentive is an obvious aspect to include in brownfields policy.  
Public-private partnerships are also proposed, but this is a highly regulated and 
cumbersome method, and known to slow down progression. 
Potts & Cloete (2012) found no evidence of a brownfields inventory or policy for 
South Africa. These authors suggest potential aspects to be included in such an 
inventory. These include community profiling, public participation and special 
brownfields units. It considers brownfields in a holistic manner, not only looking at 
contaminated land. 
Kadas et al. (2008) provided an overview of legislative regimes for contaminated 
land in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru. The authors 
established that the levels of policy development and the regulation of contaminated 
land vary greatly in these countries. The region was improving with regard to 
regulation of contaminated land management and liability. As a first step, the 
“polluter pays” principle was already broadly implemented. 
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Spínola & Philippi (2011) discuss contaminated land and related policies in the state 
of São Paulo, Brazil in recent years. The Environmental Company of the State of 
São Paulo started managing contaminated sites in the 1990s, and published a yearly 
inventory of these sites for the state in 2002. 
The authors indicated that Brazil did not yet have an approved national policy 
regarding contaminated sites management or brownfields in 2011. Site closure 
requirements were captured in “deactivation plans”, and the creation of a “fund” for 
orphaned sites was also allowed for.  The “fitness for use” approach as described by 
Ferguson (1999) was adopted in related legislation of 2009. 
It further requires involvement in contaminated sites management by municipalities 
through master plans and land use plans – thereby acknowledging the need and 
participation of municipalities in the matter. Although it appears that only the city of 
São Paulo was actively involved in planning for such sites, it highlights the 
importance of urban planning involvement of local government in brownfields 
redevelopment. This is one of the necessary principles put forward by Hollander et 
al. (2010). The concept of brownfields redevelopment is not mentioned by Spinola & 
Phillipi (2011), indicating a similar maturity level to that of South Africa, where 
contamination is still the focus. 
Luo et al. (2009) described the Chinese contaminated land regime and sought to find 
solutions from the risk-based approach used in the UK. The Chinese government 
first recognised contaminated land as a problem in 2006. Issues with policy 
mentioned were a lack of a clear policy framework; limited supply of administrators 
and organisations dealing with the matter, little technical expertise, and no financial 
incentives for clean-up processes.   
Teng et al. (2014) documented the history of soil quality monitoring in China, and 
confirmed that the Chinese Environmental Protection Administration was in process 
of setting up a comprehensive soil monitoring network. Contaminated land 
management has thus became a priority for China, and appeared to be driven by 
environmental health concerns, due to the country’s extensive pollution problems of 
the last few decades.   
28 
Ren et al. (2015) investigated a residential brownfields redevelopment in China’s 
Tiexi industrial zone in Shenyang. The study found that despite the remediation and 
clean-up undertaken, some contaminants (including lead and arsenic) still remain in 
the soil as a human health and environmental risk. It was further confirmed that the 
Chinese government has not yet promulgated a regulation on brownfields 
management. 
Critique 
The literature considered from both developing and developed nations is in line with 
the model of Adams (2010) for policy maturity, and further with the concept of the 
risk-based clean-up approach.   The inclusion of known or potential contamination in 
brownfield definitions is not universal, with the US and Canada pertinently including, 
and the UK and Scotland excluding contamination (Adams et al. 2010, p.99). The 
definition of brownfields therefore determines the contents of brownfields policy. 
Vanheusden (2007) seems to be missing the key difference between the EU and the 
US, namely that the latter is one country, and policy-making on a national scale is a 
much simpler affair than in the case of the EU with its many layers of bureaucracy. 
This is perhaps the reason the US is more advanced than the EU in terms of policy 
and implementation thereof.  Bureaucracy is thus a detractor to brownfields policy 
development due to slow decision-making. 
Legal regimes seem to follow a trend of first implementing the Polluter Pays 
Principle, requiring remediation as contaminated land management laws are 
introduced (Kadas et al. 2008; Department of Environmental Affairs 2014).  As time 
progresses and regulators realise the key role of private developers, the concept of 
brownfields redevelopment is then embraced (Seeliger & Turok 2015). When 
considering South Africa, and other Latin American case studies (Spínola & Philippi 
2011), where contaminated land/brownfield redevelopment is in its infancy, it will 
likely take at least a decade for “developer friendly” brownfields policies to be 
developed. 
Progressive policy must therefore be simple, practical, and consistent over various 
states of a country. It must also be easy to apply, and support rapid decision-making 
for a shorter planning approvals process. Strong policy to prevent urban sprawl, 
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coupled with willingness of government to invest in brownfields, creates a conducive 
environment for private sector investment. 
South Africa has the advantage that law and policy-making is centralised on a 
national level, as opposed to Europe (Erdem & Nassauer 2013) or Canada (De 
Sousa 2001). South Africa has only defined “contaminated land”, and has not started 
the mapping of these sites. The country is therefore at Stage (1a) of policy 
development in terms of the Adams (2010) model. This is similar to other developing 
countries, with the exception of China, which is more organised and targeted in their 
approach to deal with contaminated land and brownfields development (Teng et al. 
2014). 
The research of Potts & Cloete (2012) is a useful starting point for South Africa and 
provides relevant guidance on first steps to be taken, including definitions, dedicated 
policy and guidelines. 
Developed vs. developing country brownfields policy maturity 
Some of the differences between developing and developed nation context regarding 
contaminated sites redevelopment are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Expected differences between South Africa / developing countries and developed countries 
regarding contaminated land / brownfields redevelopment 
South Africa / developing nations UK, US and Europe 
Industrialisation is still in progress Industrialisation is largely achieved 
New to the problem of contaminated sites 
(although mining sector in South Africa is 
well studied) and related human health 
and environmental (HHE) impacts. 
Governments are familiar with the 
problem of contaminated sites and its 
impacts. 
Cheap land and resulting wastage of 
urban space – low emphasis on urban 
regeneration. 
Expensive land and high focus on 
urban regeneration. 
Vast open space – receptors can often 
move away from perceived pollution 
sources. 
Limited open space (UK / Europe) 
with receptors in close contact to 
polluted sites, and resulting public 
pressure for remediation. 
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South Africa / developing nations UK, US and Europe 
High rate of poverty and related exposure 
to pollution – low levels of community 
empowerment to lobby against pollution. 
Lower rates of poverty – higher levels 
of community empowerment to lobby 
against pollution. 
Lacking guidelines regarding contaminated 
sites remediation, and no policy for 
brownfields redevelopment. 
Well-developed guidelines regarding 
contaminated sites and brownfield 
redevelopment. 
Weak understanding / low capacity in 
regulatory / approval authorities regarding 
brownfields. 
Strong knowledge / high capacity in 
regulatory / approval authorities 
regarding brownfields. 
Sources: (Potts & Cloete 2012; Blacksmith Institute n.d.; Chatham-Stephens et al. 2013; Kadas et al. 
2008; De Sousa 2006; Ren et al. 2015). 
2.5.3. Factor three: Sites with certainty regarding apportionment of liability for 
clean-up and perception of few latent risks are more likely to be redeveloped 
“Polluter Pays” Principle and related liability 
The “Polluter Pays” Principle is a well-established concept; however there are 
opposing views on its effectiveness and best application (Ambec & Ehlers 2014; 
Luppi et al., 2012). Environmental liabilities can be transferred with property 
ownership, depending on the country of jurisdiction (Latawiec et al. 2010; Practical 
Law Company 2012).   
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that private land owners fear liability and 
further regulation, which in turn prevents them from participating in redevelopment 
projects (Hollander 2010).  Liability is perceived to increase with residential end use, 
as there are more users and potentially more claimants (Adams et al. 2010).   
Liability issues may therefore cause stagnation in the redevelopment planning 
process (Nijkamp et al., 2002).   
Conservative assumptions regarding human health and environmental risk of 
contamination and permanent remediation for elimination of risk related to Superfund 
sites was effected at great cost. It was estimated that between 30-70% of the cost of 
clean-up programmes up until 1996 in the US was spent on litigation (De Souza 
2001). 
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Avenues other than the “polluter pays” principle must considered under certain 
circumstances.  Legal costs can exceed actual remediation costs causing the 
polluter to become insolvent (De Souza 2001). Historic contamination could have 
been considered within legal limits at the time (McGuigan 2000). Lastly, properties 
may have been abandoned (Accordino & Johnson 2002).  These other avenues 
include tax incentives, voluntary clean-up programmes, and redevelopment. 
Uncertainty regarding liability has therefore been established as one of the important 
barriers to brownfields redevelopment (Sigman 2010; McGuigan 2000; Alberini et al. 
2005; De Sousa, 2001; Nijkamp et al. 2002). 
The European Parliament promulgated the Environmental Liability Directive (35 of 
2004), which has since then been amended three times (European Commission 
2016). This directive provides the framework for preventing and remedying 
environmental damage through the Polluter Pays Principle (European Commission 
2016). Member states still have the discretion to apply negligence as a softening tool 
to strict compliance (Van ’t Veld & Shogren 2012). The directive is equivalent to the 
Superfund in compliance, but does not make provision for central funding. 
Relief from liability in the US 
Only in the mid-1990s, about 15 years after the promulgation of the Superfund, did 
governments start experimenting with policies to stimulate both clean-up and 
redevelopment (Bacot & O’Dell 2006).  The USEPA subsequently implemented the 
Brownfields Initiative in 1995 (De Sousa 2001).  State governments started 
implementing voluntary clean-up, which provided any party willing to clean up a site 
with protection from further legal action once a voluntary clean-up agreement was 
signed. This protected redevelopers from liability (De Sousa 2001). 
These more investor friendly options culminated in the Small Business Liability Relief 
and Brownfields Redevelopment Act (Public Law 107-118, H.R. 2869 – the 
“Brownfields Law”) in 2002, more than 20 years after the original CERCLA was 
promulgated (De Sousa 2006).  As discussed above, both the Noonan and Vidich 
(1992) and De Souza (2001) studies referred to the aversion of private sector 
investment in brownfields redevelopment until the passing of the Brownfields Law.   
32 
Most importantly, the Brownfields Law provides protection from Superfund liability 
(which was based only on ownership of property) for prospective buyers, contiguous 
property owners or innocent landowners (Bacot & O’Dell 2006).   
It is possible in the US to take insurance against long-term costs related to unknown 
issues, by any of the various parties involved in brownfields redevelopment. Such 
insurance provides some assurance to regulators and protection for developers 
(Hollander 2010). 
Today many states and organisations in the US have Brownfields redevelopment 
toolkits and guidelines for communities to use (Council for Development Finance 
Agencies, 2015; British Columbia Ministry of Environment, n.d.; Massachusetts State 
Energy and Environmental Affairs, n.d.). 
Relief from liability in Europe 
De Souza (2001) recorded the generalisation of incentives across European Union 
(EU) member states in order to incentivise redevelopment.  Some states have 
exempted polluters from actions considered legal at the time, or place time or value 
limits on retrospective liabilities (De Souza 2001).  Once clean-up was approved, 
future liability was transferred to governmental agencies. A “fault-based allocation” 
system was being used as opposed to the joint and several system in the US. 
Europe therefore had a system of shared responsibility that reduced the uncertainty 
for developers (De Souza 2001). 
Only France and Spain managed to successfully transfer liability to government 
agencies routinely, with most other countries partially or rarely achieving such 
transfers (NICOLE Working Group 2011). 
Options for reducing liability uncertainty 
When considering brownfields policy maturity, the model proposed by Adams (2010) 
shows that beginners in policy development tend to require elimination of risk, or 
compliance at all costs.  The more realistic approach seeks to manage such risk, 
referred to as the risk-based approach (Ferguson 1999).   
McQueen (2011) found that at the onset of a project, all stakeholders, namely first 
and second owner, and the regulator, should map out and address all liability and 
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risk issues, to prevent projects from suffering. Dedicating a city employee 
specialising in brownfields projects assisted greatly in reducing uncertainty among 
developers, and ensured stable process for all involved, and self-inflicted faults were 
also avoided in many cases (Bacot & O’ Dell 2006). 
Critique 
Through the key change via the Brownfields Law, the US has addressed the liability 
issues from CERCLA satisfactorily enough that private developers have become 
willing players in the redevelopment process without undue fear of attracting liability 
(De Sousa 2001).   The reduction in liability, as well as various voluntary clean-up 
programmes, has produced positive outcomes. Of the 46 states with such programs, 
less than 1% of environmental cases have been re-opened, and two thirds of these 
states have programs providing assistance in the form of tax incentives, direct 
funding, technical assistance or program support (Adams et al. 2010). 
It appears that the European attempts have been less clear, due to individual 
member states each retaining their own legislative framework, with only France and 
Spain successful at transferring liability to the state once remediation was completed 
(NICOLE Brownfield Working Group 2011; Vanheusden 2007). 
Dedicated legislation such as the Brownfields Law in the US, implemented 
countrywide as a minimum standard, has shown success in providing legal certainty 
for the many potential actors in brownfields redevelopment.  Similar to the US, it is 
possible that RSA’s brownfields redevelopment regime will benefit from dedicated 
policy and legislation addressing liability (Potts & Cloete 2012). 
2.5.4. Factor four: Redevelopment land use options based on a risk minimisa-
tion approach improve the feasibility of brownfields projects 
Due to the difficulty of determining exact human health and environmental risk, there 
is an ongoing debate regarding what activities/land uses should be permitted after 
the clean-up of a brownfields site.  Whereas industrial land use has low sensitivity to 
risk, land use such as residential and schools are examples of land uses with high 
sensitivity to risk. 
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Activity Use Limitation, as described by Hollander et al (2010), limits risk to the new 
owner by the zoning of the new land uses, according to the risk assessment 
undertaken at the time of clean-up. It should be written into the title deed of the 
relevant property. It follows the minimisation of risk approach as documented by 
Ferguson (1999).  McQueen (2011) reiterates the view that second land use should 
be determined by a risk-based approach.   
Where end land use remains the same, e.g. industrial to industrial, it is more likely 
that the private sector will fund redevelopment themselves (Howland 2003a). 
However, industrial land use yields low returns (Winson-Geideman et al. 2004). 
For residential land use, the remediation standards and human health risk is high 
(with unrestricted future use). Winson-Geideman et al. (2004) found that in Illinois, 
Cook County, properties cleaned for re-use to residential standard were half the 
number of those cleaned to commercial standard. 
In the Czech Republic, commercial land use was a common second use choice 
(Frantal et al. 2013). This was reiterated by Osman et al. (2015), where it was found 
that second uses were mostly public facilities (service and retail), with a typical 
change from production to consumer activities. Given the good returns and moderate 
clean-up costs of commercial and retail redevelopment, investors favoured these 
land uses.   
Inflexibility of zoning and development options by local government, such as interim 
use and industrial/residential combination options can be a detractor for brownfields 
redevelopment (McQueen 2011). Rall and Haase (2011) describe the interim use 
strategy adopted by Leipzig city, in which property owners in low growth and derelict 
areas, which showed positive results, waive rates on vacant plots in return for 
regular maintenance. 
Lange & McNeil (2004) found that the proposed land use of more successful 
brownfields projects is normally consistent with the master plan for the community. 
Dixon et al. (2011) indicate that the “end-product” of a redevelopment should have a 
sustainable long-term market demand to transcend property/economic “booms” and 
slumps. 
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Brownfields to green space 
It is a well-known practice in the US and Germany to redevelop domestic landfill 
sites into park landscapes; and there is extensive knowledge regarding the practice 
and monitoring over time (Misgav et al. 2001; Laner et al. 2012).   
Many examples exist of clay or stone/clay quarries that are redeveloped for open 
space or residential purposes due to their low pollution potential and health risk, 
such as the Eden Project in the UK (Whitbread-Abrutat 2003). 
Whereas these brownfields to public open space redevelopment projects have many 
benefits in terms of quality of life (De Sousa 2006), their continual long term funding 
requirements have to be borne by local government.   
Through the drive towards sustainable remediation, the EU (and the associated 
national policies) put green space creation from brownfield sites forward as incentive 
towards sustainability principles (Hou & Al-Tabbaa 2014). Brownfield site greening is 
generally regarded to be in line with sustainable development, but evidence 
suggests there are many flaws (Doick et al. 2009).   
Pediaditi et al. (2010) investigated green spaces now being reconsidered due to their 
funding requirements and proven un-sustainability in the UK context. The authors 
find a lack of mandatory institutional procedures to monitor and evaluate the 
sustainability of these brownfield site greening projects. 
Research by Doick et al. (2009) find similar results to Pediaditi et al. (2010).  
Brownfield site greening success factors were investigated on six UK projects. This 
research supports the notion that capital funding programmes for land regeneration 
should include management, monitoring and maintenance budgets. 
Critique 
There is good consensus in literature that land use options for redevelopment should 
be based on the risk as determined in the clean-up phase of the project (i.e. the land 
use of the development as a whole) (Ferguson et al. 1999; Hollander et al. 2010; Luo 
et al. 2009) . Furthermore the placement of activities within a site should follow the 
same pattern, with industrial use being the least sensitive, commercial and retail at 
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moderate risk and residential use as the most sensitive land use (Hollander et al. 
2010; Winson-Geideman et al. 2004). 
Commercial or retail land use seems to be a reasonable hybrid of limiting risk and 
generating income from a redevelopment project (Frantal et al. 2013; Bacot & O’Dell 
2006). Knowledge and flexibility of the local government is also an important aspect, 
as brownfield site redevelopment projects often have unique circumstances 
(McQueen 2011; Rall & Haase 2011). 
Public open space as end land use, or brownfield site greening, has recently become 
popular as part of the sustainable remediation movement due to the enhancement of 
the quality of life of surrounding communities (De Souza 2006). However, the long-
term financial feasibility is poor (Doick et al. 2009). 
2.5.5. Factor five: Favourable market conditions attract private sector invest-
ment 
National and local property market conditions will both influence brownfields 
redevelopment projects.  This may be in the form of the recession conditions of 
2009, which were regarded by some developers as an opportunity (Dixon 2011), or 
local market conditions as a key determinant for brownfield redevelopment project 
success (Bacot & O’Dell 2006). Through incentive schemes (either national, such as 
the USEPA Brownfields Programme, or local, such as urban development zones with 
tax breaks), government can improve the business case for investors when 
compared to other areas (Bacot & O’Dell 2006). 
From around 2001, the US and European Governments no longer make the clean-
up of low risk sites mandatory, until redevelopment is complete, or when the property 
is sold (De Souza 2001).   
Competitiveness vs. population density 
Oliver et al. (2005), in association with the CABERNET working group (2006), 
provide a useful analysis of competitiveness and population density in 15 European 
countries (including the UK and Ireland) (see Figure 1). This analysis placed the 
countries in three distinct groups as indicated below. Denmark, Austria, France and 
Spain could not be placed. 
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The analysis does acknowledge that issues such as industrial history, politics and 
various aspects of the property market are excluded. Furthermore, redevelopment 
demand and population demand can vary significantly within each country, as well as 
in various stages of economic cycle. 
The analysis makes three conclusions. Firstly, in countries where competitiveness is 
high and population density low, abatement of contamination is the focus. Secondly, 
where population density is high and availability of greenfields for development is 
scarce, regeneration projects are a priority. 
 
 
Figure 1: “Population density and competiveness of selected European nations” (NICOLE Brownfield 
Working Group 2011, p.16) 
Thirdly, countries with medium population density and lower competitiveness were 
earmarked as having to benefit from redevelopment of brownfields/previously 
developed land.  No reasons are provided for the last-mentioned statement 
regarding medium-density countries. 
Market conditions in high-income areas 
According to Adams et al (2010), market conditions tend to be stronger in higher 
income areas. In the UK, the more prosperous south-east areas are considered 
better potential redevelopment areas when compared to the north west, where de-
industrialisation has had significant impacts since the 1970s (Adams et al. 2010). 
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Frantal et al. (2013) found that prosperous areas are more likely to be redeveloped; 
and municipalities with higher development potential will contain more redeveloped 
sites. This study concluded that development potential can be measured by certain 
indicators, most importantly local business activity, proximity to urban centres and 
transport infrastructure, and quality of local infrastructure. 
The stronger these local market conditions, the more likely private sector will fund 
redevelopment themselves, making a return on investment in a shorter timeframe 
(Howland 2003). 
Incentivised areas and public investment 
It has been proven that property values of an incentivised area can outpace that of 
the city in a US context, proving the impact of schemes such as grant funding and 
public investment (Bacot & O’Dell 2006; Amirtahmasebi et al. 2016).  Private sector 
investment attracted by public investment can be significant (Shand 2010). 
Critique 
Brownfields redevelopment will probably follow the trend of conventional property 
development in cyclic boom and slump periods from a macro-economic perspective 
(Dixon et al. 2011a).  However, this will be influenced by sustainable development 
and urban regeneration policies incentivising brownfields redevelopment over 
greenfields development (Dorsey 2003). 
Local (micro) conditions can overcome the macro-conditions in unique 
circumstances only (Bacot & O’Dell 2006). This is proven in the case of the Ebotse 
Golf Estate in South Africa in 2007, where the remediation cost of an old sand quarry 
was well below the market value of the developed estate (Le Roux 2007). 
It appears that brownfields surrounded by urban decay will generally require more 
public funding as catalyst before private investment will follow (Howland 2004; 
Bethlehem 2013). Higher income areas tend to attract redevelopment projects more 
often, due to quicker and improved return on investment (Frantal et al. 2013; Osman 
et al. 2015). 
The brownfields policies of the US and European governments show cognisance of 
market conditions and a risk-based approach. This is proven in that sites with low 
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contamination levels are not required to undertake remediation until the 
redevelopment is complete or the sites are being sold (De Souza 2001). 
2.5.6. Factor six: Quick access to a variety of funding options, coupled with 
clear and rapid approvals process encourages redevelopment 
CABERNET’s A-B-C funding model 
In 2006, CABERNET developed the A-B-C model for redevelopment projects, which 
provides an understanding of clean-up vs. redevelopment potential, as well as 
private vs. public funding. Figure 2 shows the model as re-visited by the 2011 
NICOLE Working Group. The 2011 revision of the model adds the “who pays” 
dimension, which deals with the apportionment of risk (NICOLE Brownfield Working 
Group 2011, p.18). 
Sites with low levels of contamination and high land value after remediation were 
proposed to be suitable to be redeveloped by the private sector alone.  Heavily 
contaminated (often Superfund) sites, with a low land value after remediation were 
proposed to be suited the public sector and funded by the government only.  
Moderately complex sites were found to present an opportunity for public-private 
partnerships (NICOLE Brownfield Working Group 2011). 
  
Figure 2: Developed CABERNET A-B-C Model, as developed in 2006 by CABERNET and re-visited in 2011 
by the NICOLE working group (NICOLE Brownfield Working Group 2011, p.18) 
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Other authors support the findings of the NICOLE working group.  Howland (2003) 
found sites with low contamination suitable for private sector funding. Dixon et al. 
(2011) concluded that strong public-private partnerships allow the risk of more 
heavily contaminated sites to be shared, and improve the chances of success. 
Brownfield sites with significant contamination not being suitable for the private 
sector were also confirmed by other authors (De Sousa 2001; Lange & McNeil 2004; 
Adams et al. 2010). 
Access to funding 
Yount & Meyer (1999) found that smaller developers could not readily access 
funding, obtain grants, and lacked information regarding remediation. Larger 
development companies could more often gain the support of other stakeholders for 
developments, and were more commonly part of public funding schemes.  This 
finding was before the promulgation of the “Brownfields Law” in 2002. After its 
promulgation, small businesses could more readily access the brownfields 
redevelopment sector when the USEPA’s funding was expanded from Superfund 
sites only, to include brownfields (Adams et al. 2010). 
Limited funding resources were available for investigation, remediation and 
redevelopment in the late 1990s in Canada. US and European governments were 
found to offer more direct funding and incentives to “share” funding and risk with the 
private sector (De Souza 2001).  By 2005, the Canadian government committed 
funding for redevelopment for the first time, but 95% of this was focused on federal 
projects (Adams et al. 2010).    
By 2010, provincial and local government were mostly responsible for regulation of 
smaller brownfields in Canada, holding the private sector fully responsible for clean-
up and redevelopment funding. The country’s poor funding initiatives did not deter 
the private sector in strong markets such as Toronto, but weaker markets, such as 
Quebec, required more government assistance (Adams et al. 2010, p.92).  This is 
aligned with the findings of Dixon (2011) that marginal sites were likely to remain 
undeveloped in tough economic times. 
Adams et al. (2010) found that the UK saw an improvement in development on 
brownfield lands only when legal powers and funding resources for intervention were 
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added to brownfields policy.  These changes assisted to improve private sector 
interest. 
Funding incentives 
Funding incentives include tax incentives based on area (e.g. urban development 
zones) (Yount & Meyer 1999), lowering of liabilities for voluntary clean-up (De Sousa 
2001), and more flexible risk-management schemes (NICOLE Brownfield Working 
Group 2011; Chen & Ma 2013). 
McQueen (2011) found that the availability of tax incentives are often too late in the 
redevelopment process - with private developers requiring grant and funding options 
in the initial stages of the redevelopment process.  The author further found that 
upfront grants and reductions in development charges were more successful funding 
instruments (McQueen 2011, p.59). 
Urban Development Zone in South Africa 
The Urban Development Zone (UDZ) scheme in South Africa was initiated in 2004 
and offers tax-deduction incentives for development in the urban core of cities. It 
provides a 20% tax deduction of the investment value for improvements made, 
excluding purchase price of property, within the first year of investment. The same 
percentage is applicable for four years after that (City of Johannesburg 2006; South 
African Revenue Service 2004).   
The private sector in South Africa was found to be averse to the tax breaks as an 
incentive for brownfields redevelopment. It was however noted as a necessary part 
of a potential brownfields policy (Potts & Cloete 2012). 
R 9 billion of the investments made in the Johannesburg UDZ made use of the tax 
incentive since the inception between 2004 and up to 2012 (City of Johannesburg 
2012). The Cape Town UDZ has facilitated tax breaks for an amount of R 2,9 billion 
between 2005 and 2010 (City of Cape Town 2011). Despite its apparent aversion, 
the private sector did therefore make use of this tax-incentive. 
The UDZ tax incentive only assists to reduce taxable income and improve profits. In 
the first years when a redevelopment project is still making a loss, it does not assist. 
Developers cited this as a shortcoming of the UDZ incentive (Mwangala 2010). This 
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finding agrees with that of McQueen (2011).  Developers indicated that the UDZ was 
not a primary funding or investment attraction tool. Market demand and potential 
rental growth were indicated as primary attracting factors to the Inner City 
(Mwangala 2010; Rhizome Management Services 2009).   
Rapid approvals and knowledge of city employees 
The Italian government’s quicker approval of remediation times and voluntary 
agreement between government and stakeholders were identified as success factors 
by Tonin (2014).  This finding was corroborated by McQueen (2011), who found that 
the quicker processing of redevelopment applications by authorities assisted the 
redevelopment process. 
Tonin (2014) concluded that the capacity in government to assess remediation plans 
and projects was also important to success.  Bacot & O’Dell (2006) found that that 
flexibility and knowledge of city employees is crucial to make projects work and 
increase private sector trust. 
Critique 
It appears that, due to their maturity and good understanding of brownfields, the US 
and Europe have numerous public funding and support options available for 
brownfields redevelopment projects (Hollander 2010; Ferguson 1999). These 
mechanisms are available to private developers. 
South Africa does not have many direct funding options. The private sector bears 
most of the risk/cost. Theron (2010) indicates that financial institutions do not have 
the in-house expertise to evaluate brownfields proposals. Lenders often require 
extensive documentation before engaging brownfields projects, and remain 
conservative. Seeliger and Turok (2015) noted a greater willingness by the banks in 
recent times to fund brownfields projects. 
Developers need to shorten the timeframe of the development cycle due to the cost 
of lending (McQueen 2011; Tonin 2014). Some of the incentive schemes offered 
provide indirect assistance, but often too late in the process (McQueen 2011). The 
long-term commitment required making brownfield projects succeed, as noted by 
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Hollander (2010) and Dixon et al. (2011) appears to be in conflict with the need of 
developers to shorten the development timeframe. 
Brownfield funding assistance schemes limited to target areas in the urban core are 
effective in providing assistance for redevelopment.  These schemes allow for the 
strategic intervention of combatting urban decay (Bacot & O’ Dell 2006).  The UDZ 
initiative in South Africa is a successful secondary initiative to support redevelopment 
where market demand is already high (Mwangala 2010). 
2.5.7. Factor seven: Larger sites with economy of scale are more often redevel-
oped than small sites 
Yount & Meyer (1999) compared large and small-scale redevelopment projects to 
identity the key factors affecting investment decisions. Environmental risk 
assessments represented a larger portion of total costs on small sites, reducing the 
return on investment of these smaller sites. Investigation costs did rise somewhat 
with site size, but larger project sites could better dilute this cost due to their greater 
investment value and expected return (Yount & Meyer 1999). 
Dixon et al. (2011) found that combining a number of small sites appeared to 
improve chances of success of brownfields redevelopment. This was corroborated 
by Osman et al. (2015). These authors undertook an analysis of their database, and 
found that that larger brownfields sites (i.e. 30 hectares and larger) were more often 
redeveloped when compared to small sites (<15 hectares). Frantal et al. (2013) also 
conducted a database analysis, and found that the average size of redeveloped sites 
was approximately eight hectares, with the total range being between one and 
30 hectares. 
In the South End area of the Charlotte case study, average sizes of brownfield 
redevelopment sites were less than one hectare (Bacot & O’Dell 2006). It appears 
that this finding is thus not aligned with other literature (Dixon et al. 2011b; Osman et 
al. 2015).  However, many of the South End sites received grant assistance of up to 
50% of their contamination assessments (Bacot & O’ Dell 2006).  These sites were 
therefore assisted to overcome the challenge noted by Yount & Meyer (1999). 
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Critique 
There is sufficient literary evidence to suggest that small individual brownfields 
redevelopment sites, of a few hectares in size, are less often redeveloped. Larger 
sites of at least eight hectares, or combining smaller sites to approximately 15 
hectares, are more often redeveloped (Dixon et al. 2011b; Osman et al. 2015; 
Frantal et al. 2013).  This phenomenon is due in part the economy of scale diluting 
the fixed cost of site assessment and remediation (Yount & Meyer 1999; Bacot & 
O’Dell 2006). 
2.5.8. Factor eight: Readily available municipal services and close proximity to 
transport corridors are incentives to redevelopment 
Various authors has found that brownfield sites in close proximity to airports, rail 
infrastructure or city centres were redeveloped more frequently when compared with 
sites with poorer locations (Lange & McNeil, 2004; Hollander et al. 2010). 
Lange & McNeil (2004) collected data for 75 sites through the survey method, and 
compared successful redevelopments with less successful projects. More than 50% 
of successful sites benefited from infrastructure in close proximity as compared to 
less than 30% of less successful sites (Lange & McNeil 2004, p.105). 
These findings were corroborated by Osman et al. (2015), where close proximity to 
rail, city centres and motorways were found to be important regeneration factors for 
brownfields.  This analysis was done from a database of 101 successfully 
regenerated sites. 
Frantal et al. (2013) determined that close proximity to infrastructure could assist to 
overcome other detracting factors, such as previous industrial use and the presence 
of contamination.  Factors deemed part of infrastructure proximity were distance to 
regional centres, proximity to main road network, and quality of local infrastructure. 
Critique 
Redevelopment sites closer to regional centres and major transport infrastructure 
such as roads, rail and airports, are typically developed sooner than sites located 
further away (Lange & McNeil 2004; Osman et al. 2015; Frantal et al. 2013).  The 
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findings across the studies are aligned, and include various types of transport 
infrastructure and municipal centres. 
2.5.9. Factor nine: Strong political and community support encourage redevel-
opment 
Socio-political “approval” or “license to operate” is well documented in literature 
(Demuijnck & Fasterling 2016). The concept is relevant for brownfields 
redevelopments, due to the potential negative history of these sites (Dillon 2014; 
Hollander et al. 2010; Frantal et al. 2013).   
In the UK, brownfields redevelopment was found to be driven by a long-standing 
desire to protect greenfields sites (Dorsey 2003). Non-governmental organisations’ 
and general public opposition to the development of rural areas has led to more than 
50% of developments in the UK in recent years to include brownfield 
redevelopments (Adams et al. 2010). 
Hollander (2010) indicated that short term “quick wins” are not common in successful 
projects, but rather strong long-term vision of various stakeholders. This theory is 
corroborated by Dixon et al. (2011), who also found that successful projects have a 
strong “brand” i.e. creating “flagship” projects.  Long-term job creation will likely 
assist community support and success (Lange & McNeil 2004). 
The support of local government can assist to fill final funding gaps, and to lower 
property taxes (Hollander et al. 2010).  Frantal et al. (2013) found that “soft” factors 
such as political leadership, strong stakeholder and community support can allow 
negative factors to be overcome. 
Critique 
Literature indicates that community and political support are required for brownfield 
redevelopment projects to succeed (Demuijnck & Fasterling 2016; Hollander et al. 
2010; Lange & McNeil 2004; Frantal et al. 2013). 
Drivers for achieving community support for brownfields redevelopment will vary, 
based on the socio-economic situation of the surrounding area.  As a factor, high 
unemployment rate was found to impact more significantly on the redevelopment of 
less expensive brownfield sites, and was present in 52% of cases investigated 
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(Osman et al. 2015). This was due to the short-term employment opportunities as 
part of the redevelopment process. 
2.6. Synthesis and conclusions 
This literature review has demonstrated that there is a substantial body of knowledge 
pertaining to contaminated land remediation and brownfields redevelopment 
internationally. Developed economies such as the US and Europe’s policy thinking, 
tools (funding and advice) and assistance are well developed for attracting 
brownfields redevelopment projects (Adams et al. 2010). There are further two main 
driving forces for brownfields redevelopment, namely containing urban sprawl and 
addressing contamination related to public and environmental health. 
Key factors influencing the success of brownfields redevelopment identified from 
international literature include: 
 Sites with little or no contamination are more readily redeveloped; 
 Mature brownfields management policies facilitate development; 
 Sites with certainty regarding apportionment of liability for clean-up and 
perception of few latent risks are more likely to be redeveloped; 
 Redevelopment land use options based on a risk minimisation approach improve 
the feasibility of brownfields projects; 
 Favourable market conditions attract private sector investment; 
 Quick access to a variety of funding options, coupled with clear and rapid 
approvals process encourages redevelopment; 
 Larger sites with economy of scale are more often redeveloped than small sites; 
 Readily available municipal services and close proximity to transport corridors are 
incentives to redevelopment; and 
 Strong political and community support encourage redevelopment.   
These factors may be relevant for the development of this sector in South Africa.   
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Developing nations are still primarily concerned with enforcing compliance, with little 
emphasis placed on creating a positive environment for investment from the private 
sector (Kadas et al. 2008; Spínola & Philippi 2011). Compliance is varied, and 
successful brownfields redevelopment projects are comparatively few. There are 
strong similarities between South Africa and Latin America in terms of approach and 
maturity to brownfields (Kadas et al. 2008; Spínola & Philippi 2011; Potts & Cloete 
2012; Seeliger & Turok 2015). 
South Africa has a strong knowledge base from the mining sector and mine closure 
regulations (Limpitlaw et al. 2005; Hattingh & Bothma 2013). This country’s 
contaminated land management and brownfield redevelopment sector is only 
starting, and may gain much from the international knowledge, research base and 
mature policies attracting private investment. Testing some case studies in South 
Africa against the success factors identified internationally will provide assistance 
towards the development of the brownfields revitalisation regime.   
  
48 
3. Research method 
In chapter 2, the techniques and approaches regarding brownfields redevelopment 
suggested by the literature were first explored. From this literature review, key 
success factors were drawn out. The South African situation regarding brownfields 
redevelopment was also investigated. Certain differences were identified between 
developing countries and developed countries with regard to brownfields 
redevelopments. This approach created the theoretical knowledge basis for 
application to the case studies.  
This chapter focuses on the research methods used, and the motivation for selection 
of case study sites.  Internationally, case study research on brownfields of either a 
few, or hundreds of sites, appear to be prevalent (Howland 2003), depending on the 
availability of data.  Documentary research as primary method of investigation have 
been successfully used by researchers where only a few cases were studied 
(Jensen 2010; Erdem & Nassauer 2013).  The case study sites in this study were 
selected because of certain shared features, whilst providing a representative cross-
section of urban brownfields in Johannesburg. 
 In chapter 4, three South African case studies are analysed using documentary or 
archival research, against the theoretical background of international literature. 
Chapter 5 evaluates the case study findings against literature. 
3.1. Multiple case study method 
Multiple case study research is preferred to single case studies by Rowley (2002). In 
analytical generalisation, every case study is seen as an experiment.  Multiple case 
studies are regarded as similar to multiple experiments. Where an increased number 
of case studies shows replication of a theory, observations are expected to be more 
robust (Rowley 2002). 
Data was collected to explore three sites over the long term, from which to make 
comparisons with the literature. The data collected represents each case as a 
sequence of events over a period of years. This data was used to describe change 
over time, or time-series analysis (Yin 2003). Due to the varied site selection, 
contrasting results were expected, to test the validity in the South African context of 
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the success factors of the success factors drawn out of the literature review (Rowley 
2002). 
 
3.2. Documentary analysis method 
Documentary research has many advantages, including public availability, cost-
effectiveness and covering a long span of time (Bowen 2009). It is a valid method for 
qualitative case studies, providing in-depth descriptions of cases and tracking 
change over time (Yin 1994; Stake 1995). 
The documentary research was based on the consultation of various types of 
documents drawn from different sources over the history of each of the case studies, 
thereby providing triangulation.  Important time-based events applicable to this study 
are mostly historic and not ongoing, confirming the applicability of the documentary 
research method. Each data source was evaluated for origin, reliability, objectivity 
and applicability to the case study or research question, after Bowen (2009). 
3.2.1. Limitations of documentary research 
Due to the research method employed for this research, no contamination 
measurements for any environmental media were carried out. Moreover, no 
interviews with site owners or professionals involved in any of the sites were held, 
nor were any questionnaires sent out. The potential limitations in documentary 
research include insufficient detail, some documents not being retrievable, and bias 
in the selection of documents (Bowen 2009).   
As documentary research was followed, understanding of the three case study sites 
was limited to documents publicly available. The data gathered was silent on a 
number of issues.  A deeper understanding of each case study may have been 
gained through interviews with site owners and personnel, professionals and access 
to private records. 
This study was qualitative.  Weightings were not attached to the associated success 
factors identified for each site. 
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3.3. International research methods for brownfields 
Howland (2003) indicates that case study research is the most prevalent 
methodology in brownfields literature. This approach is confirmed by the literature 
review of this study (Lange & McNeil 2004; Dixon et al. 2011a; Hollander et al. 2010; 
Nijkamp et al. 2002). 
There are also studies where only two or three case studies were described in depth 
and compared (Howland 2003a; Jensen 2010; Erdem & Nassauer 2013). Howland 
(2003) analysed three case studies in the same city, to understand the interface 
between publicly and privately driven brownfields redevelopment projects. Howland 
used mostly documentary research, with only two interviews conducted. 
Jensen (2010) used archival research to obtain data for four case studies of 
brownfields to renewable energy projects, apart from conducting many interviews. 
Erdem & Nassauer (2013) studied three public parks developed on brownfield sites 
designed at varying times in European and US contexts, using only documentary 
research. 
Hollander (2010) first surveyed USEPA officials, then made use of three case studies 
to develop hypotheses to identify key variables. The sites selected were of varying 
sizes and complexity and in different cities. Apart from the interviews conducted, 
documentary research was done on public records and newspaper articles 
(Hollander 2010). 
 
3.4. Identification of case study sites 
Three case study sites were selected which represented certain shared features and 
provided a representative cross-section.  Shared features included their location 
within the urban edge of Johannesburg, original industrial land use as part of the 
origins of Johannesburg, and the intent of the landowners to redevelop brownfields 
land. Aspects considered in the choice of sites include distance from the inner city, 
size, the certainty of contamination and redevelopment success. The size of the 
study sites was chosen to vary, as well as each site’s proximity to the city centre of 
Johannesburg. The Egoli Gas site and AECI Modderfontein were clearly 
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documented as contaminated.  Contamination of the Newtown site was not clearly 
established.   
The status of each case study was documented. One site's redevelopment was 
successful, one site’s redevelopment was not yet implemented, and the last site was 
in the process of being redeveloped. These projects were studied to obtain a better 
understanding of the respective success factors for redeveloping brownfields. 
Newtown 
Newtown is a precinct of approximately 25 hectares in the inner city of 
Johannesburg.  Its original land use was industrial, with activities such as power 
generation, rail yards, maintenance workshops and the fresh produce market of the 
city.  Urban decay increased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. With substantial 
public and private sector investment and redevelopment since this time, this mixed 
use precinct is regarded as a highly successful initiative in the inner city (Shand 
2010; Rhizome Management Services 2009; Bethlehem 2013). Most of the property 
in the area is government-owned. 
Egoli Gas site 
The Egoli Gas site is the smallest of the case studies, approximately 14,85 hectares 
in extent, and is located west of the University of Witwatersrand and east of the 
University of Johannesburg in the “institutional belt” along the south of Empire Road.  
The site is thus on opposite side of Wits from the centre of Johannesburg. It has an 
industrial land use history of producing gas from coal (from 1927 to 1992). A portion 
of this site is used as distribution site for gas produced by SASOL.  The old 
gasworks factory itself is derelict, as the intended redevelopment initiative of 2010 
did not go ahead. 
Modderfontein 
The AECI explosives factory was established in the Modderfontein area, 
approximately 18 km from the Johannesburg city centre, as part of the start of mining 
in the Witwatersrand in 1896. It grew with the mining industry to circa 2000, in the 
manufacturing of explosives and fertiliser from nitrogen and ammonia related 
processes.  The site, therefore, has an industrial history.   
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At the height of production, the operational part of the site was approximately 
200 hectares in size, and the buffer zone required by the Explosives Act more than 
2 000 hectares. In 1999, parts of the area became available for development due to 
improved safety standards and release of land from the buffer zone. Heartland 
Properties was established as the property development arm of AECI. It successfully 
undertook redevelopment projects on the buffer land until 2013. Approximately 
1 600 ha of the former buffer zone was sold to the property developer Zendai in 
2013, who has embarked on a multi-decade development process of the area. 
 
3.5. Sources of data 
Valid sources of data for each of the case studies and their locations include various 
document forms, as identified by the methodology of Bowen (2009).  Official 
documents and government publications studied include administrative documents 
representing agencies and organizations, such as progress reports, business plans, 
brochures, position papers, and minutes of meetings.  
Institutional policy documentation reviewed include spatial development frameworks, 
integrated development plans, urban development frameworks, and area-based 
economic development plans. Public documents such as published and publicly 
presented documents including books, newspaper articles, and magazines were also 
reviewed.  
Site-based documents studied include regulatory applications made such as town 
planning or environmental impact assessments and related specialist studies, media 
releases by site owners, notices sent to shareholders and transaction documentation 
for land sale agreements. 
3.5.1. Analysis of document sources 
The approach used to analyse data sources was to list all the documents in tabular 
format; determine for each document a category, original purpose, extract key data 
points, and note the degree of relevancy to the study (Bowen 2009). Aspects such as 
authenticity, credibility, and accuracy had to be determined. 
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3.5.2. Data sources for Newtown 
A wide variety of sources as described was available for the Newtown case study. 
These included official documents, institutional policy documents developed for the 
area specifically. Regarding site-based documents of the private sector, fewer of 
these were available. The identified sources showed a high level of corroboration of 
facts. Evaluation reports commissioned by the JDA and consultant’s documents 
appeared the most objective, whereas marketing and media releases by the City of 
Johannesburg (CoJ) and newspapers were found to be less objective. 
3.5.3. Data sources for Egoli Gas site 
Document sources for this site were limited mostly to site-based documents related 
to the redevelopment process, with fewer public plans and policies.  These site-
based data sources showed a high level of accuracy and validation from source to 
source.  Most of these sources were either specialist site investigations or actual 
letters or minutes of meetings, providing insight to the various stakeholders’ 
viewpoints.  The sources investigated did not clearly provide information on why the 
development did not go ahead. 
3.5.4. Data sources for Modderfontein 
Documentation because of AECI being a public company was a dependable source 
of accurate data. These included sources on the activities of Heartland Properties 
and the land sale and activities of Zendai. Numerous site-based data sources such 
as specialist reports, environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and minutes of 
stakeholder meetings were also used. Institutional policies of the City of 
Johannesburg and media reports provided background confirmation of site-based 
information.  The sources identified showed a high level of validation of facts. The 
site-based and company reporting documents were found to be objective. 
3.6. Document analysis and evaluation of data 
3.6.1. Analysis of data 
The method of analysing documents was modelled according to Bowen's 
methodology.  This involved perusal, then reading, and lastly interpretation of 
important and pertinent passages of text identified.  Document analysis produced 
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data, which was then arranged in themes and classes through content analysis 
(Labuschagne 2003). 
The data analysis regarding each case was exploratory, seeking to present an 
accurate unfolding of events over time, and placed into themes where appropriate.  
After the presentation of the data regarding each case study, observed reasons as to 
why each redevelopment case was successful or not, were documented.  These 
reasons were derived from the data itself. 
3.6.2. Determination of factors to analyse and evaluate case studies 
An exploratory literature survey was firstly undertaken to obtain a high-level 
understanding of the international body of knowledge regarding contaminated sites 
and brownfields.   
Then, the survey was narrowed to the redevelopment of brownfields.  This included 
firstly the barriers to redevelopment, and secondly approaches and methods to 
overcome these barriers.  Lastly, the survey sought to identify case studies where 
success or failure of brownfields were documented. 
From this understanding, a literature review was undertaken to identify success 
factors, which were documented by various authors, thereby seeking replication of 
principles among authors. 
3.6.3. Evaluation of data 
In Chapter 5, data for the three case studies was evaluated against the success 
factors as identified from the literature.   Success factors identified from the literature 
were reconsidered based on the key factors that emerged from case study findings, 
to derive a final set of success factors for brownfields redevelopment, based on the 
South African context. 
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4. Analysis of case studies 
As indicated in the previous chapter, three case study sites were selected (Figure 3).  
Each of the cases is presented in this chapter. The three selected properties have all 
been in use for more than a century and linked to the establishment of Johannesburg 
in the late 1800s. 
The Newtown area in central Johannesburg represents a precinct rather than an 
individual site – with various initiatives and developments having taken place in the 
last decades.  Since the development of Brickfields around 1890 and the President 
Street Power Station at the turn of the 20th century, the area has been redeveloped 
numerous times.  Between 1970 and 2000, business locations to the north and east 
of the city centre became more favourable, and many private and public entities 
moved away from the city centre, with increasing dormancy in especially the 
Newtown area (Beavon 1997).  This Newtown precinct was chosen as a case study 
due to its industrial origins, numerous changes of land use, and private and public 
ownership. 
The Cottesloe Gas Works was established in 1927, and was one of the key early 
sources of energy for the city through a coal-to-gas process.  The gas production 
plant was closed in 1992.  Since then it has only been used for the import, storage 
and distribution of gas to central Johannesburg (Tsica Heritage Consultants 2010).  
The unused historic part of Egoli Gas has been dormant since 1992.  The property 
was proposed for remediation and redevelopment in 2009, yet the project was not 
implemented. 
AECI’s Modderfontein property, where explosives were first manufactured for the 
gold mining industry in 1896, was about 18 km outside the city at the time of its 
establishment.  It has since been incorporated in the urban edge of Johannesburg.  
In 1999 and 2000, with improved safety standards, the Explosives Act buffer 
requirement fell away. As a result, the land surrounding the Modderfontein site 
became available (AECI 2000; Engineering News 2000).   
Apart from the development activities of Heartland Properties, the larger land 
portions to the north, have been dormant since then (eProperty News 2005). 
Approximately 1 600 hectares of AECI property was sold in 2014 to Hong Kong 
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based property group Zendai, and the redevelopment planning process is currently 
underway (Republic of South Africa 2014; Zendai Holdings Limited 2013).  Smaller 
land parcels not sold to Zendai at Modderfontein are managed by AECI’s Acacia 
Real Estate, which includes some land still available for redevelopment 
(http://www.aeci.co.za/bs_acacia_estate.php) 
  
Figure 3: Regional context of the three case study sites selected (source: Map Studio 2016) 
4.1. Newtown 
4.1.1. Introduction and context 
Newtown is a precinct comprising approximately 25 hectares in the inner city of 
Johannesburg. It is located directly south of the Transnet marshalling yard between 
the M1/Carr Street off-ramp and the Nelson Mandela Bridge (See Figure 4).  It is in 
Ward 60 of Planning Region F of the city.  Most of the land in Newtown is owned by 
the City of Johannesburg. 
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Figure 4: Regional context of Newtown (source: Google, AfriGIS 2016) 
Early History 
An extract of Pritchard’s commercial map of Johannesburg of 1896 shows the 
Brickfields area, where Newtown is now located (Figure 5).  The British governing 
authority identified Brickfields, Burgersdorp and a part of Fordsburg for demolition 
and redevelopment in the early 1900s.  After forced removals and burning of the 
area in 1904, 70 hectares was earmarked and became known as “Newtown” (Brodie 
2014). 
For the next 90 years, Newtown was the main industrial area of the city.  By 1915, 
Newtown’s industrial uses included the rail marshalling yard and related 
infrastructure, the fresh produce market and livestock yard (including an abattoir).  
Power generation activities included the Jeppe Street Power Station (including its 
turbine hall and cooling towers), as well as the tram shed and the electric workshop 
(housing the turbines for the tram system) (Brodie 2014).  There was also a migrant 
worker’s compound located in this precinct (Gaule 2005). 
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Figure 5: An extract of the map 1896 of Johannesburg (Pritchard 1896) with the approximate position of 
the current Newtown indicated (Source: Vintage Maps, [online] Available at: http://www.vintage-maps-
prints.com/products/old-map-johannesburg-california-1896 ) 
Decline and urban decay 
By the early 1980s, the city council had reneged on maintaining the Inner City 
infrastructure, and as a result there was a decline in the Newtown area which led to 
a state of urban decay.  The adjacent Central Business District had already started 
its gradual migration to Sandton.  During the late 1990s, vacancy rates increased, 
large institutions closed their offices in the city centre, and investment further 
declined. (City of Johannesburg 2011a). 
Urban renewal and redevelopment 
The city started various urban renewal initiatives from 1992 onwards, which provided 
the necessary impetus for a change in the Inner City.  The Greater Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Council was established in 2000, and the Johannesburg Development 
Agency (JDA) in 2001. The JDA’s mandate was to implement urban regeneration 
capital projects within the city (City of Johannesburg 2011a).   
Significant political support was behind the urban renewal of Newtown; the President 
of South Africa supported the vision in 1997.  Major funding initiatives that provided 
support for Newtown were the Urban Renewal Programme and the Gauteng Blue IQ 
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project, both initiated in 2001. The Blue IQ was a multi-billion rand initiative to 
develop specific major infrastructure projects in the province 
(http://www.blueiq.co.za).  The Urban Renewal Programme was a national initiative 
focussing on investment in eight urban nodes of poverty. 
The JDA acted as an implementing agent for public investment, fast-tracking 
development approvals, infrastructure investment, and active urban management. 
These activities created conducive market conditions.  The private sector responded 
well to this urban renewal, contributing numerous privately funded developments in 
the last 20 years.  Newtown is currently one of the sought-after investment areas on 
Johannesburg’s Inner City. 
 
Figure 6: Aerial image of Newtown in 2000 (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers & Urban Solutions 
Architects 2001, p.7) 
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4.1.2. Description of data sources 
Each data source is described here to confirm its nature, origin, reliability, objectivity 
and its relation to the study topic. 
Newtown Urban Design Framework 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The ICO appointed GAPP Architects and Urban Designers (GAPP) to compile the 
Newtown Urban Design Framework (UDF) in 1999.  The Newtown Urban Design 
Framework was a design implementation document, showing a physical 
interpretation of CoJ’s Inner City policies.  It assisted with the prioritisation of public 
investment, and guided decision-making.   This document has a high level of 
reliability, but its objectivity is not certain.  Most of its recommendations were 
implemented. 
Relation to the study topic 
The objectives of the afore-mentioned document included the coordination of the 
various initiatives in Newtown, (creating a commonly shared vision), and providing a 
strategy for implementation of the main actions required to stimulate investment 
(GAPP 1999).  It was also aimed at improving investor confidence.  Most of the 
conclusions and recommendations proposed were later implemented.  It points to 
the consultant’s understanding of urban decay, renewal of brownfields and property 
development.   The document is therefore highly relevant to the research question. 
Newtown Cultural Precinct Urban Design Plan 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This precinct plan was a more detailed explanation of design principles and policies 
proposed in the 1999 Newtown UDF; and the foundation for agreement of site 
development plans and building plan approvals in the Newtown Precinct.  It was 
completed in 2001. 
Alignment and advice were incorporated from parallel studies undertaken at the time, 
such as the Newtown Cultural Precinct Plan – Town Planning Aspects and 
Incentives, the Urban Cost Modelling for Newtown, and the Infrastructure Analysis 
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for the Newtown area (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers & Urban Solutions 
Architects 2001). This document has a high level of reliability and objectivity; most of 
its recommendations were implemented. 
Relation to the study topic 
Particular proposals made, that assisted rapid redevelopment, included a proposed 
design review panel and procedure, blanket rezoning to accommodate all proposed 
land uses according to the Precinct Plan, and town planning procedures to tailor 
development parcel sites according to the Precinct Plan (GAPP Architects and Urban 
Designers & Urban Solutions Architects 2001). 
This document also addresses the aspect of specialised council functions to support 
redevelopment, land use, transport and municipal infrastructure, funding, marketing 
and political support for redevelopment. The document is therefore relevant to the 
research question. 
Inner City Position Paper 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The position paper was a planning report for the JDA as implementing agency in 
2001, and was drafted by the City of Johannesburg.  Its specific author is not 
mentioned in the paper.  It summarised the status quo, challenges and opportunities 
for the Inner City, thereby giving direction to the activities of the JDA.  It further 
prioritised public investments over the short term and clarified institutional 
arrangements. 
The style of the document appears to be concise and pragmatic, with little jargon and 
marketing.  Its description of the status quo, as well as the problems plaguing the 
Inner City, is a valuable summary. Many proposals made in the document were 
implemented (City of Johannesburg 2001). 
Relation to the study topic 
This document identifies regeneration for the inner city.  Aspects such as market 
conditions, availability of municipal services, funding and political support are all 
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addressed in this strategy. The document is therefore relevant to the research 
question. 
Newtown Cultural Precinct Design and Development Manual 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This manual, compiled by GAPP was commissioned by the JDA in 2003, to guide 
and control development of the precinct.  It is considered reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
This document confirms the presence of the design review panel, as proposed by 
the 2001 Urban Design Framework, whose role was to assist with expediting the 
redevelopment of “bad buildings” (as it was referred to by the City of Johannesburg). 
A pilot City Improvement District (CID) is referred to as already in existence for a 
small area, to be extended to the whole precinct.  The objectives of the CID are also 
described, including numerous urban management, marketing and major events 
(GAPP Architects and Urban Designers 2003b). The document is therefore relevant 
to the research question. 
2003 City of Johannesburg Spatial Development Framework 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
A Spatial Development Framework (SDF) seeks to give spatial guidance for 
development as envisaged in the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of a local or 
metropolitan municipal area.  As SDFs are policy documents, which are subject to 
public comment and council approval (which gives them legal standing), their 
reliability is high – as many other public and private investment decisions are based 
thereon. It is therefore expected to be objective. In 2003, with growing development, 
containing sprawl was an important aspect to address.   
Relation to the study topic 
In the “New Opportunity Areas Programme,” mentioned in the SDF, the city sought to 
identify unique areas that comply with its planning principles.  One of these areas 
was “Redevelopment, Densification and Infill.”  Redevelopment and brownfield sites 
were therefore addressed in the document, which relates to brownfields policy as 
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part of the research question (City of Johannesburg 2003). The document is 
therefore relevant to the research question. 
Urban Development Zone Tax Incentive 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The Urban Development Zone (UDZ) tax incentive is a national government policy 
which was initiated in 2003 in order to address urban decay in South Africa’s largest 
cities, through an accelerated depreciation allowance.  The South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) drafted this document.  The City of Johannesburg submitted an 
application for the establishment of an Urban Development Zone (UDZ) for the 
Johannesburg Inner City to National Treasury in 2004 (City of Johannesburg 2004).  
This application included Newtown. 
The UDZs were subsequently implemented in most of the metros, with billions of 
rand worth of private sector investment benefitting from the incentive. The document 
is expected to be reliable.  It has been estimated that, since its inception in 2004, the 
UDZ tax incentive used by the private sector accounts for R9 billion in developments 
in the Johannesburg zone, including large banks, mining houses, hotels and 
residential developers (City of Johannesburg 2012). 
Relation to the study topic 
This tax incentive policy addressed the funding of urban renewal in 13 inner city 
areas of the major centres of South Africa, which includes brownfields sites. 
Activities listed in the incentive are construction and improvement of commercial, 
residential buildings, and low-cost housing units, situated within the UDZs.  Further, 
the policy seeks to encourage investment in highly populated areas, Central 
Business Districts (CBDs), inner city environments, and areas with existing urban 
transport infrastructure for trains, buses or taxis.  Only “costs incurred in relation to 
the erection, extension, addition or improvement of the building” are applicable to 
this tax incentive.  Therefore, land purchase cost is excluded.  Specific allowance 
was made for low-cost residential housing, where the unit cost was below R350 000 
and rent below 1% of the unit value per month. 
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The depreciation values for the various types of development are mostly around 20-
25% in the first year of assessment, and taper off with smaller percentages in 
following years.  All the depreciation values add up to 100% depreciation of 
investment over between seven and ten years (SARS 2003). This policy document is 
highly relevant to the funding aspect of the research question. 
Greater Newtown Cultural Quarter Development Strategy 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The JDA undertook the compilation of this business plan for Newtown as a cultural 
precinct in 2004, in order to encourage the attraction of private sector investment. 
This took place after the initial phase of public sector development was almost 
complete.  Various strategic objectives were identified, each with a number of 
projects to support it.  As with other JDA documents, it appears to be a reliable 
objective document. 
Relation to the study topic 
Applicable strategies in the document included a land development and release 
strategy, reinforcing linkages to the surrounding areas and city and a whole, 
institutional arrangements and residential development (JDA 2004). 
Maximum investment from the private sector was sought.  Identified projects, related 
to the research question, included the improvement of public transport, light 
industrial and office space conversion to loft-type housing, branding, provision of 
safe public space, review of urban frameworks, the creation of development parcels, 
and ensuring related infrastructure requirements were met.  This document 
addresses funding, redevelopment, infrastructure provision, transportation access 
and political support, and is thus relevant to the research question. 
Newtown North Urban Design Framework 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The JDA appointed GAPP and Urban Solutions in 2005 this urban design study to 
advise the development of Newtown to the north of Carr Street, where the Old Park 
Station is located, mostly on Transnet-owned land, which was the other large 
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property owner in Newtown, apart from the City of Johannesburg.  It is considered 
reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
This document addresses various aspects of redevelopment, namely land 
ownership, land use, the lack of engineering services, attraction of private sector 
investment, and statutory approvals. 
Newtown Redevelopment incorporating Newtown North – Engineering 
Services Investigation and Assessment Report 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This assessment of engineering services for Newtown was commissioned by the 
JDA in 2006, to assess the need for infrastructure upgrades as part of future 
development (PD Naidoo and Associates & Themba Consulting Engineers 2006). 
PD Naidoo and Associates (PDNA) is well-known consulting engineering firm, and its 
report, compiled in associated with Themba Consulting Engineers, is expected to be 
reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
Municipal engineering services are one of the aspects to address as part of 
redevelopment of brownfield sites. Redevelopment cannot take place without 
sufficient municipal services capacity.  Services investigated were bulk water, 
sewage, storm water, roads, gas, electricity and telecommunications. 
This report concludes that bulk services in Newtown are sufficient overall, but that 
minor supply services, especially around No. 1 Central Place, require significant 
upgrading and re-alignment.  The total cost of upgrades, at the time, was estimated 
to be R16 million.  This cost was escalated by 10% per annum, to a cost of 
approximately R30 million in 2015 (PDNA & Themba Consulting Engineers 2006). 
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Analysis of the Impact of the JDA’s Area-Based Regeneration Projects on 
Private Sector Investment 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The JDA appointed Rhizome Management Services in 2009 to analyse and confirm 
private sector investment that came about as a result of the JDA’s regeneration 
projects.     
The authors interviewed 30 relevant role-players, and studied a wide variety of 
document sources, including cadastral plans as part of their research.  The data on 
project expenditure was extracted from the JDA’s Development Information 
Management System (DIMS), including capital and professional fees. 
Limitations include the sole focus on the JDA’s activities, and the assumption that 
there is a 1:1 ratio, noted as conservative, of property transfers to further 
investments made, due to the insufficient feedback from private sector developers on 
their investments after property purchase (RMS 2009). The document did not 
reference the 2005 Newtown North Urban Framework conducted by GAPP. The 
approach of the study is professional, and the content is expected to be reliable and 
objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
The assignment sought to quantify private sector investment, analyse property 
market trends, identify factors influencing investor interest, and determine the key 
factors for investor decisions and motivations. This report is relevant to the funding, 
market conditions, infrastructure availability aspects of brownfields redevelopment, 
and directly related to the research question. 
Joburg Inner City Urban Design Implementation Plan 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
A consortium of consultants was appointed jointly by the JDA and the CoJ in 2009 to 
compile this plan from existing documents.  The purpose of this implementation plan 
was to establish common objectives for all the players in the Inner City.  Priority 
areas for intervention and coordination of actions were identified at a high-level and 
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in detail for the numerous precincts.  These common objectives and coordinated 
actions were then used to identify investment priorities for the Inner City budget 
allocation over the next three financial years (2009-2011).  As the document was 
drafted by external consultants under the auspices of the JDA, its reliability and 
objectivity is expected to be high (JDA & City of Johannesburg 2009). 
Relation to the study topic 
Newtown’s state in 2009 is described, including completed interventions and 
challenges/opportunities for future action.  Development interventions proposed 
mostly relate to the further redevelopment of particularly bad buildings, and an 
increase in residential and mixed use. (JDA & City of Johannesburg 2009). 
The remaining content of the report focuses on less intensive management 
improvements related to public spaces. The document therefore has limited 
relevance to the research question. 
2010 Region F Spatial Development Framework 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
A discussion on these aspects of the regional SDFs was provided in on page 73 for 
the overall SDF for the city. Regional SDFs were instituted from 2006 onwards as 
part of division of the city in administrative regions. 
Relation to the study topic 
The 2010 Region F SDF refers to the Inner City area, which includes Newtown, 
Ferreirasdorp and Westgate - all as part of sub-area 12. The sub-area 12 was 
identified as a high-priority area due to the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) running through 
it, which requires the prioritisation of infrastructure investment along the identified 
corridor.  One of the development objectives set out was to support private sector 
redevelopment initiatives, particularly of the “bad buildings” initiative the city had 
initiated.    
The redevelopment of the Potato Sheds, Central Place and Majestic Building, all in 
Newtown, were indicated as especially important mixed use developments.  There 
were no new industrial uses proposed for Newtown.  Other aspects pertaining to 
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redevelopment included changing road hierarchies, improving access and mobility, 
and supporting the business core through public space upgrading (City of 
Johannesburg 2010). 
This document addressed municipal infrastructure, land use, transport corridors, 
redevelopment and catalytic public spending to attract private sector investment. 
This policy document is relevant to the research question. 
Newtown: a Cultural Precinct – Real or Imagined (Master of Arts Research 
Report) 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Urban Genesis, a company specialising in urban management, and active in the 
Inner City since 2002, employed the author of this research report.  From 2007, 
onwards she worked for the Newtown Improvement District.  It is for this reason she 
had first-hand experience of the case study area for an extended period in the early 
2000s.  Shand’s research includes interviews with many of the important players in 
the regeneration process of Newtown, including Barry Senior of GAPP, and Graham 
Reid, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the JDA from 2001 to 2005.  The report is 
thus expected to be reliable, but rather subjective due to the author’s personal 
involvement (Shand 2010). 
Relation to the study topic 
The report provides useful insight to many aspects of the case study area’s urban 
regeneration and management, (including funding, infrastructure, and political 
support) through the involvement of the author in Newtown and interviews with key 
people. The report is thus relevant to the research question. 
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Johannesburg Inner City End of Term Report 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This report appears to have been commissioned by the JDA.  It seeks to provide 
understanding and clarification regarding the urban renewal of the Inner City, with a 
focus on two aspects:  Firstly, the Inner City policies and programmes led by the city; 
Secondly, to summarise important public and private sector projects undertaken in 
the decade from 2001 to 2011 (City of Johannesburg 2012). 
The facts in this report are sourced from the City of Johannesburg and the JDA, 
amongst others.  In terms of the impact of public funding on the private sector, its 
main source is the report by Rhizome Management Services of 2009 (one of the 
data sources described above). 
This document is expected to be a reliable source of information.  However, the 
document serves a marketing purpose for Johannesburg as a “World-class African 
City” – and this limits the objectivity of the document. 
Relation to the study topic 
The document has many references to Newtown and provides a valuable source of 
information regarding the case study and the relevant policies of the City of 
Johannesburg.  It further particularly addresses the funding and policy aspects of 
urban regeneration of which brownfields sites are part of.  The document is relevant 
to the case study of Newtown and the research question. 
Urban Regeneration in the Joburg CBD 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Lael Bethlehem was the CEO of the JDA from 2005 to 2010, and therefore has first-
hand experience of the activities and drivers for regeneration of Newtown.  However, 
this journal article (written in 2013) cannot be considered to be an academic paper 
owing to that fact that no references are provided.  It therefore simply relies on the 
author’s experience and knowledge. The article is reliable, but perhaps subjective, 
as the author was personally involved.   
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Relation to the study topic 
The article provides a summary of urban regeneration in the Joburg CBD from the 
perspective of Bethlehem, who had particular insight into the matter. The article’s 
relevance to the study topic relates to key factors the author cites for urban 
regeneration, which includes industrial brownfields properties.  These factors are: 
“Public investment in urban renewal and infrastructure, City Improvement Districts, 
Institution and corporate investment, and entrepreneurial private investment in the 
residential sector.” (Bethlehem 2013, p.19) The article is thus relevant to the 
research question. 
“What’s the Plan?” The changing approaches to regeneration and spatial 
planning in the Inner City of Johannesburg (2000 to 2015) Inner City Booklet 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The booklet investigates the evolving approach of government on a local level 
towards urban renewal in Johannesburg.  This booklet was used for a public 
exhibition/open day to engage Inner City stakeholders hosted at the end of 2015.  It 
considers the numerous planning documents for the Inner City.  Although the 
exhibition and booklet were both commissioned by the City of Johannesburg and 
JDA and notes certain achievements, it also notes some of the 
shortcomings/alternatives of the approaches followed (City of Johannesburg & JDA 
2015). The objectivity and reliability of the document appear to be high. 
Relation to the study topic 
This booklet may provide insight into the local government approach towards 
redevelopment of Newtown, which is relevant as a success factor for the 
redevelopment of brownfields. The contents of the booklet is thus relevant to the 
research question. 
Inner City Transformation and Investment Trends: 2009-2014 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This presentation-style document was compiled by the JDA.  It seeks to provide an 
understanding and clarification regarding the urban renewal of the Inner City in the 
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period from 2009 to 2014.  Its main headings are the context, property market 
trends, public and private sector investment, and lastly a way forward (JDA 2015). It 
is expected to be a reliable and objective source of information. 
Relation to the study topic 
The document provides limited information regarding the case study site between 
2009 and 2014.  It indicates the value of public and private investments made.  
Challenges include the continuous funding of the City Improvement District. The 
document is relevant to the case study of Newtown and the research question. 
Newtown Urban Design Framework Review (GAPP 2015) 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The assignment was likely commissioned by the JDA.  It provided a high-level review 
of the original plan and vision, the revision of spatial and legal frameworks, the 
revision of institutional arrangements, and an implementation programme for 
identified projects.  This document is considered to be reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
The commissioning of this review confirms the long-term commitment of the city 
pertaining to effective brownfields regeneration.  Additional projects such as Site 8, 
Site 6 (recently awarded to Crowie Projects), the Old Park Station and other 
opportunities north of Carr Street are described in the document.  The land release 
strategy described in the 1999 framework is planned by creating various 
redevelopment parcels, each to be sold off and separately developed.  Refinements 
to the precinct are also proposed.   
News Archive, City of Johannesburg website (http://www.joburg.gov.za) 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The articles reviewed from the City of Johannesburg’s website have an obvious 
promotional style, with jargon often being used, and unsubstantiated statements 
made.  They contain few references to data sources, and it is assumed that most of 
these data sources would be from within the City of Johannesburg itself.  Where 
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specific amounts or numbers are mentioned, these appear to be correct and verified 
by other sources. Their objectivity is thus low, and reliability moderate. 
Relation to the study topic 
The archive provides a news source over time, for verification of events regarding 
the case study. It is therefore relevant to the case study, and the research topic in 
relation to local government involvement. 
Johannesburg Development Agency website (http://www.jda.co.za) 
This website is the repository for the activities and documents of the JDA.  Although 
not objective, dates and information provided are expected to be accurate. 
As a special purpose company of the city, the JDA was instrumental in the 
redevelopment of Newtown.  Its activities, annual reports and planning documents 
provide arguably the best record of events of the case study site. 
Newtown Improvement District website (http://www.newtown.co.za) 
This website is the repository for the activities of the Newtown City Improvement 
District (NID).  Although not objective, dates and information provided are expected 
to be accurate. 
Rea Vaya website (http://www.Reavaya.co.za) 
This website is the repository for the future planning, routes and schedules of the 
Rea Vaya Bus Rapid Transit system, which commenced in 2009.  Although not 
objective, dates, route maps and information provided are expected to be accurate. 
Gautrain website (http://www.gautrain.co.za) 
This website is the repository for the future planning, routes and schedules of the 
Gautrain system, which includes its bus routes at every station.  Although not 
objective, dates, route maps and information provided are expected to be accurate. 
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4.1.3. Presentation and analysis of data 
The description of the case study over time is presented here.  This section 
represents the data where information provided in data sources are consistent with 
each other. 
Aspects where no data could be found 
Despite Newtown’s past industrial land uses (such as power generation, workshops, 
abattoirs, and railway yards), no document sources could be identified that confirm 
contamination, or environmental and human health effects as a result thereof.   
Some possible reasons for this are natural assimilation over time in the case of 
hydrocarbons, waste such as ash being removed to other locations, and the 
encapsulation of soil layers by the periodic redevelopments over time. 
Urban decline of the 1980s and 1990s 
By the early 1980s, the Worker’s Compound and Cooling Towers were used only as 
a storage depot, because of urban decay and the migration out of the city.  The 
Turbine Hall was occupied in the late 1990s by squatters, and crime levels were high 
(City of Johannesburg 2011a; City of Johannesburg 2003a).   
The city council divided the Johannesburg CBD into four metropolitan substructures 
after the 1994 elections, which added to the decline of the Inner City.   The City of 
Johannesburg was practically bankrupt by 1997/1998.    After intervention and 
restructuring assistance from National Treasury, the Greater Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Council was established in 2000 (Bethlehem 2013; Shand 2010). 
Therefore, it can be deduced that some areas of Newtown could by 1999 have been 
categorised as “brownfield.” 
Early city initiatives in the 1990s 
The Cooling Towers were demolished in 1985.  GAPP compiled the first Urban 
Design for Newtown in 1987 (Shand 2010).  The city started various urban renewal 
initiatives from 1992 onwards.  The Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) was 
initiated in 1992 to combat urban decay.  In turn, the CJP started numerous other 
organisations and initiatives, such as the Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust in 1993 
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and the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless in 1995.  Some of the developments 
undertaken in Newtown at the time were Museum Africa (1994), SABMiller’s “World 
of Beer (1995), the Workers Library and Museum (1995), and the Reserve Bank 
(1996). 
The urban renewal of Newtown had the necessary policy and political support, when 
considering the many initiatives and investments from the national, provincial and 
local government.  It started with the new vision for the Inner City, “The Golden 
Heartbeat of Africa” as launched in 1997 by Thabo Mbeki (City of Johannesburg 
2007).  Some of the political support stemmed from the tainted history of the area in 
the early 1900s (Gaule 2005; Johannesburg Development Agency 2004). 
The Inner City Office (ICO) was established to align contradictory planning and 
policies in 1998.  This office oversaw the drafting of the Inner City Spatial Framework 
and Inner City Economic Development Strategy, both in 1999.  These documents 
identified various urban renewal programmes, which included Newtown and 
Braamfontein. 
The Gauteng Province invested in the ICO (which eventually became the JDA) 
during 1999 through Blue IQ.  The Blue IQ (now the Gauteng Growth and 
Development Agency) is an investment holding company funded by the Gauteng 
provincial government. It provided funding to the JDA as implementing agent for 
various projects, including Newtown. The Gauteng Economic Department also 
funded a building maintenance project in Newtown (Shand 2010). 
The 1999 GAPP Urban Design Framework (UDF) was one of the seminal planning 
documents for Newtown.  Figure 7 shows its key existing and proposed installations.  
The framework proposed a series of goals for Newtown.  These included creating a 
safe and secure environment, improving accessibility, developing the Turbine Hall, 
creating a critical mass and a 24 hour city, and establishing a coherent development 
framework for the area.  The establishment of a focused special purpose vehicle to 
drive the development and land release process was also a goal of this urban design 
framework.  The JDA became the special purpose vehicle that was envisaged. 
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Existing installations (1999) 
 
1. The Market Theatre & Museum Africa 
2. Worker’s Library & Museum 
3. The Magistrates Court s 
4. Westgate Station 
5. MetroMall Taxi Rank 
 
Proposed installations (1999) 
 
6. Proposed Newtown Station 
7.Transport Museum 
8.Cybersite & Interactive Media Centre 
9.AngloGold Corporate Headquarters 
and Museum 
10.National African Art Gallery 
11.Science and Technology Centre 
12.Craft & Design Centre 
13.Hall of Fame 
14.Interactive Entertainment Centre 
 
Figure 7: Plan of Newtown with existing and proposed redevelopment interventions in the Urban Design 
Framework of 1999 (GAPP 1999, p. 25) 
Bethlehem (2013) described the JDA’s interventions in the Inner City, including 
Newtown, in two phases. The first phase, from 2000 to 2005, focused on iconic 
interventions designed to attract attention, thereby acting as catalysts for future 
development.  The Nelson Mandela Bridge and Mary Fitzgerald Square were the 
interventions undertaken in this phase.   
The second phase, from 2005/2006 onwards, included smaller sustained activities to 
support private sector investment.  It included the Newtown Improvement District and 
its active urban management such as adequate lighting, cleaning, service provision 
and management of public spaces.  These initiatives are still ongoing.  The Rea 
Vaya public transport system was one of the larger interventions of this stage. 
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Establishment and first activities of the JDA (2001 – 2005) 
The Inner City Position Paper, generated by the JDA in 2001, documented 
strategies, guiding principles and first priorities.  The guiding principles of this paper 
proved to remain intact throughout the tenure of the JDA.  These included focusing 
on improving the management of the public environment, working collaboratively 
with other stakeholder in the Inner City, creating a favourable investment 
environment, and maintaining and increasing momentum (Johannesburg 
Development Agency 2001).  Specific interventions identified in this document and 
affected in Newtown include Newtown as a Special Activity Precinct, Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) camera installation for public safety, MetroMall intermodal facility 
development, the Newtown City Improvement District and creation of middle-income 
housing opportunities. 
The unique situation that most of Newtown Precinct was government-owned, meant 
that urban renewal and redevelopment could be done on a large scale in a short 
time-span (Johannesburg Development Agency 2015).  The JDA committed 37% of 
its budget in the first few years to Greater Newtown.  Its investment in the case study 
area was the highest between 2001 and 2006, with gradual exit of the JDA since 
2005.   
Investment in infrastructure 
The precinct plan update, compiled by GAPP in 2001, proposed various measures to 
improve access to transport corridors and municipal services (Figure 8).  These 
measures included urban design, traffic and engineering studies.  The Nelson 
Mandela Bridge connection to Braamfontein and the M1/Carr Street Interchange 
were both completed in 2003.  In the same year, the MetroMall transport interchange 
and trading facility was completed in an effort to address taxi management and 
public transport.  These projects were catalytic early investments for improving 
access to Newtown.  These projects were all implemented through the JDA. 
Two assessments of civil engineering infrastructure were undertaken: in 2001 by 
Themba Consultants, and 2006, with Themba Consultants in association with PDNA.  
Services investigated included bulk water, sewage, storm water, roads, gas, 
electricity and telecommunications. 
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The 2006 study concluded that bulk services were sufficient overall, but that minor 
supply services, especially around No. 1 Central Place, required significant 
upgrading and re-alignment.  The total cost of upgrades at the time was estimated to 
be R16 million.  As No. 1 Central Place and Newtown North were not developed at 
the time, such upgrades were not required.  Escalated by 10% per annum, this cost 
had risen to about R30 million in 2015 (PDNA & Themba Consultants 2006).  Such 
service upgrades will now have to be effected, as the redevelopment of sites at 
Central Place and Newtown North is imminent. 
  
Figure 8: Precinct Plan Concept (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers & Urban Solutions Architects 
2001, p.13) 
Early planning and policy development 
In the 2003 citywide SDF, the concepts of redevelopment, densification and infill of 
brownfields, was supported by the City of Johannesburg (City of Johannesburg 
2003a; City of Johannesburg 2010b).   
Planning and guideline documents drawn up for Newtown specifically included the 
Urban Design Framework in 1999, the Cultural Precinct Urban Design Plan in 2001, 
the Central Place Precinct Plan in 2003, the Cultural Precinct Design and 
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Development Manual in 2003, and the Newtown North Urban Design Framework in 
2005.  All of these documents were compiled by GAPP. 
Particular proposals made to assist with rapid redevelopment included a design 
review panel, a procedure for quicker building plan approvals in the precinct, blanket 
rezoning to accommodate all proposed land uses according to the Precinct Plan, and 
town planning procedures to tailor development parcel sites according to Precinct 
Plan (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers & Urban Solutions Architects 2001). 
The Greater Newtown Development Business Plan was completed in 2004, and 
many of its projects and plans implemented.  This document addresses funding, 
redevelopment, infrastructure provision, transportation access and political support, 
and is thus relevant to the research question. 
Identified projects that came to fruition included the improvement of public transport 
(through Rea Vaya and the Gautrain), light industrial and office space conversion to 
loft type housing (Grain Silo housing project), branding and provision of safe public 
space (through the NID), review of urban frameworks, the creation of development 
parcels, and ensuring infrastructure requirements (through NID) were met. 
These planning documents gave clear direction and assisted good decision making 
for the redevelopment of Newtown.  The JDA generally implemented the proposals in 
the documents soon after.   The documents were consistent with each other in that 
they all identified problems and provided implementable solutions. These studies 
were likely associated success factors towards the redevelopment of the area. 
Public and private property development 
Mary Fitzgerald Square was completed in 2004 as first improvement to the public 
realm.  The No 1. Central Place redevelopment, looking over Mary Fitzgerald Square 
was completed in 2005 by the JDA (GAPP 2005).  The Science & Technology Centre 
(SCIBONO) was finished in 2004 in the defunct Electric Workshop. 
The Turbine Hall redevelopment for AngloGold Ashanti’s head office was completed 
in 2007 ((City of Johannesburg 2011a)).  Due the squatter problem in and around the 
Turbine Hall, its development was seen as one of the anchor projects. 
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The attraction effect of the Urban Development Zone tax incentive 
The City of Johannesburg indicates in an article that R9-billion worth of UDZ-related 
private investment was invested in Newtown between 2004 and the end of 2011 
(City of Johannesburg 2012). For Newtown, these investments include the Turbine 
Hall AngloGold Ashanti Head Office development (City of Johannesburg 2004).  For 
the Inner City overall, commercial banks, mining house headquarters, the Africa 
Housing Company (AFHCO) and City Property are among the beneficiaries of the 
UDZ tax incentive.  This investment value was recorded somewhat less in 2010 at 
R8.2 billion, as reported by the Region F IDP of 2010 (City of Johannesburg 2010b).   
RMS (2009) indicates that the “Department of Economic Development” tracking of 
UDZ related information did not contain any detail, or process to track whether 
developments took place or not.  RMS, therefore, did not make use of the 
Department of Economic Development’s data. 
Although the City of Johannesburg article indicates that the UDZ “attracted” the 
investment amounts, interviews with private property developers indicate otherwise.  
RMS (2009) and Mwangala (2010) both conducted interviews with property 
developers in the Inner City, and the findings are similar.  The UDZ Tax Incentive was 
viewed by investors as improving profits, but not a primary attraction for development 
in the Inner City.  Primary attractions to development were deemed to be growing 
market demand and tangible improvements in urban management.  This view was 
confirmed and re-iterated by the JDA (Johannesburg Development Agency 2015). 
Private sector investment (2005 to present state) 
Crime reduction in the Inner City 
Fifteen CCTV cameras were originally installed as a pilot programme in the Inner 
City in 2001 in order to reduce crime, (Johannesug Development Agency 2001; City 
of Johannesburg 2011a).  The Johannesburg Metro Police Service started its 
operations in 2005, enforcing the Inner City by-laws.  The number of cameras in the 
Inner City was increased gradually to a total of 240 cameras in 2008, leading to 
significantly reduced crime.  The CID officers have also contributed to significant 
crime reduction by their visibility and surveillance (Johannesug Development Agency 
2001; City of Johannesburg 2011a). 
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Newtown Improvement District 
Between 2005 and 2010, few infrastructure upgrades or development projects took 
place for Newtown in particular; major infrastructure and public spending were 
complete (Shand 2010).  However, the Newtown Improvement District was 
established in 2006.  Its focus was active urban management, which included 
marketing, events and services management, and the provision of cleaners and 
public safety ambassadors.  These ambassadors were trained to direct and assist 
visitors to the area.  Tenants pay a levy for these operational aspects 
(http://www.newtown.co.za).     
The NID was funded by the JDA from 2006 to 2010, with the intention that the sale of 
1 Central Place would provide sufficient funding so that the JDA/Blue IQ could 
withdraw from the area.  This did not take place, and the JDA has continued to fund 
the NID’s activities. Shand (2010) describes the exit of funding from the JDA, and 
handover of the NID to the City of Johannesburg’s Directorate of Arts, Culture and 
Heritage (COJACHS) in 2010.  This ongoing funding was listed as a challenge in 
2015 (Johannesburg Development Agency 2015). 
Bus-Rapid Transit and the Gautrain (2009) 
The Rea Vaya Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system started by the city in 2009, and has 
recently added Newtown to its destinations (www.Reavaya.co.za).  The Gautrain, 
completed in 2012, included a bus service for Park Station.  The Park Station bus 
route runs along Sauer Street, assisting to improve the accessibility to Newtown 
(www.gautrain.co.za). 
Newtown Junction and other recent private sector developments 
Although the first steps of planning of the Potato Sheds redevelopment was already 
in progress in 2010, construction only started in 2012, and the project was completed 
in 2014.  Its total value was R1.4 billion, which was the largest investment in the 
Inner City in many years (Shand 2010; Bethlehem 2013). 
Around the same time, between 2014 and 2015, the Majestic Development opposite 
the Market Theatre, redevelopment of the Grain Silos and the City Lodge were all 
completed for a combined value of more than R200 million. 
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The tender for the Site 6 mixed-use development has recently been awarded to 
Crowie Projects. Atterbury Properties is also busy with the Joburg Auto City 
Franchise at the Carr Street off-ramp.  These two projects will add R450 million to 
private investment in Newtown. 
The Newtown North (as per the Urban Design Framework completed in 2005) 
redevelopment plans did not progress according to the 2005 planning. This slowing 
of development in the north, on Transnet land, was noted by the JDA in 2015 
(Johannesburg Development Agency 2015). This was due in part to the squatter 
problem that developed at Park Station (Shand 2010). 
The review of the 1999 Newtown Urban Design Framework by GAPP in 2015 refined 
and amended some of the development proposals.  Further sites were indicated for 
land release (such as Site 6 referred to above), as a result of this document.  The 
review confirms the City of Johannesburg and JDA’s long-term vision and 
commitment in the area. 
4.1.4. Preliminary analysis of the Newtown case study 
The City of Johannesburg and JDA identified the following common normative 
planning principles (applied by the City and its companies over 15 years of Inner City 
regeneration) in its 2015 analysis of spatial planning and regeneration in the Inner 
City: 
 Investment attraction through iconic projects; 
 Institutional arrangements for Inner City Regeneration; 
 Coalition formation and partnerships for regeneration; 
 Spatial planning approach; 
 Urban design; 
 Focus on urban management and enforcement; and 
 People focussed - pro-poor, livelihoods and community needs focus 
(McGurk 2015, p.7). 
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Bethlehem (2013) is of the opinion that the four most important factors for 
improvement and investments within the Inner City were the following: 
 public investment in urban renewal and infrastructure; 
 City Improvement Districts 
 Institutional and corporate investment; and 
 Private, entrepreneurial investments, especially in the residential sector 
(Bethlehem 2013, p.19)   
These aspects are confirmed by the findings of the RMS report of 2009, discussed 
below. 
The JDA’s public funding and its attraction for private sector investment was 
investigated by Rhizome Management Services in 2009.  It was estimated that the 
government investment made via the JDA in the Newtown Precinct between 2001 
and 2008 was R188 million (Johannesburg Development Agency 2009; Rhizome 
Management Services 2009).  This figure only included investments by the JDA. 
Shand (2010) cites a higher figure of R300 million, but does not provide any detail on 
what is included in this figure.  As a result of the catalytic investment, private 
investment in the same time period was estimated at R 2.7 billion.   
Overall property rental rates rose in Newtown from R25/m2 in 2003 to about R55/m2 
in 2008 (City of Johannesburg 2011a).  The occupancy rate for rental office space in 
Newtown increased from 58% in 2003 to 84% in 2008.  The property transactions in 
Newtown were quiet until 2005, with significant increase since then (Rhizome 
Management Services 2009).   
The RMS report of 2009 made some conclusions relevant to the Newtown case 
study.  These include: 
 Many new property developer interviewees indicated that the JDA’s investment in 
particularly Braamfontein and Newtown encouraged them to invest. 
 General consensus among investors showed Braamfontein and Newtown to be 
the best interventions in the Inner City, due to the large-scale and long-term 
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negotiated capital investments, coupled with professional planning, urban 
management, and social programmes.   
 Ongoing interest and active management of regenerated areas were found to be 
as important to Newtown’s success as its initial investments, emphasising the 
importance of the Newtown Improvement District. Social infrastructure 
investment, including programmes, education and awareness were among the 
important factors. 
 Primary attractors to development were deemed to be growing market demand 
and tangible improvements in urban management. 
 Smaller capital-focussed interventions were seen to be less effective. 
 A quick rise in the number of deeds transfers was evident in areas where the JDA 
intervened.   
The common factors from the data sources analysed appear to be the following: 
 Political support for the Newtown Precinct meant that significant public funds 
were allocated to the precinct, both for planning and execution of the 
redevelopment project.  Government ownership of most of the precinct increased 
the scale and shortened the implementation timeframe of regeneration.   
 The continual spatial planning and urban design approach guided decision-
making according to sound principles.  This allowed evaluation and adjustment 
as development took place.  Spatial planning documents were undertaken in 
1999, then reviewed in 2001.  Design guidelines were developed in 2003, 
together with further plans.  The UDF of Newtown North was completed in 2005.  
In 2015, these plans were re-evaluated and built upon in preparation for future 
redevelopments. 
 The JDA, as special purpose vehicle for both planning and execution of 
regeneration activities, was an important institutional arrangement.  Throughout 
its tenure, this institution appears to have been pragmatic, professional and 
objective in its conduct.  Its conduct built trust and confidence in the private 
sector. 
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 Early large-scale interventions such as the Nelson Mandela Bridge, MetroMall, 
Mary Fitzgerald Square and the M1/Carr Street interchange attracted investment 
to the Newtown Precinct. 
 Dedicated urban management, including consistent municipal services, 
marketing, public space management and safety through the Newtown 
Improvement District improved investor confidence. 
 Large-scale corporate and private sector investment as a result of the public 
investments created further confidence for smaller private investors.  Examples 
such as the Turbine Hall redevelopment for AngloGold Ashanti in 2005 and the 
Newtown Junction redevelopment of the Potato Sheds by Atterbury Properties in 
2014 are examples of these.  The upper limit of public investment as stated by 
Shand (2010) which possibly include the NID’s management, was R300 million.  
Private sector investment from 2001 to 2015 is more than R4 billion. 
Whereas these improvements and investments of the early 2000s are substantial, 
this particular time coincided with the property boom in South Africa over the same 
period (2002 – 2007). This boom is an external influence which improved the return 
on investment made in the area (Rhizome Management Services 2009).  
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4.2. Egoli Gas 
4.2.1. Introduction and context 
The Egoli Gas site is the smallest of the case studies, approximately 14,85 hectares 
in extent, and located between the Universities of Witwatersrand (Wits) and 
Johannesburg in the “institutional belt” along the south of Empire Road.  Adjacent 
land uses include the John Orr School to the east, the Milpark commercial node and 
Milpark Hospital to the north, and the SABC to the west (see Figure 9).  It falls in 
Ward 60 of Planning Region F of Johannesburg. 
  
Figure 9: Context of the Egoli Gas site within the "institutional belt" (source: Google, AfriGIS 2017) 
The southern border of the Braamfontein Spruit watershed runs along Enoch 
Sontonga Avenue, with the Sturrock Park and the Wits Campus draining northwards.  
Sturrock Park and the Egoli Gas site represents the headwaters of the Braamfontein 
Spruit, which is the main drainage feature of this area.   
The Spruit was modified to a closed storm water culvert on the Egoli Gas property. 
The groundwater flow on site follows its topography, which slopes from south to 
north. 
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The site has an industrial land use history of producing gas from coal, established in 
1927. This production ceased in 1992.  A portion of the site is currently used as 
distribution site for gas produced by SASOL.   The site is zoned “Industrial 2” on the 
western side of the original Braamfontein Spruit tributary and “Municipal” on the 
eastern side thereof. 
The old gasworks factory itself is derelict, as the intended redevelopment initiative of 
2010 did not go ahead. 
History 
With the closing of the President Street Gas Works in 1928, a new site was sought 
for gas production from coal.  The Cottesloe site (Egoli Gas site) was selected 
because it was hidden from the residential areas of town by topography, yet close 
enough to the edge of the city.  Its slope was further suitable for gravity flow of 
various liquids of the gas-making process (Tsica Heritage Consultants 2010).  The 
Gasworks was established in 1927, and first managed by the Department of Water 
and Gas in Johannesburg’s City Council. 
Gas production from coal 
Between 1928 and 1991 hydrogen-rich coal-based gas was produced at the 
Cottesloe Gas Works.  This manufacturing process was highly polluting; and by-
products of the coal-to-gas process included coke, coal tar, ammonia, and sulphur.  
Tar, ammonia and other impurities were gravity fed to the “tar and liquor well.”  Coke 
was used by the works itself for heating purposes, and sold to other industries for the 
same purpose.  Approximately 25 000 tons of coke were produced as a by-product 
annually.  Tar could be used for laying roads, pathways, protective coating.  Tar oil 
and black varnish were also sold (Tsica Heritage Consultants 2010). 
Closing of coal to gas plant in 1992 
From the 1960s, a decline was seen in gas production due to the decision to start 
supplementing gas supply with that of Sasol.  In 1988 the decision was taken to 
close the plant, and in 1992 the then-called Metro Gas ceased production of coal-
based gas on site.  From then onwards Egoli Gas purchased its entire requirement 
from Sasol Gas.   
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During this time, the public also began to raise concerns regarding the yellow smoke 
from the retort stacks and apparent contamination of the Braamfontein Spruit by the 
Gasworks.  It could not clearly be ascertained from the data sources if these claims 
were substantiated (Tsica Heritage Consultants 2010). 
Gas supply and activities from 1992 to present 
The city council intended to demolish certain parts of the buildings and machinery 
after the closure of the coal-to-gas plant.  However, a prolonged negotiation ensued 
with the National Monuments Council (NMC). This Council required a Heritage 
Conservation Management Plan to be undertaken due to the heritage value of the 
buildings and infrastructure (Tsica Heritage Consultants 2010).   
Nevertheless, certain portions of the site were leased out.  Prior to selling the site, 
thieves stripped many of the machines and valuable metal parts.  The old unused 
buildings have been steadily deteriorating ever since, and remain in a dilapidated 
and structurally dangerous state (Tsica Heritage Consultants 2010).   
Privatisation was realised in 2000 when the Egoli Gas Consortium bought the works 
and established Egoli Gas (Pty) Ltd (http://www.egoligas.co.za).  The gas distribution 
function of the site has increased, gas pipelines to customers improved, and the 
business has become more efficient and profitable.  The high-pressure gas storage 
site of SASOL is at Langlaagte, with the low-pressure storage and distribution on 
site, to approximately 12 000 end-users.   
Further upgrades and extensions are planned as part of a R300 million expansion 
plan (Egoli Gas 2014).  The owners of the site have been considering the 
redevelopment of the derelict portion of the site since the early 2000s.  This initiative 
reached a high point in 2011, but was never implemented (Davie 2011). 
4.2.2. Description of data sources 
Each data source is described here to confirm its nature, origin, reliability, objectivity 
and its relation to the study topic. 
City of Johannesburg Spatial Development Framework (CoJ 2003) 
This document as data source is discussed in section 4.1.2 
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2010 Region F Spatial Development Framework 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Section 4.1.2 (page 78) above contains a discussion on the origin, reliability and 
objectivity of the equivalent regional SDF. 
Relation to the study topic 
The Region F SDF refers to the Inner City area, which includes the Egoli Gas site as 
part of sub-area 1. This area comprises mostly of institutional uses.  One of the 
development objectives set out was to support land uses complimentary to 
institutional land use, including high-density residential uses, but excluding large 
scale retail and industrial uses (City of Johannesburg 2010b). 
The document addressed municipal infrastructure, land use, and transport corridors 
close to the case study site. This policy document is relevant to the research 
question. 
Draft NEMA Basic Assessment Report 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report was compiled by Velcich & 
Louw in 2011 as part of the EIA process undertaken for the proposed 
redevelopment, under the 2010 NEMA EIA Regulations.  These regulations require 
the relevant Environmental Assessment Practitioner (EAP) to remain objective and 
independent in their reporting and assessment.  The report was written by reputable 
environmental consultants. 
Most of the information used for the EIA report is sourced from specialist 
investigations as part of the EIA process. Such studies include geotechnical, storm 
water design, soil vapour survey, civil engineering services, electrical services, 
ecology, and archaeology (Van der Westhuizen 2011).   Due to these reasons, the 
report is expected to be reliable and objective. 
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Relation to the study topic 
The report, and particularly its public participation annexure, provides insight to 
contamination, land use options, municipal services, provincial/local government, 
and stakeholder engagement (public and government) for the proposed 
redevelopment of the Egoli Gas site. It is highly relevant to the case study and 
research question. 
Egoli Gas Site Remediation Plan 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Georem was appointed by the site owner in 2006 to advise them on the 
management and remediation of contamination on site as part of the redevelopment 
process.  The company is well known in the mining industry for its environmental 
sampling, as well as remediation work for soil and groundwater media.  The report 
served as a specialist study for the EIA process, and summarised most of the 
previous soil and groundwater investigations undertaken by various other 
consultants. 
 The objectivity of the site remediation plan may be questioned, as the company 
would have been contracted to undertake the work should authorities have accepted 
the plan.  However, as the company works regularly with environmental consultants 
and authorities, it appears professional and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
The report provides insight to the level of contamination on the site, and the 
management of risk as a result thereof. The report also suggests suitable land uses 
based on the level of risk across the site and makes reference to certain 
contaminated land policies that needed to be adhered to. The report is highly 
relevant to the case study and the research question. 
Health-based risk assessment 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Georem appointed Infotox in 2011 to undertake a phase one review of available 
information and a health-risk assessment of contamination levels on site.  The 
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assignment was based on Georem’s site work and remediation plan.  Infotox was to 
identify further work required to implement the remediation plan (van Niekerk 2011).   
Relation to the study topic 
The report considered the same information as the site remediation plan, but its 
focus was the human health risk of contamination and related land uses. The report 
is highly relevant to the case study and the research question. 
Egoli Gas Precinct Plan for a Mixed Use Development 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
GAPP was appointed by Egoli Gas to develop the development’s precinct plan.  As 
the plan was drafted for the redevelopment in 2010, the information is primary and 
reliable.  In a similar fashion to the EIA document, the precinct plan considered many 
specialist studies, including civil engineering studies, a traffic assessment, a site 
remediation plan, town planning and the EIA (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers 
2010).  GAPP is a well-known consultant in private and public sector assignments, 
and the proposals made appear to be objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
This plan considers contamination risk and related proposed land use, various City of 
Johannesburg planning policies, municipal services availability, stakeholder 
comments and support. The report is highly relevant to the case study and the 
research question. 
Egoli Gas Works Heritage Report 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
A heritage assessment had to be completed in terms of National Heritage Act (1998) 
prior to the development due to the fact that the Gasworks is more than 60 years old. 
The report was completed by Tsica Heritage Consultants in 2010. The relevant 
approvals were obtained from the various heritage authorities at local, provincial and 
national levels. 
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Relation to the study topic 
This document provides a detailed history of the case study site and its operations, 
which is relevant for understanding the location of the various activities on site.  It 
also provides details of the ownership changes, which in turn relates to 
apportionment of liability and responsibility for remediation. The report is highly 
relevant to the case study and the research question. 
Annual Report of the Competition Commission of South Africa 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The 2001 annual report of the Competition Commission provides an overview of the 
cases it considered during the time period.  The sale of the city’s Metro Gas to the 
Egoli consortium is summarised in the report.  The Department of Trade and Industry 
was the author of the report.  As it is an annual report with full financial and other 
information related to its operations, it has to comply with audit rules and regulations. 
The report appears to be reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
This document confirms the transfer of ownership of the property, which is an 
important aspect of the redevelopment of this brownfields site, as it relates to the 
legal entity responsible for contamination and the liability for remediation. 
News Archive, City of Johannesburg website (http://www.joburg.gov.za) 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Section 4.1.2 (page 82) above contains a discussion on the origin, reliability and 
objectivity of the equivalent regional SDF. 
One particular article published on 11 November 2011 describes the proposed 
redevelopment, and contains verbatim statements by the CEO, Mr Quintus Joubert as 
well as Barry Senior from GAPP.   The article has the same verbatim quotes and broad 
content as the article published in the Mail & Guardian of the same date, 11 November 
2011.  It appears that these articles had a similar source, probably a media briefing or 
statement from Egoli Gas. 
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Relation to the study topic 
The Gas Works specific article provides insight to the case study in terms of 
chronology of events and details of the redevelopment process and various 
applications made. 
Mail and Guardian Newspaper (http://www.mg.co.za/) 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
An article published on 11 November 2011 by L. Davie, describes the proposed 
redevelopment, and verbatim statements by the CEO, Mr Quintus Joubert as well as 
Barry Senior from GAPP.    The article has the same verbatim quotes and broad 
content as the article published on the City of Johannesburg’s website of the same 
date, 11 November 2016. It appears that these articles had a similar source, 
probably a media briefing or statement from Egoli Gas. Its objectivity and reliability is 
expected to be moderate. 
Relation to the study topic 
The specific article provides insight to the case study in terms of chronology of 
events and details of the redevelopment process.  Aspects discussed include the 
various applications made, indications on how contamination has hampered private 
investment previously, remediation activities on site, value of investment and 
proposed land uses. 
4.2.3. Presentation and analysis of data 
The description of the case study over time is presented here.  This section represents 
the data provided where information provided in data sources are consistent with each 
other. 
Aspects where no data could be found 
Various data, related to this case study, could not be obtained: 
 Apportionment of liability between City of Johannesburg and Metro Gas at the time 
of the land sale could not be determined. 
 It could not be determined if the statutory applications, namely the town planning 
and EIA applications were approved. 
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 It is not clear from the data if the tender document was issued to tenderers or not.  
The newspaper articles of November 2011 were the latest data in the public domain 
regarding the development. 
 No data could be obtained indicating whether the tenderers would have assumed 
any liability for contamination and remediation should they have been successful 
in the bid. 
 It is not known if any of the remediation actions were undertaken. 
 The data did not provide a clear indication of why the Egoli Gas redevelopment did 
not take place. 
Sale of Metro gas to the Egoli Gas Consortium (2000) 
The Competition Commission approved the sale (including the property) between 
Metro Gas and the Egoli Gas Consortium, focusing on the privatisation of gas sales 
to consumers, employment issues, and noting that Metro Gas was a failing company 
(Competition Commission 2001).  No mention is made in the annual report of the 
aspect of contamination or related liability. 
Newspaper interviews of 2004 with the CEO at the time, Quintus Joubert, confirm 
that Egoli Gas had been considering redeveloping part of the site since 2001 (City of 
Johannesburg 2011b; Kloppers 2004).  Many developers have been interested in 
undertaking the redevelopment, but contamination of the site has always been a 
challenge preventing this (Davie 2011).   
This intent to redevelop the site was in line with city policy at the time.  The overall 
city SDF, compiled in 2003, was entitled “A Growth Management Approach.”  The 
document made reference to vacant land and brownfield sites that should be 
developed in order to support densification and infill development.  It further 
proposed an upgrade and regeneration programme, primarily focused on the Inner 
City (City of Johannesburg 2003a).  This city-wide SDF does not make any specific 
reference to the site itself, nor the area surrounding the site. 
Determination of soil and groundwater contamination 
SRK, Groundwater Consulting Services and Metago Environmental Engineers have 
undertaken various phases of contamination assessments, groundwater 
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assessments and monitoring on site between 1996 and 2000.  Metago then 
continued with groundwater monitoring for the next decade (Georem International 
2011).  It appears from Georem’s report that groundwater monitoring was ongoing. 
Georem International has done significant work since the mid-2000s in determining 
the location, depth, distribution and levels of contamination on site as a result of the 
coal to gas process.  The company considered all previous studies and reports 
during its investigations.  Georem conducted a soil vapour survey of more than 200 
points across the site, which largely confirmed findings of previous studies (GAPP 
Architects and Urban Designers 2010). 
Georem’s understanding of the studies and status of contamination on the site is 
summarised below. 
It was initially found that the top two metres, and in isolated areas up to six metres, 
of soil and fill material in the eastern section of the site were contaminated with 
various Poly-aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH) and some inorganic pollutants.  This area 
of the site was referred to as the “valley-fill area”.  A shallow weathered aquifer within 
the fill material was found to be contaminated, and causing cross-contamination of 
the deeper shale aquifer.   
Similar PAH contaminants were present in mostly the upper three metres of the soil 
of the decommissioned plant area.  On-site boreholes down-slope from the plant 
area all contained organic and inorganic contamination, with the highest levels 
around the plant area.   
Early indications were that the contaminants had not yet migrated off-site.  
Concentrations of contaminants decreased markedly towards the north of the site, 
indicating that the contaminants were not very mobile or soluble (Georem 
International 2011). 
The Braamfontein Spruit was also formalised into a pipe on site, preventing to some 
extent the migration of contaminants northwards from site via surface drainage  (Van 
der Westhuizen 2011). 
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Upstream off-site sources of contamination 
Water quality from the direction of Sturrock Park contained inorganic contamination, 
which was thought to be from the old landfill located beneath Sturrock Park.  
However, after the installation of a monitoring well on the Sturrock Park property, it 
was confirmed that Sturrock Park’s contribution was not significant (Georem 
International 2011). 
  
Figure 10: Area of Contamination (GAPP 2010: 31) 
 
Continuous monitoring 
Metago’s wider monitoring programme included monitoring of up- and downstream 
water has also been continuous since 1996.  Monitoring was conducted at 
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seventeen on- and off-site wells on a quarterly basis.  Findings from this wider 
monitoring programme show that the pumping of off-site boreholes at the University 
of Johannesburg and John Orr School may be creating preferential flow paths 
towards these boreholes, necessitating more eastern/western perimeter monitoring 
holes (Georem International 2011).  It appears from Georem’s report that monitoring 
is ongoing. 
The redevelopment proposal 
Appointment of professional team 
It is evident from the appointment and completion dates of specialist reports as part 
of the EIA that the first appointment of consultants for the redevelopment was in 
2008.  The planning stage of the redevelopment was at its peak between 2009 and 
2011.   
Specialist studies conducted to support the environmental and town planning 
applications included a geotechnical investigation, an "engineering services outline 
scheme report," a health-based site risk assessment, a contamination remediation 
plan, an ecological study, an archaeology, and a traffic impact assessment (Van der 
Westhuizen 2011). 
The two most important statutory applications made were a land use planning 
application (in terms of the Town Planning Ordinance of 1985) by Steve Jaspan and 
Associates (2011), and an environmental authorisation (in terms of the NEMA 2010 
EIA Regulations) by Velcich & Louw (2011). 
The Heritage Conservation Management Plan, compiled by Tsica Heritage 
Consultants (2010), was part of the development proposals for the site, specifying 
the significance of each building and structure and how these can be preserved.  
These were incorporated into the development proposal by GAPP (2010). 
Suitability of the site for the proposed redevelopment 
Alignment with local government planning policies 
The 2010/2011 version of the Region F Spatial Development Framework was 
compiled on a detailed level per area.  Region F includes the site, as part of sub-
area 1. 
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Infrastructure investment was prioritised along the Empire Road corridor to support 
mixed development uses due to the proximity of the Rea Vaya along Empire Road.  
Such mixed-use should have included inclusionary and gap market housing.  Land 
use changes complementary to the institutional belt, including high density 
residential uses, were supported by the city (City of Johannesburg 2010b). 
Apart from the large retail component, the redevelopment proposal was aligned to 
the 2010 Region F Spatial Development Framework. 
Limitation: The town planning memorandum by Steven Jaspan and Associates could 
not be obtained as a data source.  This memorandum would have described and 
motivated how the development proposal aligned with the latest spatial development 
framework for the area. 
Surrounding land use 
Atlas film studio, 44 Stanley Avenue, Garden Court Hotel and Johannesburg 
Chamber of Commerce are in the precinct between Empire, Owl, and Barry Hertzog 
Roads, where numerous old industrial buildings were refurbished and re-used.  
Institutional, residential and commercial development thus surrounded the site 
(GAPP Architects and Urban Designers 2010).     
Despite the 2008 recession, there were some major developments in the immediate 
area around the site prior to 2010.  These were residential, office, and institutional 
developments; and included niche apartments and professional offices, film studios 
and advertising firms (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers 2010). 
Transportation access and municipal services 
Empire Road is a major east-west route to the north of the site.  The Rea Vaya 
system also runs along this road.  Enoch Sontonga to the south of the site is also an 
east-west road, linking Braamfontein with Vrededorp.  Annet Road on the western 
boundary of the site connects these larger arterials and provides access to the site.  
Frost Avenue offers an extra entry point to the site.  Empire Road offers an on- and 
off-ramp to the M1 Highway less than 3 km from the site.  The site, therefore, has 
excellent local and regional transportation access. 
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Apart from electricity provision, which would require the developer to fund a new 
substation, other existing municipal services could accommodate the development.  
These services included bulk water, storm water, and sewage (GAPP Architects and 
Urban Designers 2010). 
Georem’s Site Remediation Plan 
As part of the redevelopment planning, Georem compiled a site remediation plan in 
2011, which was an updated version of work originally conducted in 2006.  The 
integrated approach included systematic planning of activities, dynamic work 
strategies, and real-time measurement technologies.   The systematic planning of 
remediation was to be incorporated into the final development proposal, so that 
excavation and soil movement costs could be limited.  A combination of methods 
was proposed, depending on contamination levels and health risk.   
Excavation of soil was only to be undertaken in hotspot areas where on-site 
treatment was not possible.  Between 1,500 and 2,000 m3 of heavily contaminated 
soils were to be excavated and removed to a registered hazardous waste disposal 
site. 
The pumping of oxygen-saturated water via subsurface wells (referred to as bio-
venting) was proposed to assist the natural process of breakdown of hydrocarbons 
by microorganisms of remaining areas with lower levels of contamination.  The 
injection of chemical oxidants was also suggested as an additional measure to break 
down PAH structures to more degradable compounds.  This injection method was 
proposed for the valley fill area as well as the plant area. 
The pumping and treatment of contaminated groundwater was proposed from 
concentrated contamination points.  A range of on-surface treatments was 
considered, including chemical additions remediate pH, air stripping, carbon 
absorption, biological treatment, and UV oxidation.  The purpose of the pump-and-
treat method was not the removal of all contaminants, but rather those that are high 
in concentration and solubility.  The effluent from the treatment process would be 
directed to the sewer system. 
The valley-fill area was to be capped with clean soil after initial excavation and in-situ 
treatment.  Clean soil would be placed over the contaminated soil to prevent volatile 
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organic compounds being released into the atmosphere (as bio-organisms break 
these down).  Healthy soil, with seeding, would assist with natural assimilation. 
Impermeable capping was proposed for the old plant area.  If elevated VOC release 
was still measured in the plant area after remediation, an impermeable capping with 
bentonite clay or high-density polyethylene would be installed.  This method would 
ensure good indoor air quality for future building users and include ongoing 
monitoring. 
The migration of contaminants via groundwater northwards was not an identified 
issue, and the above remediation measures were to be implemented as part of the 
redevelopment. For these reasons, the proposal for a cut-off trench with a permeable 
reactive barrier was disregarded. 
As there was no pertinent legislation on remediation standards at the time in South 
Africa, international standards would have been used, and finer detailed work plans 
and remediation outcomes agreed between the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), 
site owner and stakeholders (Van der Westhuizen 2011).  The costs of the various 
remediation initiatives above were not discussed nor available (Georem International 
2011). 
Health-based risk assessment 
The risk assessment undertaken by Infotox in 2011 identified the absence of a 
conceptual groundwater model for the site as a shortcoming of the work undertaken 
to date.  Infotox further concluded that site safety for human use could only be 
achieved after the remediation plan proposed by Georem was completed, further 
tests conducted and a land release document compiled, as was the practice in the 
US (van Niekerk 2011). 
The proposed redevelopment proposal 
A comprehensive urban design precinct plan for mixed-use development was 
compiled in 2010 (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers 2010).  Land uses included 
retaining the Egoli Gas offices and distribution centre, the conversion of the old retort 
houses into a hotel, retail and lifestyle area, the development of mixed-use office and 
residential use east and south of the old retort houses, student accommodation on 
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the uncontaminated area in the south, and a park area on the contaminated valley fill 
area.   
The total bulk building surface was estimated to be approximately 100 000 m2 
(GAPP Architects and Urban Designers 2010; Van der Westhuizen 2011).  The 
development cost was estimated at R1 billion in 2011 (City of Johannesburg, 2011). 
  
Figure 11: Redevelopment Plan for Egoli Gas site (GAPP 2010, p. 40) 
Apart from the ongoing operations of Egoli Gas, no new industrial land uses were 
proposed for the site.  Of the proposed 100 000 m2 of development (excluding open 
space), the percentages of each land use were 10% for retail, 40% for offices, 4% for 
hotel and 46% for residential (including combined upper income and student 
accommodation). 
Civil engineering proposals included the construction of a storm water attenuation 
dam at the downstream (northern) side of the site on top of the Braamfontein Spruit 
channel.  This dam was to comply with the city council’s requirement for storm water 
attenuation (Van der Westhuizen 2011). 
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Development phasing proposed at the time 
The strategic first phase of the project would have been a retail development in the 
gasworks buildings, supported by offices, a hotel, and residential use.  The first 
phase would have served as catalyst for further investment (GAPP Architects and 
Urban Designers 2010). 
Stakeholder engagement outcome on the redevelopment proposal 
It is clear that extensive public consultation was undertaken, as is evident from public 
participation annexure of the Draft Basic Assessment (BA) Report (Van der 
Westhuizen 2011).  The Environmental Assessment Practitioner (EAP) consulted 
with a broad range of stakeholders, including universities, resident associations, 
students, developers, individuals and a range of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs).  Meetings, letters, emails and telephone calls were recorded in the 
comments and response report - a standard procedure when conducting EIAs. 
It is clear from the comments and responses received from stakeholders, that there 
is general support for the development, but with a number of stakeholder issues, 
such as heritage, land use, and links to adjacent sites.  There was also a clear 
attempt by the various consultants appointed to take into consideration and update 
the development proposals, based on these stakeholder concerns (Van der 
Westhuizen 2011). 
Comments from the City of Johannesburg on applications for the redevelopment 
It is clear from an internal memorandum from the Environmental Management 
Section of the City (5 August 2010) regarding the town planning application, that no 
objection was raised, nor was any mention made of contamination on the site.   
The same environmental management section of the City commented on the Draft 
BA report with its specialist studies to the GDARD in August 2010.  These comments 
indicate an understanding of the pertinent issues of the site, and refer to the need to 
comply with the regulations of the National Water Act (1998).  The memorandum 
further notes that the land use alternative of open space for the entire site was not 
duly considered in the report, especially considering the contaminated nature of the 
site. The BA report was believed to be biased due to the Braamfontein Spruit already 
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being modified into a channel, proposing that rehabilitation of the stream should be 
considered (Van der Westhuizen 2011). 
Preliminary comments from GDARD 
At the time of the applications, it was standard practice for the competent authority 
for the environmental application to comment on the draft EIA report before 
submission of the final version.  In this case, the only comment received from 
GDARD at the time was that a contamination remediation plan for the contaminated 
soil and ground water should be included in the application (Van der Westhuizen 
2011). 
Absence of comments from Department of Water Affairs 
Despite numerous attempts, the appointed environmental consultant was not able to 
solicit comments from the then Department of Water Affairs during its comment 
period.  The report with all its annexures was submitted to the Department.  The 
relevant specialist at National Office to which it was allocated, never submitted 
comments on the Draft BA report, and the consultant opted to submit the Final BA 
Report to GDARD, indicating DWA comments would be presented if received from 
the Department (Van der Westhuizen 2011). 
Receiving comments or approval from DWA would have been vital for the GDARD to 
make a decision on the environmental application. 
Tenders for redevelopment 
Based on interviews with GAPP Architects and the same company CEO as in 2004, 
Mr. Quintus Joubert, the Mail and Guardian reported in November 2011 that Egoli 
Gas would issue a tender in early 2012 for the intended redevelopment (Davie 
2011).  From these interviews, it appears that the plans for redevelopment were still 
on track at the time.  The rezoning application to the City had reportedly also been 
made by this time, with approvals expected in 2012.  Construction was to commence 
in the fourth quarter of 2012 (City of Johannesburg 2011b). 
It is not clear from the data if the tender document was in fact issued to tenderers.  
The newspaper articles of November 2011 are the latest data in the public domain 
regarding the development. 
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Macro-economic conditions at the time of the tenders 
The GDP growth rate was negative in 2009, but grew to 3.1% in 2010 due to 
development and infrastructure investment associated with the Soccer World Cup in 
2010.  The finance minister at the time estimated an increase of 0.4% in GDP for the 
year 2010 (Steyn 2015).  It appears from Table 2 below that 2011 and 2012 were 
years with poor economic growth. 
Table 2: Residential property growth and GDP growth for South Africa between 2007 and 2015 
Year Property Growth % GDP Growth % 
2007 22.4 5.5 
2008 -0.5 3.6 
2009 0.4 -1.5 
2010 2.4 3.1 
2011 1.1 3.6 
2012 2.3 2.5 
2013 4 2.2 
2014 7.4 1.6 
2015 5.8 1.3 
(Sources: ABSA, Reserve Bank South Africa 2016) 
4.2.4. Preliminary analysis of the Egoli Gas case study 
Based on the data investigated, the following aspects, derived from the review of the 
literature, suggest reasons for the failure in implementing the development. 
Remediation was probably not part of the responsibilities of the developer or main 
contractor in the tender document envisaged at the end of 2011.  If this was the 
case, such developers would have experienced difficulty in obtaining support from 
commercial banks, due to the related cost and liability uncertainty, as noted by 
Theron (2010), potentially leading to redevelopment failure. 
Given the speciality of remediation required, it is likely that only Georem would have 
been considered for the remediation contract.  No estimate could be found in the 
data for the cost of implementing the remediation plan.   The uncertainty of the 
remediation costs could have led to difficulty in obtaining funding. 
By the end of 2011, consultation with authorities was still underway, and therefore 
approvals had not yet been obtained.  Agreement with stakeholders such as DWA 
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and City of Johannesburg was still to be undertaken.  If agreement on the 
remediation standards could not be reached with competent and commenting 
authorities, it could have resulted in a delay in obtaining statutory approvals.  Such 
delays could have contributed to redevelopment failure.   
As the site was not in the UDZ area where tax incentives were available, this could 
have lowered the medium-term return on investment of the proposed redevelopment, 
but not likely to have influenced the decision from developers to tender, as the UDZ 
was not a primary attractor for investment even in the Inner City (Mwangala 2010; 
Johannesburg Development Agency 2015). 
From the findings of Seeliger & Turok (2015) that only a few niche developers were 
interested in the risk of inner city and brownfield redevelopment projects, it can be 
deduced that developer interest in tenders for the Egoli Gas site with known 
contamination may have been limited. 
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4.3. AECI Modderfontein 
4.3.1. Introduction and context 
The Modderfontein area of Johannesburg is to the east and southeast of the 
Buccleuch N1/N3 Highway interchange.  The site borders Linbro Park agricultural 
holdings to the east, Tembisa and its various extensions to the northwest along 
Allandale Road, and the R25 to Bapsfontein on its southern boundary Figure 12.  
The site is located in Ward 32, Sub-area 19 of Planning Region E of Johannesburg. 
This case study site includes all the AECI land that became available for sale or 
redevelopment after the deregulation of the Explosives Act buffer circa 1999, around 
the remaining operational area (see Figure 12). 
The case study site is in a tertiary catchment area of the Modderfontein Spruit, which 
drains in a north-westerly direction into the Jukskei River (see Figure 13). 
Surrounding current land use 
The land uses surrounding the site vary.  A cemetery and the Gautrain Depot are the 
only forms of development on the remaining vacant area to the northwest of the site, 
where the Modderfontein Spruit has its confluence with the Jukskei River.  Low-
density residential areas include Linbro Park agricultural holdings (A.H.) and Glen 
Austin A.H. further north.  High density residential areas such as Alexandra and 
Tembisa, and the western suburbs of Kempton Park are adjoined with industrial 
areas like Kelvin, Isando and Chloorkop around the study site.  The newly developed 
mixed land use estates of Heartland Properties are also situated around the site. 
Transportation access and municipal services 
Transportation access includes main feeder routes such as Allandale Road, the N3 
Highway, and the R25.  The Gautrain’s Marlboro Station is located approximately 
one kilometre west of the site.  Its route between Pretoria and OR Tambo Airport 
runs along the western boundary and through the southern area of the site. The 
Modderfontein Station is proposed on the site itself. 
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(Black border indicates AECI land holdings in 2013, Yellow indicates developable and saleable land, Red indicates AEL 
operational area) 
Figure 12: Local context of AECI’s land holdings and disposable buffer land around the AEL operational 
area (source: Google, AfriGIS 2016, Zendai 2014) 
Manufacturing and pollution history 
The Modderfontein Dynamite Factory started in 1896 to manufacture explosives for 
the mining industry in South Africa, which grew tremendously in the following century 
(Brodie 2014).  The Kynoch factory and the Cape-based company Cape Explosives 
Works merged with the Nobel Industries in 1923, to become African Explosives and 
Chemical Industries (AECI) as it is known today (Booth 2011). 
With the ammonia synthesis process introduced in 1932, the nitrate load into natural 
waters increased.  Various extensions to these manufacturing plants ensued in the 
following decades.  From 1977, the making of nitro-glycerine was undertaken by a 
semi-automated process in the interests of safety.  By 1983 the Modderfontein 
Factory was the largest diversified commercial explosives factory in the world 
(Breier-Menke & Moffat 1987). 
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Figure 13: Site context of Modderfontein site (source: Surveyor General 2016) 
Explosives Act buffer zone 
Approximately 3 000 hectares was largely undeveloped around the perimeter around 
the factory to comply with the requirements of the Explosives Act of 1956, thereby 
providing a safe buffer zone (Breier-Menke & Moffat 1987).  AECI retained the 
ownership of these undeveloped properties. 
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Nitrogen waste and effluent from manufacturing 
1956 Water Act and its implications 
Pollution of the Modderfontein Spruit by AECI was probably at a peak in the late 
1950s.  This pollution was caused due to the ongoing expansions of the explosives 
manufacturing process that resulted in an increased pollutant load in effluent water.  
This increased pollutant load therefore had an impact on natural waters downstream 
of the facility. 
AECI started collecting data in 1962 in order to monitor its activities in an effort to 
meet the standards of the 1956 Water Act discharge standards to public streams.  
Wastewater was classified as “weak” or “strong" based on the nitrogen 
concentrations (Breier-Menke & Moffat 1987). 
Application of the “strong” effluent, in the form of liquid fertiliser, on adjacent pastures 
was begun on initially 1 500 hectares surrounding the facilities, with the addition of 
another 600 ha at a later stage.  These fields were used as feed for rearing cattle, 
under the supervision of AECI’s dedicated team of agricultural scientists (Altona et 
al. 1983).  After implementing a range of solutions in the early 1960s to reduce 
nitrogen loads, effluent with high nitrogen loads to Dam Four reduced by more than 
70% (Altona et al. 1983).   
Construction of denitrification ponds in 1976 
Due to the increasing nitrogen loads being released into natural waters, two new 
denitrification ponds were constructed in 1976.   The efficiency of nitrogen use and 
fixing after the completion of the denitrification ponds was estimated at 99.9% in 
1983.  From this data, it can be deduced that nitrogen levels were managed within 
acceptable levels from this date onwards (Altona et al. 1983).   
Nitrate loads in AECI’s No. 4 Effluent Dam 
Elevated levels of nitrates in the Jukskei system could likely be linked to the 
Modderfontein Spruit and mining activities in the Central Rand area (Van Veelen & 
Van Zyl 1995).  Van Veelen and Van Zyl argued that these loads were generated by 
the AECI operations, which is no longer active.  These elevated nitrate levels are 
supported by reports dating back to 1955 of downstream users complaining about 
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water quality in the Modderfontein Spruit, due to the ever-increasing loads of 
wastewater from the factory (Breier-Menke & Moffat 1987). 
Water quality of the Modderfontein Spruit 
An analysis was done by Huizenga & Harmse in 2005 on the historic water quality of 
the Jukskei River.  The monitoring data for this study was only available for the years 
of 1994 – 1997. The assessment focused on whether it was geological or human-
made pollution sources that were responsible for the low PH, high sulphate 
concentrations and elevated levels of other inorganic constituents such as 
phosphate, nitrate, and chloride in the early 1980s.   
The Modderfontein Spruit was found to be one of the contributors to pollution of the 
Jukskei (Huizenga & Harmse 2005).  Possible sources of pollution identified included 
AECI and the Kelvin Power Station (KPS), as these were the largest industries along 
the Modderfontein Spruit, as well as the Isando industrial area, which is upstream of 
these facilities. No liability was apportioned.  The levels of nitrates in the 
Modderfontein and Jukskei were very similar, indicating that AECI did not contribute 
abnormal nitrate loads to the Modderfontein Spruit.  The potential source of low pH 
and high sulphates in the Jukskei River was possibly related to gold mining activities, 
known to cause these effects (Huizenga & Harmse 2005).  This was determined by 
comparative water chemistry analysis between water from the Klein-Jukskei and the 
Central Rand area, but the process of how the contaminated groundwater entered 
the Jukskei remains unclear (Huizenga & Harmse 2005, p.444) 
Stakeholder engagement 
AECI established a Community Awareness and Emergency Response Committee 
(CAER) in 1995 as a forum for reporting on complaints and incidents at the factory.  
The committee meets every two months and minutes of meetings are made 
available to the public on AEL’s website 
(http://www.aelminingservices.com/operations/other-operations/caer-charter). 
It therefore appears that the company has some form of commitment to stakeholder 
engagement on a regular basis. 
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Redevelopment activities since 2000 
In 1999, Heartland Properties was established as a subsidiary of AECI in order to 
develop or sell off undeveloped land that became available as a result of the 
Explosives Act buffer zone no longer being a requirement.  In the following 14 years, 
the company successfully developed numerous estates with residential, commercial 
and office use, thus fulfilling its mandate (AECI 2000; Heartland Properties 2008; 
Heartland Properties 2012; AECI Limited 1999). 
In 2013, the remaining 1 600 hectares of the buffer zone was sold to the Hong Kong 
based property developer Zendai.  The sale included all the assets and transfer of 
staff of Heartland Properties (Republic of South Africa 2014). Zendai has been in 
process of planning and developing the first stages of “Modderfontein City” since the 
purchase (Zendai et al. 2015).   
 
4.3.2. Description of data sources 
Each data source is described here to confirm its nature, origin, reliability, objectivity 
and its relation to the study topic. 
Disposal of wastewater from Modderfontein Factory: review of the biological 
nitrogen removal systems 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Employees of AECI authored this published academic article in 1983. This increases 
credibility, since they would have privileged information regarding the operations. 
Relation to the study topic 
The article provides history of the case study site regarding contaminants and its 
management as well as activities on the Explosives Act buffer zone. 
Industrial Water Management: Changing Perspectives 1937 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Employees of AECI authored this published academic article in 1987. This increases 
credibility, since they would have privileged information regarding the operations. 
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Relation to the study topic 
The article provides history of the case study site regarding contaminants and its 
management as well as activities on the Explosives Act buffer zone. 
1999 AECI Limited Annual Report 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The 1999 annual report to shareholders is governed by certain auditing regulations 
and scrutinised by a wide range of stakeholders.  An annual report is a legal 
requirement of a listed company. It is therefore expected to be a reliable data source 
with correct facts. 
Relation to the study topic 
The report confirms the intent to dispose the non-operational assets, including land 
through the establishment of Heartland Properties in 1999.  Reference is made to 
limited areas of contamination that would have to be remediated prior to such land 
development or sale activities.  The intent to redevelop brownfield sites owned by the 
company is confirmed. 
South Africa to import urea 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This magazine article from 2000 was also published on the Engineering News 
website.  It can be expected that the information would be objective and fairly 
reliable. 
Relation to the study topic 
The article confirms the decommissioning of AEL’s number four ammonia plant, and 
the sale of a controlling stake in Kynoch Fertilisers to an international company. 
2003 City of Johannesburg Spatial Development Framework 
This document as data source is discussed in section 4.1.2. 
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Environmental Impact Report for Isidleke Development, Modderfontein 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This EIA Report was compiled by an independent environmental consultant in 2005, 
and is therefore expected to be objective and reliable.  Oryx Environmental also has 
a strong track record in the environmental industry.  The company was 
commissioned by Heartland Properties for one of the ongoing redevelopment 
projects on AECI land. 
Relation to the study topic 
The report confirms contamination of nitrogen and manganese at selected sites, and 
particularly at effluent Dam No. 4. It is therefore relevant to the study topic. 
Scoping Report & Plan of study for EIA Relocation of the Detonator Destructor 
Facility 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This EIA Report was compiled by an independent environmental consultant in 2007, 
and therefore expected to be objective and reliable.  Willchem cc has a proven track 
record in the environmental industry, specifically in the industrial and mining sector.  
The company was commissioned by Heartland Properties to compile the EIA for the 
relocation the detonator destructor facility on AECI land. 
Relation to the study topic 
The report provides insight into the planning of Heartland/AECI regarding future 
operations and new land uses.  AECI’s duty of care with regards to environmental 
management, specifically decontamination, is notable at a time when formal soil 
screening regulations were not yet available in South Africa.  This duty of care and 
forward planning approach may have been an associated success factor for 
brownfields redevelopment on the case study site. 
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2007 AECI Corporate Citizenship Report: Case Study - Rehabilitation of 
Modderfontein's Dam No. 4 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
As part of its corporate citizenship report in 2007, AECI discussed the rehabilitation 
effluent dam No. 4.  The reporting style appears to be scientific and reliable.  As 
AECI’s 2007 annual report includes the case study site, it adds to reliability, as 
stakeholders and shareholders would have scrutinised the report. 
Relation to the study topic 
This case study description confirms contamination of Dam No. 4, and the need for 
remediation, which is part of the case study description. 
AECI and Heartland Properties Presentations to Investors 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Heartland/AECI likely compiled these presentations internally for its investors in 
2008, 2012 and 2013.  Information is expected to be reliable, as investors would 
have scrutinised the presentation.  It is expected to be reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic of Heartland’s 2008 presentation 
This presentation provides insight to the planning activities of Heartland at the time 
of economic downturn.  The status of redevelopment and land ownership is also 
indicated. The significant cost of required infrastructure investments for future 
redevelopment and development is also shown. 
Relation to the study topic of Heartland’s 2012 presentation 
This presentation provides insight to the planning activities of Heartland prior to the 
land sale to Zendai.  The status of redevelopment and land ownership prior to the 
land sale is also indicated. 
Relation to the study topic of AECI’s 2013 presentation 
This presentation provides insight to the planning activities of Heartland at the time 
prior to the land sale to Zendai. The status of redevelopment and land ownership 
prior to the land sale is also indicated. 
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Minutes of Modderfontein Community Liaison Meeting (Heartland Properties 
2009) 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Mr. Diepenbroek, the CEO of Heartland, chaired this meeting and was further the 
author of the minutes.  Various internal and community stakeholders attended the 
meeting on 5 March 2009.  As it was an open meeting, and vetted by the attendees, 
it is expected to be a reliable and objective data source. 
Relation to the study topic 
This document confirms some of the redevelopment activities of Heartland 
Properties.  It also confirms the rehabilitation of pollution attenuation Dam No. 4, as 
listed in other data sources. 
Heritage Impact Assessment for Modderfontein Village Development 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This heritage assessment was undertaken by an independent heritage consultant (R. 
Bosman) in 2010, and can be expected to be reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
This document provides a summary of the history of the case study site and its 
operations, which is relevant for understanding the location of the various activities 
on site.  It further provides an independent account of the site’s activities since 2000.  
The document is not used for heritage purposes, but rather a general data source. 
This report is relevant to the case study and the research question. 
2010 Region E Spatial Development Framework 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The origin, objectivity and reliability of this report has been discussed in section 4.2.2 
115 
Relation to the study topic 
The Region E SDF refers to the Alexandra/Sandton area, which includes the site as 
part of sub-area 19, which includes AECI Modderfontein and the surrounding 
suburbs. 
The 2011 Spatial Development Framework of Region E, the Alexandra / Sandton 
area, included the site as part of sub-area 19, AECI Modderfontein and the 
surrounding suburbs.  Sub-area 19 area comprised mostly institutional uses.  The 
main development objective was to “develop a high quality, sustainable human 
settlement” on the remaining vacant land (City of Johannesburg 2010a, p.154).   The 
SDF earmarked the sub-area for redevelopment, infill, and densification of the city.  It 
indicated the following:  “redevelopment and consolidation of the existing AECI 
factory and associated industrial areas” (City of Johannesburg 2010a, p.155). 
This document addressed municipal infrastructure, land use, and transport corridors 
of the case study site. This policy document is relevant to the research question. 
Presentation on AECI, Heartland, Zendai Transaction 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This presentation appears to have been jointly compiled between the two companies 
as part of the land sale agreement in 2013.  It is expected to be reliable and 
objective, and contains a summary of the structure, conditions, valuations, and maps 
relative to the commercial agreement. 
Relation to the study topic 
This document provides insight into the land sale agreement, and is relevant to the 
case study. 
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Shareholder Circular - major transaction in respect of the acquisition of 
property assets in Modderfontein, South Africa (Shanghai Zendai Property 
Limited, 2013) 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
Zendai sent a circular to all its shareholders prior to a special general meeting, with 
information regarding the intended land sale, as part of the condition of sale.  The 
document is expected to be reliable but perhaps not objective, as Zendai was 
directly involved. 
Relation to the study topic 
One of the aspects in the circular was that no detailed site investigations with 
regards to contamination, heritage or other such aspects, was done prior to the sale; 
and it was assumed that information provided by AECI was correct. 
This document provides insight into the land sale agreement, and is relevant to the 
case study. 
Proceedings of the Competition Commission on the land sale between AECI 
and Zendai 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
In 2014, the Competition Commission of South Africa had to consider to purchase as 
part of the conditions of the land sale agreement.  The proceedings of the 
Competition Commission are expected to be and objective and reliable data source. 
Relation to the study topic 
The document confirms the land sale, and it may provide other information and 
confirm facts from an independent source regarding the case study.  It is not 
otherwise related to the study topic. 
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The further evolution of South African environmental legal practice 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
The environmental department of Edward Nathan Sonnenberg (ENSafrica) wrote the 
article in the normal course of its business in 2014, providing comment and insight to 
environmental law in South Africa.  It is one of the well-known law firms in the 
country, therefore expected to be reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
ENSafrica was the legal advisor for the land sale agreement between Zendai and 
AECI, and would therefore have had particular insight to the negotiations.  This 
article indicates that environmental legacy issues were a key aspect of the 
transaction, due to the intended redevelopment including residential land use.  This 
suggests the presence of contamination, liability and requirements for remediation as 
part of the redevelopment. 
Modderfontein Regeneration: Final Workshop Report 
Origin, reliability, objectivity 
This document was drafted by Atkins and ARUP as main consultants to Zendai after 
its public workshop in July 2015.  It contains records from all the stakeholder 
consultations and planning undertaken for the proposed Modderfontein City, mainly 
in visual format. This document is comprehensive.  As it was subject to public 
scrutiny, it is expected to be reliable and objective. 
Relation to the study topic 
This document covers all development aspects, including contamination and related 
land use zoning proposals, comments and inputs from society and government.  It is 
probably the most relevant data source regarding the redevelopment proposals 
made for the case study site. 
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4.3.3. Presentation and analysis of data 
The description of the case study over time is presented here.  This section represents 
the data where information provided in data sources are consistent with each other. 
Aspects where no data could be found 
Various data, related to this case study, could not be obtained: 
 It is not clear if Zendai has made any formal statutory applications (EIA and town 
planning) after the land purchase. 
 Heartland’s funding source is not certain. 
Limitations 
The operations of African Explosives Limited (AEL) are ongoing (City of 
Johannesburg 2010a; AECI 2013).  AEL’s activities from 2000 onwards on the 
remaining 1 300 ha, excluded from the Zendai transaction in 2014, is not part of this 
case study.  This area includes the explosives magazines. 
Remaining areas of contamination in the buffer zone 
AECI detailed in its 1999 Annual Report that each of the properties to be developed 
has “pockets of contamination that are the legacy of up to 100 years of industrial 
operation”.  It further states that each of these areas was defined and characterised, 
and programmes put in place to remediate these affected areas (AECI Limited 
1999). 
Contamination at Kynoch Fertilisers 
Kynoch fertiliser terminated the manufacture of nitric acid and ammonia around 
2000, due to an agreement reached with SASOL for the supply of nitrogen needs of 
AECI, thus closing down the no. 4 ammonia plant (Engineering News 2000).  The 
site operations at the time of termination included two tailings facilities, presumed to 
be for gypsum.  In 2000, AECI sold its remaining stake in Kynoch but the property 
remained in AECI’s possession (AECI Limited 1999). 
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The Kynoch Fertiliser factory and its tailings facility were listed as contaminated land 
in the environmental sensitivity map as presented in the workshop report of 2015 
(Zendai et al. 2015, p.83).  The plant area was included in the land sale agreement 
to Zendai.   
Contamination at No.4 Effluent Dam 
An EIA report dated 2005 for the Isidleke development at Modderfontein by Oryx 
Environmental confirms the presence of contamination as follows: 
The water quality data provided by AECI suggests high levels of 
contamination of nutrients such as ammonia (NH3N) and manganese (Mn) at 
some sites (Oryx Environmental 2005, p.55). 
This aforementioned report states that the confirmation of Mn suggests that other 
similar metals could be present, but are not indicated or accounted for.  The 
contaminated areas are further indicated to be directly east of Dam No. 4, as well as 
westward. 
The No. 4 Effluent Dam was no longer required after the scaling down of nitrogen 
production in 2007.  Inspection and analysis showed that the sediment did contain 
elements similar to that of first effluent but not in levels justifying complete removal.  
Recent sampling proved that contaminants caught in sediment were not readily 
released into the water.  The dam was rehabilitated, and monitoring downstream is 
continuous to ensure none of the contaminants mobilise again (AECI 2007; 
Diepenbroek 2009). 
This dam has subsequently been incorporated in the Modderfontein Nature Reserve, 
and was therefore excluded from the land sale to Zendai. 
As part of AECIs ongoing plans for development on buffer areas, an EIA process 
was undertaken in 2007 to relocate the Detonator Destruction Facility to the future 
core explosives area.  Soil sampling of nitrates, lead and aluminium was to be 
undertaken and appropriate action taken if necessary (Willchem cc 2007).  It is not 
clear what the outcome of this sampling was, as the EIA report was not found in the 
public domain. 
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The core explosives area described in the Scoping Report corresponds with the area 
that was retained by AEL in 2013. 
Activities of Heartland Properties and AECI from 1999 to 2013 
Heartland Properties, a fully owned subsidiary of AECI, was established in 1999 to 
realise value from the surplus land around the various operations, and the buffer 
areas earlier required in terms of the Explosives Act.  All the land was originally 
zoned for heavy industrial uses, to allow for AECI’s expansion (AECI Limited 1999; 
Oryx Environmental 2005).  At the onset of Heartland Properties, there were about 
3 000 hectares available for conventional development to the open market.   
Light industrial, retail, and commercial options were developed in Longmeadow 
Business Estate, while Thornhill and Lakeside were the first residential estates.  The 
Greenstone Hill and Park development was established in 2001 between 
Modderfontein and Edenvale (Heartland Properties 2008; Oryx Environmental 2005).  
In 2010, Heartland only had about 2 300 ha left, having sold off 1 000 Ha in the 
preceding ten years (Bosman 2010). 
Future developments such as Westlake, Pinelands, Highlands and the Historic 
Precinct were still to be realised (Heartland Properties 2012).  These areas were all 
included in the land sale to Zendai, and incorporated into the development 
framework (AECI 2013). 
By 2013, the site and surrounds had limited municipal services capacity, and 
significant contributions and investment from private developers were required for 
further urban development (AECI 2013). 
Planning 
It appears that master planning for AECI’s properties has been ongoing since the 
establishment of Heartland Properties, with various iterations.  GAPP undertook the 
first vision for the site in 2005 (Oryx Environmental 2005), whilst the City of 
Johannesburg undertook its own version in 2009, the Modderfontein Contextual 
Framework, according to which it wanted development to proceed (City of 
Johannesburg 2010a). 
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Alignment with municipal planning policies 
Development of AECI’s buffer area was aligned with both the 2003 and 2010 SDF 
policy documents. 
Stakeholder engagement 
Evidence suggests that Heartland has adhered to legal requirements regarding 
public participation during the numerous EIA processes since the establishment of 
Heartland (Oryx Environmental 2005; Willchem cc 2007). 
In addition, there is proof that since its establishment in 2009, the Modderfontein 
Environmental Community Initiative (MECI) has met on a regular basis with 
Heartland Properties regarding a range of aspects including new developments, 
rehabilitation initiatives and environmental management 
(http://meci.co.za/minutes.html). 
Zendai land sale and development initiative (2013 onwards) 
The Chinese property developer Zendai purchased 1 600 ha from AECI in 2013 at 
just more than R1 billion for what is to become an R 84 billion regeneration project 
(Muller 2015).  The Heartland Property Company was included in the sale.  The 
Modderfontein Reserve of 275 ha and the AEL factory land of 1300 ha were retained 
by AECI (see Figure 14). 
Concerns were raised in 2013 of potential liability in terms of contaminated land, 
prior to the enactment of the contaminated land regulations in NEMWA in 2014, due 
to the inclusion of residential land use of the land to be sold (Edward Nathan 
Sonnenberg 2014).  None of these concerns were clarified or tested.  Zendai did, 
however, in their clarification to shareholders, mention that the company had not 
undertaken its own due diligence.  They relied on the studying of documentation and 
history as provided by AECI (Zendai Holdings Limited 2013). 
With regard to brownfields policy, National Norms and Standards for the 
Remediation of Contaminated Land and Soil Quality published in 2014, will apply for 
the remediation of the Kynoch tailings dams, indicated as area 3A on Figure 14.   
The 2015 masterplan is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 14: Land sold to Zendai (marked Transaction Area in blue) in 2013 in context of AECI property and 
the remaining AEL operational area (Source: Zendai 2013) 
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Figure 15: Zendai’s master plan for Modderfontein City (source: Zendai 2015: 65) 
Transportation access and municipal services 
Since purchasing the land, Zendai has invested a further R400 million in municipal 
infrastructure, undertaken an extensive master planning exercise, and engaged a 
broad range of stakeholders regarding the development framework.  Transfer of the 
last land portion was only taken two years after the initial sale agreement, in 2015 
(Muller 2015).   
From Zendai’s stakeholder engagement workshop report, detailing the proposed 
development over the next two decades, it is clear that comprehensive thinking and 
planning on all aspects of new “city” is being undertaken.  Once agreed with relevant 
key stakeholders, such as the City of Johannesburg, detailed precinct plans, related 
approvals and development will proceed as per market demand (Zendai et al. 2015).   
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The Gautrain’s Modderfontein Station will likely be located on the site, intended to be 
commissioned by early 2019 (Muller 2015), improving the development’s public 
transport access. 
4.3.4. Preliminary analysis of the Modderfontein case study 
Heartland’s development activities were on excess land used as buffer area.  The 
buffer area had few industrial activities, other than some effluent dams, the Kynoch 
operations with its tailings dam, and explosives magazines.  The 1 600 ha not yet 
developed and sold to Zendai was also from the buffer area. 
These buffer areas had low levels of contamination and in isolated areas only.  This 
factor, low overall contamination in isolated areas only, can be associated with 
Heartland’s redevelopment success. Further, Zendai’s future redevelopment 
activities will likely be positively affected by the low levels of contamination. 
The evidence suggests that AECI has approached effluent water management 
scientifically since the 1960s, with proven duty of care with regard to rehabilitation of 
problematic areas of their operations.  This approach arguably made it easier to 
redevelop (through Heartland) and sell off land to Zendai, as rehabilitation was 
already completed.  AECIs commitment to rehabilitation may be associated with the 
redevelopment success of Heartland Properties.  For example, if No. 4 Effluent Dam 
was not rehabilitated, it could not have been included in the Modderfontein Reserve.  
The company spent R34 million on land remediation between 1996 and 1999, and its 
annual reports prove its spending on remediation and rehabilitation (AECI Limited 
1999). 
It can be expected that site assessments will have to be undertaken at the old 
Kynoch plant area to determine the extent and level of contamination prior to 
development. 
The property boom between 2002 and 2006 probably assisted development 
activities from a macro-economic perspective at the onset of Heartland’s land 
development initiatives.  In terms of redevelopment cost, land purchase was 
discounted due to AECI’s ownership – this more than likely improved the business 
case of these developments when compared to developers that had to still purchase 
land. 
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Over 14 years, Heartland Properties developed valuable knowledge and expertise 
regarding land development of AECI’s excess property around its operations.  
Heartland’s institutional knowledge and understanding of the Modderfontein area’s 
property market is likely to be associated with redevelopment success of Zendai. 
From Zendai’s R400 million investment in infrastructure in the first two years after the 
land sale, and its bank guarantees with Hong Kong Bank’s South African branch, it 
appears that the developer has quick access to private funding.  This quick access to 
funding options can be expected to be related to redevelopment success in the 
future. 
Due to the strong trade relations between South Africa and China, it can also be 
assumed that provincial and local government will support Zendai’s development 
activities.  Political support for redevelopment of the case study site may also be 
associated with potential success.   
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5. Discussion 
In this chapter, each of the three case studies is evaluated against the nine 
contributing success factors to brownfields redevelopment identified in the literature 
review. 
5.1. Evaluation of case study findings against literature 
5.1.1. Newtown 
The precinct-level intervention is regarded as one of the more successful 
interventions in the Johannesburg inner city. Large-scale interventions requiring 
significant funding attracted the attention of private investors. 
Factor one: Sites with little or no contamination are more readily redeveloped 
From the data analysed, no contamination was documented for the area of 
Newtown.  When redevelopment activities started in earnest, from 1999 onwards, 
contamination was not evident in Newtown.   
The presence of no proven contamination as a success factor probably lead to the 
redevelopment success of Newtown as a brownfields precinct (De Sousa 2001; 
Howland 2003b; Bacot & O’Dell 2006; Hollander et al. 2010). 
Factor two: Mature brownfields management policies facilitate development 
Momentum for redevelopment started in the late 1990s. The establishment of the 
Inner City Office in 1999 and the JDA in 2001 were particular turning points. 
Redevelopment policy and planning documents were compiled and implemented in 
quick succession between 1999 and 2003.  The City of Johannesburg has continued 
to update these as required.  For example, four urban design frameworks and 
precinct plans have been compiled for Newtown in 1999, 2000, 2005, and 2015. 
These planning frameworks and plans were mature policies; and assisted in 
shortening the development approvals process; and showed a high degree of 
integration between different aspects of development and role-players.  As 
contamination was not an issue affecting redevelopment, the policies and plans did 
not have to address environmental risk. 
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The SARS UDZ Tax Incentive, implemented in 2004, was an effective secondary 
incentive policy to improve profit margins, but not a primary attraction for private 
investment to the area (Rhizome Management Services 2009; Mwangala 2010).  
The investment in the Inner City would have taken place without the SARS Urban 
Development Zone tax incentive (Johannesburg Development Agency 2015). 
The urban renewal strategies and incentives for the Inner City and Newtown have 
contributed to facilitate redevelopment in Newtown over the last two decades.  
Therefore, the presence of brownfields policy maturity as a success factor (Lange & 
McNeil 2004; McQueen 2011; Adams et al. 2010) was arguably associated with the 
redevelopment success of Newtown.  As the Newtown did not have contamination, 
the silence of policies on the issue was not relevant to the case study. 
Factor three: Sites with certainty regarding apportionment of liability for clean-
up and perception of few latent risks are more likely to be redeveloped 
Most of the properties and associated buildings in the history of Newtown were 
originally owned by the City of Johannesburg, its subsidiary companies, or similar 
large public entities (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers 2003a).   
As contamination could not be identified as an issue from the data analysed, related 
liability for remediation of such contamination was not applicable. No latent risks 
were therefore expected for redevelopment in Newtown. 
The perception of few latent risks in Newtown was probably associated with the 
redevelopment success (Sigman 2010; McGuigan 2000; Alberini et al. 2005; De 
Sousa, 2001; Nijkamp et al. 2002). 
Factor four: Redevelopment land use options based on a risk minimisation 
approach improve the feasibility of brownfields projects 
No evidence could be found in the data that the new land uses proposed and 
implemented in Newtown were influenced by contamination risk to human health or 
the environment. 
The current land uses in Newtown vary greatly - they include retail, commercial, 
office, entertainment, hard and soft open space, education, institutional and 
residential uses.  No new industrial land use has been implemented in Newtown. 
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This shows consistency with findings in the literature, which indicates that most 
brownfield sites have industrial land use origins, but redevelopment tends to be 
commercial, retail or residential (Frantal et al. 2013; Winson-Geideman et al. 2004).   
No land use restrictions were necessary, as there was no evidence for 
contamination.   This success factor is not applicable to the Newtown case study. 
Factor five: Favourable market conditions attract private sector investment 
2001 to 2008-time period 
South Africa experienced a property development “boom” between 2002 and 2007 
on a macro-economic level.  Private investors expected strong returns according to 
the property boom at that time (Funke et al. 2006).   
Most of the investment in the early 2000s in Newtown was in public infrastructure, 
and funded by public institutions.  These investments were not highly dependent on 
favourable market conditions, but the institutions would still have benefitted from 
good interest rates and favourable lending terms.   
The JDA, through its area-based intervention, spent R188 million in Newtown 
between 2001 and 2008, thereby assisting to create favourable micro-economic 
conditions for private investment.  Significant investments were made in municipal 
services and transport infrastructure.  Over the period of 2001 to 2008, R 2.7 billion 
was spent in Newtown by the private sector (Johannesburg Development Agency 
2009). 
According to the evidence of this study, the development of AngloGold Ashanti’s 
Turbine Hall in 2005 was the most significant early private investment in Newtown.  
The JDA’s analysis confirms that private sector investment was flat until 2005.  A 
significant increase occurred in 2007 and 2008, with more than 60% of private sector 
investment (as measured from 2001) occurring in those two years.  The JDA’s 
analysis also makes reference to the context of the 2002-2007 property boom 
assisting the positive impact of the JDA’s investments (Rhizome Management 
Services 2009). 
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The active urban management of the NID has had a positive impact on the case 
study site since its inception in 2006, which may have assisted in the success of 
Newtown’s redevelopment. 
2009 to 2016-time period 
Brownfields redevelopment is more difficult in poor property markets (Adams et al. 
2010).  With the financial crisis and recession in 2008, the property boom in South 
Africa ended.  Residential property growth, as an indication of the overall property 
market, was poor in the years following the 2008 recession (Global Property Guide 
2016; Steyn 2015). The increased growth figure in 2010 before the Soccer World 
Cup was an exception. 
According to the JDA, private sector investment in Newtown between 2009 and 2016 
was in excess of R 1.6 billion, excluding another R450 million in planning or under 
construction (Johannesburg Development Agency 2015).   
Private development interest in Newtown has increased since 2013.  The most 
recent of these developments is the Newtown Junction retail and commercial 
development at the Potato Sheds in 2014, a R 1.4 billion investment.  This was 
despite very little public investment (R16 million) made in Newtown after 2008.   
The strong macro-economic market conditions between 2002 and 2007 likely 
contributed to the private sector investment in Newtown’s redevelopment. 
The investment in the Inner City would have taken place without the SARS Urban 
Development Zone tax incentive.  Despite the fluctuating macro-economic growth 
periods, other factors such as growing market demand and tangible improvements in 
urban management seems to have stimulated redevelopment in Newtown (Rhizome 
Management Services 2009; Mwangala 2010; Johannesburg Development Agency 
2015).   
Most importantly, the JDA, as special purpose vehicle and implementing agent of the 
City, was effective in the funding and execution of public investment identified in the 
planning documents.   This created long-term favourable micro-economic conditions.   
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The favourable area-based market conditions created by local government likely had 
a significant impact on private sector investment and redevelopment success in 
Newtown, similar to the case study of Charlotte presented by Bacot & O’Dell (2006).   
Factor six: Quick access to a variety of funding options, coupled with clear 
and rapid approvals process encourages redevelopment 
Most of the properties and buildings in Newtown belong to government.  The fact 
that the JDA and other public entities undertook many of the developments, 
prevented long approvals processes, due to co-operative governance and political 
will.  Funded by the various spheres of government, the JDA as special purpose 
company focused towards the regeneration of the Inner City, was an associated 
success factor in Newtown’s redevelopment success.   
As government owned most of the land and buildings, investment in Newtown was 
assisted by various government-related funding initiatives (Rhizome Management 
Services 2009; Shand 2010; City of Johannesburg 2011a). 
In addition, a blanket rezoning application was undertaken for Newtown, and a 
Design Review Panel was established, according to the Urban Precinct Plan of 
Newtown (GAPP 2003).  This replaced the need for individual rezoning applications, 
thereby speeding up the approvals process (City of Johannesburg 2003b; GAPP 
Architects and Urban Designers 2003a). 
The funding of the first phase of redevelopment projects in Newtown, in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, was therefore principally from public sources within all three 
tiers of government.  These included the City of Johannesburg, the Johannesburg 
Development Agency (JDA) in partnership with Gauteng Blue IQ, the Gauteng 
Department of Education, and the Johannesburg Property Company.  For example, 
the public private partnership of R198 million for the Brickfields social housing project 
was the largest yet for South Africa at the time (Johannesburg Housing Company 
2005). 
The private sector responded well to these catalytic publicly funded projects and 
fast-tracked approvals process, with examples of the larger developments including 
the World of Beer (SABMiller 1995), Turbine Hall (AngloGold Ashanti 2005), and 
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more recently Newtown Junction (2014) and City Lodge Hotel (2014) by Atterbury 
Properties. 
The presence of quick access to funding options and rapid development approvals 
processes as a success factor arguably lead to the redevelopment success of 
Newtown, as documented in literature (McQueen 2011; Tonin 2014). 
Factor seven: Larger sites with economy of scale are more often redeveloped 
than small sites 
The Newtown Cultural Precinct between Carr and Dolly Rathebe, the M1 overpass 
and Mtemi Piliso is approximately 25 hectares in extent.  This is larger than the 
average 15 hectares indicated in the literature review as critical size to leverage 
economy of scale (Meyer & Lyons 2000; Dixon et al. 2011a; Frantal et al. 2013; 
Osman et al. 2015). 
The sufficient size of the Newtown Precinct is consistent with the literature in terms 
of size.  The presence of sufficient size as success factor in the regeneration of 
Newtown probably lead to success. 
Factor eight: Readily available municipal services and close proximity to 
transport corridors are incentives to redevelopment 
Newtown is part of Johannesburg’s city centre, and was therefore well located to 
bulk services, major road networks, and rail infrastructure at Park Station.  However, 
due to the lack of upgrading and maintenance through the 1980s and 1990s, the 
services fell into disrepair and transport access had become problematic (GAPP 
Architects and Urban Designers 1999). 
The early planning frameworks compiled since 1999, included numerous transport-
related projects for implementation (GAPP 1999, 2000, 2003).  Specific 
transportation projects undertaken by the City as part of redevelopment, include the 
Nelson Mandela Bridge and the M1/Carr Street interchange north of Newtown, both 
completed in 2003.  By 2003, R400 million had already been invested in municipal 
services in the area (City of Johannesburg 2003b).  These projects had a catalytic 
effect on access between Newtown and the adjacent areas. 
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The Rea Vaya Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system was started by the City in 2009, and 
has recently added Newtown to its destinations.  The Gautrain, completed in 2012, 
included a bus service for Park station.  The Park Station bus route runs along Sauer 
Street, improving the accessibility of Newtown. The implementation of these two 
public transport systems probably assisted in the success of Newtown’s 
redevelopment, improving public transportation access to the area. 
The planning and continued improvement of public transport since 2000, as well as 
the investment in municipal services, is a likely success factor in Newtown’s 
redevelopment. This is aligned with literature (Lange & McNeil 2004; Frantal et al. 
2013). 
Factor nine: Strong political and community support encourage 
redevelopment 
As government owned most of the land and buildings, investment in Newtown was 
assisted by various government-related funding initiatives (Rhizome Management 
Services 2009; Shand 2010; City of Johannesburg 2011a). The urban renewal of 
Newtown had the necessary policy and political support on a national, provincial and 
local government level, with funding spent through mainly the JDA (City of 
Johannesburg 2007; Johannesburg Development Agency 2004). 
The requirements of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 and public participation 
approach of IDPs normally followed provided an opportunity for public inputs to the 
renewal process.  Ward-related and broader meetings would have played an 
equivalent role. However, no evidence could be found in the data of participatory 
activities conducted for any of the redevelopment initiatives in Newtown. 
Shand (2010) argues that Newtown has indeed became a community through inter 
alia its public and private sector investment, cultural activities, and growing 
residential land use (Johannesburg Development Agency 2015).  The long-term 
vision of this community was a secondary contributing factor to the success of the 
precinct (Dixon et al. 2011b; Hollander et al. 2010). 
The presence of political and community support as success factor in the Newtown 
Precinct redevelopment probably lead to its redevelopment success. This is in 
alignment with literature (Hollander et al. 2010; Frantal et al. 2013). 
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5.1.2. Egoli Gas site 
Despite many positive factors, many specialist studies and an ideal locality, this 
single-owner site was not redeveloped successfully.  Exact reasons remain unclear. 
Factor one: Sites with little or no contamination are more readily redeveloped 
The Egoli Gas site works site was moderately contaminated at a site level, but 
pollutants were not proven to migrate off-site to downstream properties.   
Between 1 500 m3 and 2 000 m3 of highly contaminated soil would have had to be 
removed for offsite disposal or treatment.  This was the most costly part of 
remediation.  On-site treatment was to be conducted for the remaining material. The 
cost of site remediation activities was not known with any level of accuracy, and 
therefore the risk of cost overrun was listed as a risk in the site remediation plan 
(Georem International 2011).   
In line with the findings of Nijkamp (2002), the site owner delayed the remediation 
and was aiming to combine it with the redevelopment, in order to save costs. 
Egoli Gas had been considering redeveloping part of the site since 2001, and over 
time many developers had been interested in undertaking the redevelopment.  
Contamination of the site was always a challenge preventing redevelopment (City of 
Johannesburg 2011b; Kloppers 2004; Davie 2011).  This reiterates the lack of private 
developer interest where contamination is known and the cost is undetermined (De 
Sousa 2001; Meyer & Lyons 2000). 
The absence of little or no contamination as success factor was arguably associated 
with the redevelopment not going ahead, as identified in literature (Howland 2003). 
Factor two: Mature brownfields management policies facilitate development 
Policies regarding brownfields redevelopment 
The 2003 and 2008 Spatial Development Frameworks of the planning area 
supported the notion of densification, infill and strategic brownfields site 
redevelopment (City of Johannesburg 2003a; City of Johannesburg 2010b).  The 
Egoli Gas redevelopment was aligned with these policy documents.  The SDFs were 
mature in its support for brownfields to be redeveloped. 
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The “Framework for the management of contaminated land” (DEA 2010) was 
referenced by Georem at the time in 2011.  This policy document provided some 
guidance on soil screening values depending on end land use (industrial, 
commercial or residential). 
No comprehensive, integrated policy addressing brownfields redevelopment was in 
place at the time of the redevelopment process (Potts & Cloete 2012). As the Egoli 
Gas site had known contamination, a brownfields policy to assist redevelopment 
would have had to address this issue. 
The policies mentioned above did assist to facilitate the redevelopment, but were 
silent on overcoming the barriers to redevelopment associated with contamination. 
An overarching policy mechanism (considering various pieces of legislation) such as 
the Brownfields Law in the US was not in place solve the problem of liability 
apportionment for prospective property developers.  This could have in turn assisted 
funding from commercial banks. The various approvals processes and the role of 
each authority was further unclear and slow. 
Maturity in “generating engagement with the private sector” as per stage 3 of the 
model of Adams (2010) was therefore still lacking. 
As found in literature (Adams 2010), the absence of brownfields policy maturity as 
success factor probably lead to redevelopment not going ahead.   
Factor three: Sites with certainty regarding apportionment of liability for clean-
up and perception of few latent risks are more likely to be redeveloped 
The gas plant had already been decommissioned at the time of purchase.  Following 
the polluter pays principle, liability for pollution rested with the City of Johannesburg, 
the original owner.  It is uncertain if the purchase agreement between Egoli Gas and 
the City addressed the aspect of pollution and related liability, as those details were 
not included in the review of the acquisition (Competition Commission 2001). 
It is probable that Egoli Gas accepted the liability of pollution. This is inferred from 
the fact that numerous specialists were appointed to determine the extent (and 
associated remedial cost) of the contamination on site as part of the redevelopment 
proposal (Georem International 2011; van Niekerk 2011).  Whereas the exact cost for 
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remediation was not confirmed, these studies greatly assisted to reduce uncertainty 
regarding latent risks. 
Although there was significant interest by developers for the decade from 2001 to 
2011, the contamination of the site was always a constraint (Davie 2011).  This 
confirms the uncertainty of private investors regarding liability of the site, as 
documented in literature (Sigman 2010; Jensen 2010; McCarthy 2002). 
According to media reports, a tender would have been issued to private developers 
for the plan (Davie 2011).  One would assume that the liability for pollution would 
vest with Egoli Gas and not be transferred to the developer.  However, the data is 
silent on whether latent risks were clarified in the eventual tender document that 
Egoli Gas issued to developers, and what the exact ownership arrangement were 
going to be.  It is likely that developers intending to submit tenders may have 
struggled to obtain funding/bank guarantees from financial institutions due to the 
presence of contamination and uncertainty regarding liability, as indicated by Theron 
(2010). 
The absence of certainty regarding liability and few latent risks for private developers 
was probably a contributing factor to the redevelopment not going ahead. 
Factor four: Redevelopment land use options based on a risk minimisation 
approach improve the feasibility of brownfields projects 
The redevelopment plan design by GAPP appeared to be a sensible plan with the 
correct principles, densities, land use variety and the result of a thorough 
understanding of the site and its surroundings (GAPP Architects and Urban 
Designers 2010).  The development was phased, with the development of the hotel, 
retail space and some office uses in the old gas works comprising the first stage. 
The valley-fill area on site (highest levels of contamination) was earmarked for open 
space use after rehabilitation with soil capping.  Less contaminated areas were 
planned for retail use.  The clean area to the south was earmarked for student 
accommodation.  Land use planning for the development was thus according to 
contamination risk.  This is aligned with the risk-based approach currently being 
used in brownfields management (Ferguson 1999; Hollander et al. 2010; Luo et al. 
2009). 
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The presence of redevelopment land use options based on a risk management 
approach as success factor should have contributed to redevelopment success. It 
appears that other factors were greater determinants in this particular case study. 
Factor five: Favourable market conditions attract private sector investment 
The property boom in South Africa (Funke et al. 2006) ended in 2008.  Apart from the 
increased growth figure in 2010 (due to increased activity before the World Cup), 
residential property growth, as an indication of the overall property market, was poor 
at the time of the proposed redevelopment between 2009 and 2012 (Global Property 
Guide 2016).  Brownfields redevelopment is more difficult in poor property markets 
(Adams et al. 2010). 
Due to the Egoli Gas site's location outside the Inner City UDZ, favourable area-
based conditions could also not be capitalised upon, as was the case for Newtown, 
and other cases in the UK and the US (Bacot & O’Dell 2006; Dixon et al. 2011b; City 
of Johannesburg 2006). 
The absence of favourable market conditions as success factor was arguably 
associated with the redevelopment not going ahead.   
Factor six: Quick access to a variety of funding options, with clear and rapid 
approvals process encourages redevelopment 
Given the low appetite for risk from public banks (Theron 2010), and as the property 
was confirmed to be contaminated, it is likely that the project would have had to be 
largely privately funded, as property redevelopment with known contamination was 
not a well-understood concept at the time in South Africa.  The willingness of banks 
to loan money for brownfields referred to by Seeliger & Turok (2015) refers to inner 
city scenarios, but contamination is not mentioned in the particular paper. 
A portion of the development costs may have been carried by the landowner, Egoli 
Gas.  These would include aspects such as the cost of land, remediation, and power 
generation from gas.  The cost of construction, and other development costs, was 
likely to be for the developer.  In addition to this, no tax incentives were available for 
the redevelopment due to the property being located outside the UDZ jurisdiction.  A 
tax incentive would have improved the profit margin of the redevelopment process. 
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The EIA was compiled according to the 2010 NEMA EIA Regulations, which meant 
the approvals process was clear: the competent authority would only have 30 days 
to issue a record of decision, although this timeframe was often not adhered to.   
Township establishment applications in terms of the Town Planning Ordinance of 
1985 follow a clearly understood application process.  Applications often takes longer 
than a year, especially if objections are raised (City of Johannesburg 2016a).  The 
chairperson of the South African Affordable Residential Developers Association 
(SAARDA) indicated that approvals previously taking 12 to 18 months, now often 
takes 3 years (Slabbert 2016). 
If water containing a waste was to be released into the environment, it would require 
a water use license application (WULA) in terms of Section 21 (g) of the National 
Water Act (1998).  However, this was not the case, as contaminated water of the 
remediation activities was planned to be released into the sewage system.   
No clear process was available at the time for the various soil remediation activities 
intended.  If the DWA would require a WULA, this was likely also to slow down the 
process, as there was no legislated review timeframe for such applications at the 
time.  At the time of this development, the typical timeframe for WULA approvals of 
mining activities was three and a half years. Government has recently, in 2015, 
implemented a shorter process of 300 days (Munnik 2015). 
The absence of quick access to funding options and rapid approvals processes were 
likely associated factors in the redevelopment not going ahead, as documented in 
literature (McQueen 2011; Tonin 2014). 
Factor seven: Larger sites with economy of scale are more often redeveloped 
than small sites 
The Egoli Gas site is 14.85 hectares in extent.  This parcel size is in line with the 
literature finding that larger sites are required to leverage economy of scale (Meyer & 
Lyons 2000; Dixon et al. 2011b; Frantal et al. 2013). 
According to the literature (Meyer & Lyons 2000; Dixon et al. 2011a; Frantal et al. 
2013; Osman et al. 2015) the site had a large enough size and economy of scale. 
This aspect was therefore not associated with the redevelopment not going ahead. 
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Factor eight: Readily available municipal services and close proximity to 
transport corridors are incentives to redevelopment 
The Egoli Gas site was well serviced with regard to municipal services, and capacity 
was confirmed with the city council.  However, electrical capacity was not available 
and a new substation would be required.  The option of using gas to generate 
electricity on site to overcome this constraint was investigated (GAPP Architects and 
Urban Designers 2010).  Major road networks such as Empire Road, the M1 and the 
then-planned Rea Vaya bus system were in close proximity to the site. 
As the Rea Vaya’s routes run along Empire Road in close proximity to the site, it may 
have assisted in the success of the Gas Work’s redevelopment with regard to access 
and public transportation to the redevelopment. 
Municipal services and transport corridors were readily available for the Egoli Gas 
site, which is one of the required aspects of successful redevelopment in literature 
(Lange & McNeil 2004; Osman et al. 2015; Frantal et al. 2013). 
Access to transport corridors and municipal services was present as a success 
factor (Lange & McNeil 2004; Frantal et al. 2013), but did not contribute to the 
redevelopment not going ahead. 
Factor nine: Strong political and community support encourage 
redevelopment 
The derelict nature of some areas of the site and related issues such as crime were 
a concern of the surrounding community. Therefore, the prospect of urban 
regeneration of the site was regarded by the media as positive (Davie 2011; City of 
Johannesburg 2011b).  Feedback from public participation as part of the EIA process 
was generally positive, as long as each stakeholder’s key issues were addressed 
(Van der Westhuizen 2011). 
Although certain comments on the statutory applications needed to be addressed, 
the City of Johannesburg was welcoming of the proposal due to its alignment with 
the City’s densification, infill, urban regeneration and transport planning policies (Van 
der Westhuizen 2011). 
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Support for statutory applications 
It is not known if the formal approvals (environmental or town planning) were 
obtained from the City Council and GDARD before the redevelopment process came 
to a standstill in 2012.  Preliminary comments from these authorities did not indicate 
any fatal flaws related to the redevelopment.  Furthermore, GDARD’s studies 
commissioned in 2010 and 2012 to investigate the possible use of mine residue 
areas for urban development, and their approval of the Ebotse Golf Estate on an old 
quarry site, showed their intent to support brownfields development (GDARD 2012; 
Le Roux 2007). 
The redevelopment project had sufficient political and social support.  This factor has 
been documented as assisting in success of redevelopments (Hollander et al. 2010; 
Adams et al. 2010; Meyer & Lyons 2000).  The presence of social/political support as 
a success factor (Hollander et al. 2010; Frantal et al. 2013) did not contribute to the 
redevelopment not going ahead. 
5.1.3. Modderfontein 
The redevelopments undertaken by Heartland Properties from 2000 to 2013 can be 
regarded as successful. Its original Longmeadow Business Estate was sold out by 
2004, and the Greenstone Hill mixed use development was sold out by 2007. By 
2010, it had developed and sold off approximately 1000 ha of land.  These events 
provide a historic view, from which certain observations can be made. 
One cannot yet determine with certainty whether the proposed Modderfontein City 
redevelopment will be successful, as it is still in its early stages. Decades of 
redevelopment are still to follow. 
Factor one: Sites with little or no contamination are more readily redeveloped 
The land which Heartland Properties started developing incrementally since 2001, 
and which Zendai purchased from AECI, comprises mainly buffer surrounding the 
remaining AEL factory. 
Remediation on known contaminated areas was completed by AECI itself.  The 
rehabilitation of Effluent Dam No. 4, two million tons of carbon-rich ash at the AEL 
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plant, and the ongoing Kynoch tailings dam removal are some examples (Coetzee 
2004; AECI 2007).   
The Kynoch Fertiliser factory and tailings facility were listed as contaminated land in 
the environmental sensitivity map as presented in the workshop report of 2015 
(Zendai et al. 2015, p.83).  It can be expected that site assessments will be 
undertaken to determine the extent and level of contamination prior to development. 
The overall site therefore has almost no remaining contamination, apart from known 
hotspots such as Kynoch (AECI Limited 1999).  This was due, in part, to AECI’s 
proven duty of care with regard to land remediation. 
The presence of low levels of contamination as an associated success factor for 
redevelopment will arguably contribute to redevelopment success. The private sector 
is more willing to invest in these cases than with heavily contaminated sites (De 
Sousa 2001; Howland 2003b; Hollander et al. 2010). 
Factor two: Mature brownfields management policies facilitate development 
The 2003 and 2010 SDF spatial planning documents of the City supported the 
brownfields redevelopment of the AECI Modderfontein land and is considered as 
mature policy (Hollander et al. 2010; McQueen 2011). 
It is expected that this maturity regarding planning documents relating to brownfields 
will be associated with the successful redevelopment of the property. 
With regard to brownfields policy as it relates to contamination, the 2014 norms and 
standards for contaminated land will apply for the remediation of the Kynoch tailings 
dams, when it takes place.   The South African norms and standards for 
contaminated land are still immature, as found by Herselmann (2013).  Nevertheless, 
it is likely that AECI followed international standards when conducting soil 
assessments of old explosives areas (Willchem cc 2007). 
The maturity of brownfields policy where it relates to redevelopment as an 
associated success factor is expected to contribute to successful redevelopment.   
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As the Modderfontein has very low levels of contamination, the silence of brownfield 
policies to overcome barriers with regard to contamination was not important for this 
case study. 
Factor three: Sites with certainty regarding apportionment of liability for clean-
up and perception of few latent risks are more likely to be redeveloped 
Zendai did not conduct their own due diligence or investigations regarding the land 
and potential liabilities attached (Zendai Holdings Limited 2013).  As the 
development proposals include a range of land uses from residential to light 
industrial, it allows Zendai to adapt the land use in future according to environmental 
risks, if discovered. 
From its circular to shareholders, and with AECI’s reputable operational record, it 
appears that Zendai has certainty regarding apportionment of liability, and expects 
few latent risks.  Certainty regarding liability risk is an important requirement for 
brownfields redevelopment success (De Sousa 2001; Nijkamp et al. 2002; McCarthy 
2002). 
The presence of certainty regarding liability as a success factor will arguably lead to 
successful redevelopment. 
Factor four: Land use options based on a risk minimisation approach improve 
the feasibility of brownfields redevelopment projects 
Low levels of contamination are present on the land to be redeveloped.  Therefore, 
land use according to human health and environmental risk is not a major 
determining factor that must be considered in the land use framework plans currently 
being compiled. 
With regards to the Kynoch plant and old operations, this area was recognised as 
being contaminated in planning documents of Zendai.  It was further indicated that 
the final land use of this area would have to be considered carefully, depending on 
determined health risk (Zendai 2015, p.58). 
Redevelopment land use options are being approached according to the risk 
management approach (Ferguson et al. 1999; Hollander et al. 2010; Hamilton & 
142 
Viscusi 1999).  The presence of this success factor should lead to the successful 
redevelopment of the Modderfontein site. 
Factor five: Favourable market conditions attract private sector investment 
The property boom between 2002 and 2006 probably assisted development 
activities from a macro-economic perspective at the onset of Heartland’s land 
development initiatives (Funke et al. 2006).   The presence of favourable market 
conditions as a success factor probably lead to the redevelopment success of 
Heartland Properties. 
Whereas the market has improved since the 2008 economic crisis, the country’s 
economic outlook, based on low GDP growth, has been mediocre since then (see 
Table 2). It appears that Zendai had a longer-term view when purchasing the land.  
Their development framework stretches to 2060, thus going beyond the short and 
medium term conditions.  Its South African CEO indicated that development would 
be guided by “market demand” (Muller 2015).  Zendai paid for the land in full in 
March 2014, indicating a strong financial position (AECI 2013).   Literature indicates 
that “long-term vision” is required to realise redevelopment projects (Hollander et al. 
2010), which is being applied in this case. 
Zendai’s investment in South Africa was probably assisted by the extensive trade 
agreements between the South Africa and China. Twenty-six new trade agreements 
between the two countries, to the value of R 94 billion, were signed by December 
2015 (Republic of South Africa 2015). These multi-lateral trade agreements probably 
assisted in creating a favourable business environment for the redevelopment 
project by a Chinese-based company.   
Zendai possibly saw the current depressed market conditions as an opportunity for 
purchasing of land at a reduced price, similar to examples in the UK (Dixon et al. 
2011a). 
The depressed property market conditions favoured Zendai at the time of the land 
sale in 2014, as opposed to the overvalued market prior to 2007. Coupled with 
favourable trade conditions between South Africa and China, favourable market 
conditions will therefore be a probable success factor for redevelopment activities of 
Zendai.    
143 
Factor six: Quick access to a variety of funding options, with clear and rapid 
approvals process encourages redevelopment 
Funding options 
With regard to Heartland Properties, land purchase was discounted, due to AECI’s 
ownership - this likely improved the business case of these developments when 
compared to developers that had to still purchase land.  Further, financial support for 
its activities from its holding company AECI, was a likely funding source (Venter 
2008).  The company therefore had quick access to at least partial funding. 
With AECI’s strong financial position, it is likely that commercial banks would have 
more easily lent money to Heartland, when compared to a conventional developer 
with no larger holding company. 
Zendai manages over 5 billion dollars of assets globally.  The payment guarantee for 
the land sale was provided by the South African branch of the Bank of China Limited 
(Zendai Holdings Limited 2013).  The strong trade agreements between South Africa 
and China may have provided additional funding options to Zendai, not available to 
other developers.   
The exact funding mechanisms to be used are not known, but the R400 million spent 
in the first two years after the land sale, proves funding is not a challenge for Zendai.   
Approvals processes 
Due to AECI’s proven commitment to remediation, these activities were removed 
from the development approvals processes, thereby simplifying and speeding up 
these processes. 
GDARD will be the relevant competent authority for precinct-level EIAs to be 
undertaken, and have shown flexibility based on site-specific scientific evidence by 
environmental practitioners (as previously described). 
The EIA processes will have to be conducted according to the 2014 NEMA EIA 
Regulations, which means the approvals process of this legal requirement is clear.  
With the promulgation of these regulations, shorter timeframes have been specified 
for the entire process.  Apart from some upfront specialist studies of approximately 
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three months, the full Scoping/EIA process takes 258 calendar days under normal 
circumstances, including competent authority review.  The process can therefore be 
completed in approximately a year. 
Township establishment applications in terms of the Town Planning Ordinance of 
1985 are a clearly understood process.  Delays in this process appear not to have 
influenced the redevelopment activities of Heartland Properties adversely, given the 
many developments already implemented since 2000. 
With the promulgation of the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 
(2013), each municipality has to draft by-laws in terms of which town planning 
applications are made.  The City of Johannesburg promulgated its by-laws in July 
2016 (City of Johannesburg 2016b).  These are more efficient and streamlined than 
the old legislation, and are expected to shorten the approvals time frame.  Zendai will 
therefore benefit from this streamlined process.   
The latest planning and environmental approvals processes in South Africa are fairly 
efficient, which will likely contribute the success of the redevelopment, in alignment 
with literature (McQueen 2011; Tonin 2014). 
The presence of available funding options for Zendai as a success factor is expected 
to be associated with the Modderfontein City redevelopment’s success (Bendor et al. 
2011; McCarthy 2002). 
Factor seven: Larger sites with economy of scale are more often redeveloped 
than small sites 
The development size of the proposed Modderfontein City is more than 100 times 
larger than the 15 hectares figure derived from the literature as the minimum viable 
size for a redevelopment site.  The development can generate sufficient economy of 
scale to improve chances of success, in comparison to redevelopments such as 
Egoli Gas, which is one development on one site. 
The presence of a property size larger than 15 hectares as a success factor in the 
Modderfontein redevelopment is arguably a contributing factor to potential 
redevelopment success.  This is supported by literature (Meyer & Lyons 2000; Dixon 
et al. 2011b; Frantal et al. 2013). 
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Factor eight: Readily available municipal services and close proximity to 
transport corridors are incentives to redevelopment 
Prior to 2013, Heartland successfully invested in the servicing and rezoning of land 
to prepare it for redevelopment, in accordance with agreements with local 
government.  However, from 2008 to 2013, Heartland Properties reported on the 
challenging situation regarding further availability of services.  Significant upfront 
expenditure on new infrastructure would have been required to speed up its 
realisation of land assets, which was not part of AECI’s core business (AECI 2013).  
This lack of infrastructure availability was thus a detractor for further redevelopment.   
In 2008 its CEO indicated that the company wished to exit the property development 
market in the next five years (Venter 2008). The sale of excess land and Heartland 
Properties was thus an opportunity to avoid such municipal infrastructure spending. 
The extensive capital spent on infrastructure in the first two years after the land sale, 
but prior to development, is an indication of the willingness of the Zendai to assist in 
providing access to services access for its future developments.  The company and 
other large developers, such as Atterbury Properties north of the Buccleuch 
Interchange, are investing in infrastructure to support their developments. 
The Modderfontein site has always been well located for transport corridors, 
including regional routes and highways directly passing the site.  The proposed 
Gautrain Modderfontein Station at the development provides an additional mode of 
transport. 
The close proximity to transport infrastructure, as well as a developer investing in 
infrastructure prior to redevelopment is present as a success factor.  It will probably 
lead to the potential success of the redevelopment of the Modderfontein site (Lange 
& McNeil 2004; Amekudzi & Fomunung 2004; Frantal et al. 2013). 
Factor nine: Strong political and community support encourage 
redevelopment 
AECI has engaged the community surrounding its operational and safety issues 
since 1996, through its Community Awareness and Emergency Response forum. 
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Heartland Properties further appears to have followed the required legal 
requirements for its EIA processes since 2000.  No evidence could be found for 
particular political support of the company’s redevelopment plans, apart from 
alignment with the relevant spatial frameworks of the area.   
With regard to community support, comments in the EIA processes investigated are 
typical of such processes.  Stakeholders were generally accepting of redevelopment 
as long as their concerns were considered (Oryx Environmental 2005; Willchem cc 
2007).  No evidence could be found of formal appeals lodged against development 
approvals, which would have been a proven sign of objection. 
Thorough and continual stakeholder engagement, rather than outright support, was 
present as associated success factor.  It probably led to the redevelopment success 
of Heartland Properties. 
Since purchasing the land, Zendai has taken extensive steps to engage the 
stakeholders on a wide basis for its urban design framework (Zendai et al. 2015).  
This consultation includes public workshops and open days with the general public 
and community groups, and interactions with City and provincial government 
stakeholders.  Before formal applications are made, these engagements provide 
context for the various stakeholders before receiving formal applications of 
development to comment on. 
The important trade agreements between South Africa and China provide additional 
political support for the Modderfontein City development (Muller 2015; Republic of 
South Africa 2015).   
The presence of social and political support as success factor will arguably be 
associated with the successful redevelopment of Zendai. This is in alignment with 
literature (Hollander et al. 2010; Meyer & Lyons 2000; Lange & McNeil 2004). 
5.1.4. Comparison of the case studies 
It is necessary to note certain contextual similarities and differences between the 
findings of the three case studies, which informs observations and conclusions 
made. These are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Contextual similarities and differences between the three case studies 
Aspect Newtown Egoli Gas AECI Modderfontein 
Contamination  No proven 
contamination 
 Moderate level of 
contamination by 
City of Johannesburg 
(first owner) 
 Low, isolated levels 
of contamination by 
first owner, AECI. 
Ownership  The majority of 
Newtown is owned 
by government 
 Numerous small land 
parcels 
 Privately owned by a 
single owner 
 Single land parcel 
 Privately owned by 
a single owner 
 Several large land 
parcels 
Funding  R300 million public 
catalyst funding 
 UDZ Tax incentive 
offered improved 
returns on 
investment 
 No public funding 
 UDZ Tax incentive 
was not applicable 
 No public funding, 
 UDZ Tax incentive 
was not applicable 
Timeline of 
redevelopment 
 Incremental 
redevelopment in 
process for more 
than 15 years 
 Once-off combined 
attempt at 
redevelopment 
 Incremental 
redevelopment in 
process for more 
than 15 years 
Redevelopmen
t approvals 
process 
 Special purpose 
vehicle was 
established for 
redevelopment. 
 Numerous iterations 
of urban 
development plans, 
periodically revisited 
 Adoption of 
masterplans by 
government prior to 
site-scale 
applications 
 
 No EIA approvals 
were required 
 
 
 
 One iteration of 
urban development 
plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 EIA approvals were 
required 
 Special purpose 
vehicle was 
established for 
redevelopment. 
 Numerous 
iterations of urban 
development plans, 
periodically 
revisited 
 Adoption of 
masterplans by 
government prior to 
site-scale 
applications 
 EIA approvals were 
required 
Infrastructure/ 
transport 
 Municipal services 
access largely 
available 
 Significant 
government funding 
required to achieve 
improved transport 
access 
 Municipal and 
transport access 
largely available 
 Municipal and 
transport access 
largely available for 
Heartland 
Properties 
 R400 million private  
infrastructure 
funding required in 
2014 
Political and 
community 
support 
 Strong political 
support in place. 
 No proven 
community support 
 No proven political 
support 
 Mixed reaction from 
community 
 Political support in 
place for Zendai 
activities, no 
proven support for 
Heartland. 
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5.2. Research findings 
5.2.1. Findings regarding factors not previously identified from literature 
Catalytic public investment in inner city brownfields areas can attract private 
investment 
The Newtown case study confirmed previous findings (Adair et al. 1994; Kemmerling 
& Stephan 2002) that significant government investment in infrastructure and urban 
management over a long period of time creates favourable market conditions in the 
intervention area.  These favourable conditions can attract private investment of a 
much greater magnitude. 
Spatial planning approach 
The spatial planning approach followed by the JDA in Newtown was successful. This 
approach has also been implemented elsewhere (Nadin 2007). The urban design 
plans and guidelines developed were followed, reviewed and updated periodically.  It 
included quicker development approvals processes due to blanket rezoning 
undertaken.  Importantly, the CoJ and JDA implemented most of the interventions 
proposed. 
The value of special purpose vehicles 
In the case studies of Newtown and Modderfontein, the JDA and Heartland 
Properties were respective special purpose vehicles (SPVs) created within greater 
property holding entities (namely the City of Johannesburg and AECI).   These 
special purpose vehicles were in both cases associated with redevelopment 
success. 
The SPVs probably had staff with strong experience in the property development 
sector, and were given special decision-making powers, making it more agile than 
the greater organisations it was part of. 
The presence of special purpose vehicles for brownfield site redevelopments may be 
associated with redevelopment success where such sites is owned by large 
companies or institutions, as identified in literature (Amirtahmasebi et al. 2016). 
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5.2.2. Findings regarding pre-identified success factors from literature 
Regarding the nine success factors identified from the literature, the following 
discussion summarises how the findings from the case studies support or contradict 
the "factors" that were derived from the literature. 
Factor one: contamination 
Concerning contamination levels, the case study findings regarding redevelopment 
were aligned with literature.  Two of the sites with little or no contamination (Newtown 
and Modderfontein) were redeveloped.  The Egoli Gas site has a moderate level of 
contamination and has not yet been redeveloped.  This appears to be the most 
significant factor.  Other factors such as risk and liability stem from contamination. 
Factor two: policy maturity 
Regarding the maturity of brownfields management policies facilitating development 
as a success factor, spatial planning policies supported brownfields redevelopment 
as a principle in the case studies, thereby confirming maturity.   Pertaining to the 
redevelopment aspect of brownfield management policy, the case study findings 
support the literature-derived factor. Regarding overcoming the contamination aspect 
of brownfield management policy, it remains lacking (immature); the case study 
findings also support the literature-derived factor. 
Factor three: liability 
The aspect of liability for remediation and related latent risks was not applicable to 
Newtown.  Clarity was not obtained in the Modderfontein case on the apportionment 
of liability.  However, due to the proven record of AECI in remediation of its land 
before redevelopment or sale, Zendai probably had high confidence that no latent 
risks would arise at a later stage. 
For the Egoli Gas site, it appears that the owners accepted the liability for clean-up 
of contamination, although they did not cause it. Due to extensive investigations, 
latent risks were therefore not expected between the first and second owner.  
Regarding confidence of developers responding to the tender documents from Egoli 
Gas, the data is silent, but latent risks were possibly expected, due to the history of 
the site. The case study findings all supports the literature-based factor. 
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Factor four: land use options 
The factor of redevelopment land-use options based on a risk minimisation approach 
for brownfields projects was most applicable for the Egoli Gas case study, with its 
moderate levels of contamination. Although the Egoli Gas redevelopment planning 
proposals were aligned with this principle, it was not successfully redeveloped, and 
case study support for the literature-derived factor cannot be proven.   
Zendai will follow the risk-based land use planning approach for the old Kynoch 
factory at the Modderfontein site, supporting the identified success factor from 
literature. The factor was not applicable to the Newtown site. 
Factor five: market conditions 
The property boom in South Africa in the early 2000s assisted the Newtown and 
Heartland Properties’ redevelopment processes with strong growth conditions.  The 
poorer property market conditions after 2008 could not be overcome in the case of 
the Egoli Gas case study, and slowed the development tempo of Heartland 
Properties in the same period.   The active trade agreements between South Africa 
and China, coupled with depressed market conditions, probably assisted with the 
investment decision for Zendai at Modderfontein.   
Through public infrastructure investment in targeted areas such as Newtown (and 
tax incentives to a lesser degree), the private sector was attracted successfully.  The 
findings of the three case studies therefore support the factor of favourable market 
conditions on redevelopment as derived from literature. 
Factor six: funding and approvals 
The Newtown redevelopment case study findings support the literature-derived 
factor of quick access to funding, and clear rapid approvals processes. The 
Gasworks case study supports the factor, but conversely proven by the absence of 
financing and quick approvals.   
Quicker approvals processes were not found in the Heartland and Zendai case 
studies. However, quick access of these companies to funding contributed to their 
success, thereby supporting the literature-derived factor. 
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Factor seven: economy of scale 
Over the three case studies, larger sites with an economy of scale were found to 
more often be redeveloped than small sites.  The scale factor identified from 
literature was thus supported by the case study findings. 
Factor eight: services and transport 
The factor of readily available municipal services and proximity to transport corridors 
is a pre-requisite for redevelopment.   From the findings of the Newtown and 
Modderfontein case studies, the factor derived from literature was supported. 
The Egoli Gas site findings confirms that the presence of services and transport 
access is a requirement, but not always a success factor. 
Factor nine: stakeholder support 
Political support as success factor was supported by the findings from the Newtown 
case study, where it preceded decision-making and funding support for the 
regeneration of the area. In the Modderfontein City case redevelopment as planned 
by Zendai, similar political support was created by the strong trade agreements 
between South Africa and China.   
Other than nominal policy support, no political support could be identified for the 
Egoli Gas site. The factor identified from literature was thus supported by the 
findings from two of the case studies.   
Community support for the redevelopment of the Egoli Gas site developed over time 
with the statutory planning processes, as the site owner and consultants considered 
comments from stakeholders, and amended the development proposals accordingly.   
The approvals processes for Heartland Properties all required stakeholder 
engagement as part of legal requirements. Hence, community support was also 
present.  For Zendai, community support is expected based on the extensive public 
meetings and engagements arranged by the developers. 
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For Newtown, community support is deemed to have been gained through the 
stakeholder engagement requirements of local government, but was less pertinent, 
as no data could be obtained of specific public inputs obtained. 
Community support as identified success factor from literature is confirmed by two of 
the case studies’ findings, and implied by the third. 
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6. Conclusions 
The research question set out in Chapter 1 of this report was: 
What are the factors that contribute to the implementation success of projects 
where industrial brownfield sites are remediated and subsequently 
redeveloped? 
In the literature review, the international body of knowledge regarding contaminated 
sites and their redevelopment was broadly reviewed.  This included the various 
definitions, assessment methodologies and redevelopment of brownfield sites.  
Brownfields redevelopment in South Africa and other developing nations were also 
reviewed. Policy development in especially South America was explored as a parallel 
to South Africa. South Africa’s research output in the field was discussed.  Nine 
factors that contribute to redevelopment success of brownfield sites within the urban 
context were derived from literature.   
Three South African case studies were then analysed using documentary or archival 
research, against the theoretical background of international literature.  These 
projects were studied to obtain a better understanding of the respective success 
factors for redeveloping brownfields. 
The case study sites represented certain shared features, and provided a 
representative cross-section.  Shared features included their location within the 
urban edge of Johannesburg, original industrial land use as part of the origins of 
Johannesburg, and the intent of the land owners to redevelop brownfields land.   
Cross section aspects include distance from the inner city, size, certainty of 
contamination and redevelopment success.  The size of the study sites were chosen 
to vary, as well as each site’s proximity to the city centre of Johannesburg. The Egoli 
Gas site and AECI Modderfontein were clearly documented as contaminated.  
Contamination on the Newtown site was not clearly established as fact.   
The status of each case study was documented: Newtown’s redevelopment was 
successful, the Egoli Gas redevelopment was not yet implemented, and the AECI 
Modderfontein site is in the process of being redeveloped. 
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6.1. Brownfields redevelopment success factors for South Africa 
Important success factors that emerge from this study for brownfields sites 
redevelopment projects in South Africa are discussed here. 
Factor one: Sites with little or no contamination are more readily redeveloped 
Both the Newtown (zero contamination) and the Modderfontein (very low level 
isolated contamination) case studies were not burdened by contamination, thereby 
simplifying the redevelopment process. 
Higher levels of contamination increases redevelopment cost and timeframe 
Higher contamination levels on a brownfields site will probably increase remediation 
cost, eventual development cost, and certainty regarding development cost. AECI 
itself undertook the remediation in the Modderfontein case study, thus not 
transferring these costs to the (re)development companies.  This approach (of early 
remediation by the polluter) reduced the eventual redevelopment cost, and the 
certainty thereof. 
The moderate level of contamination (and related remediation cost) in the Egoli Gas 
case study was not paid for by the polluter (the City). When the second owner (Egoli 
Gas) then considered redevelopment, the remediation cost had to be combined with 
the redevelopment cost. Moreover, the cost of clean-up was not certain. 
Higher contamination and related remediation may also increase the construction 
timeframe of a redevelopment project. At Modderfontein, remediation was 
undertaken separately and before redevelopment, thereby not adding time to 
redevelopment. The Egoli Gas remediation plan would have been executed as part 
of the redevelopment process, potentially slowing the project down. 
This phenomenon was not applicable to the Newtown case study as no 
contamination was present. 
Generalisation 
As this literature-derived factor was confirmed by all three case studies, 
generalisation for future brownfields is possible. 
155 
Factor two: Mature brownfields management policies facilitate development 
As noted by Adams (2010), the definition of brownfields will inform policy maturity, as 
countries place emphasis on different aspects of the definition, driven by unique 
contexts.  These include the availability of greenfields land on the outskirts of cities 
and the prevalence of contaminated sites. 
Spatial planning support is sufficient for brownfields redevelopment where little or no 
contamination is present 
Spatial planning support for brownfields was present for all the case studies. For the 
Newtown and Modderfontein sites with little or no contamination, this proved 
sufficient to support redevelopment. Spatial planning support alone was not sufficient 
to support the redevelopment of the Egoli Gas site, due to its contamination. 
This principle was replicated in two of the three cases; therefore generalisation is 
possible for future brownfields projects. 
Addressing barriers to redevelopment caused by known contamination must be 
included in brownfield policies where brownfield sites are contaminated 
Although a framework regarding guideline values for remediation based on land use 
was available, an integrated brownfields management policy did not address 
contamination sufficiently in the Egoli Gas case study. Brownfields policy was 
therefore immature in that respect, and this contributed to the site not being 
redeveloped. As the other two case study sites (Newtown and Modderfontein) had 
little or no known contamination, this feature was not applicable. 
This principle occurred in only one of the three cases, therefore generalisation is not 
yet possible for future brownfields projects. 
Factor three: Sites with certainty regarding apportionment of liability for clean-
up and perception of few latent risks are more likely to be redeveloped 
The lower the contamination on a brownfields site, the less pertinent the issue of 
liability for clean-up is expected to be. 
The issue of liability for remediation and related latent risks did not affect Newtown, 
as contamination was not present.   
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The data did not provide clarity in the Modderfontein case on the transfer of liability.  
However, AECI had a proven record regarding remediation of its land before 
redevelopment or sale. This probably reduced the importance of liability transfer for 
Zendai. 
Egoli Gas probably accepted full liability for the clean-up of the site purchased from 
the City of Johannesburg, but wanted to fund the remediation from redevelopment.  
The data did not provide clarity on the probable liability transfer between Egoli Gas 
and tenderers for the redevelopment.  In order to attract investors, one might expect 
that Egoli Gas would have protected such tenderers from liability. 
This principle was replicated in two of the three cases, therefore generalisation is 
possible for future brownfields projects. 
Perception of few latent risks improves investor confidence 
Government and later private redevelopers in the Newtown case study did not 
expect any latent risks due to contamination, which assisted to improve investor 
confidence. For Modderfontein, Zendai probably also had good confidence that few 
latent risks would arise. 
Notwithstanding the possible protection from liability in the tender documents issued 
by Egoli Gas, the history of the site and future property (land or building) ownership 
arguably affected investor confidence for the project. 
This principle was replicated in all three cases, therefore generalisation is probable 
for future brownfields projects. 
Factor four: Redevelopment land use options based on a risk minimisation 
approach improve the feasibility of brownfields projects 
Commercial/retail use is an especially well-suited land use for brownfields 
redevelopments. 
As described in the literature review, commercial land use provides better income 
than industrial land use, but lower health risk than residential land use.  It is therefore 
a commonly selected land use option for regeneration projects where contamination 
is known.  For the Egoli Gas case study’s mixed use proposal, commercially related 
land uses represented more than 50% of the proposed development. This principle 
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was not applicable to the Modderfontein and Newtown case studies as 
contamination was not known or significant. 
Risk-based arrangement of activities on a site level improve redevelopment 
feasibility 
If site-level activities are planned according to the health risk of original 
contamination locations, remediation costs are reduced, making the overall 
development more feasible. 
Although this factor was used in the planning of the Modderfontein and Egoli Gas as 
cases, these projects were not yet implemented. Therefore, the case studies do not 
show sufficient replication to suppose generalisation. 
This principle was not applicable to the Newtown case study. 
Factor five: Favourable market conditions attract private sector investment; 
Attracting private sector investment through favourable market conditions can occur 
on different levels.  Macro-economic conditions influence redevelopment, as 
confirmed by all three case studies.  These included property market conditions in all 
three cases, and international trade agreements, applicable only to the 
Modderfontein case study. 
Dedicated government intervention on a large scale can also create favourable 
market conditions, as proven by the Newtown case study. Coupled with long-term 
commitment (such as City Improvement Districts), these interventions create investor 
confidence regarding the longevity of its intended investment. Both of these are 
required for private sector participation. No generalisations can therefore be made 
for future brownfields projects. 
Based on the occurrence of this success factor in all three case studies, on more 
than one level, generalisation for future brownfields is applicable. 
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Factor six: Quick access to a variety of funding options, coupled with clear 
and rapid approvals process encourages redevelopment; 
Funding 
In areas where many of the properties are government-owned, large-scale public 
intervention with public funds over a short time-span is possible. In turn, this can 
attract significant private investment.  In the Newtown case study, this large-scale 
intervention was executed through the JDA as special-purpose vehicle, which 
assisted with improving the turnaround time of projects. 
For Heartland Properties and Zendai in the Modderfontein case study, quick access 
to funding contributed to their success. Both of these companies were part of larger 
entities, which could provide funds and access loans quicker than first-time 
developers. 
Developers interested in the Egoli Gas site redevelopment tender in 2012 were likely 
smaller developers, lacking support from commercial banks. Due to the history of the 
site and its known contamination, and the property market decline since 2008, quick 
access to funding was not likely for these smaller developers. 
The applicability of quick availability of funding as success factor is probable for 
future brownfield regeneration projects, based on replication in all three case studies. 
Rapid and clear approvals processes assist redevelopment 
The contamination burden at the Gasworks Site case study created a prolonged 
approvals process, specifically regarding remediation. If a dedicated policy 
integrating the approvals process of brownfields with contamination is not created, it 
can be expected that this situation will continue occurring.   
The Newtown precinct was the only case study where a special approval zone was 
created by blanket rezoning. The design review committee set up to rapidly review 
site development plans was also unique.  This method of speeding up approvals 
may be replicated in future brownfields with large-scale government intervention and 
the use of a special purpose vehicle such as the JDA. 
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The tactic by AECI (the polluter) to complete remediation separately and before 
redevelopment initiatives, probably simplified and shortened the redevelopment 
process for Heartland and Zendai.   
With only one case study for each of these unique situations, no generalisation can 
be made for future brownfields projects. 
Factor eight: Readily available municipal services and close proximity to 
transport corridors are required for redevelopment 
Significant investment had to be made in transport infrastructure to “unlock” the 
Newtown Precinct. Similarly, Heartland Properties noted the lack of municipal 
services as a detractor to its investors in 2012. After the land sale in 2013, Zendai 
had to spend hundreds of millions of rands on infrastructure upgrades around the 
Modderfontein site. As confirmed in two case studies, this requirement of services 
and good transport access will remain a requirement for future brownfields.   
However, as found in the Egoli Gas case study, its presence may not always be a 
determining factor. 
Factor nine: Strong political and community support encourage 
redevelopment.   
Political support influences policy, planning, and decisions regarding funding for 
redevelopment projects.  It may be due to the particular history of a place (such as 
Newtown), or due to bilateral trade agreements (as with Zendai’s investment in 
Modderfontein). Although not always applicable on an individual site level, the 
political context within which brownfield regeneration takes place is expected to 
remain an important consideration for similar future projects.  Some sites (such as 
the Egoli Gas site) may not be affected adversely or positively by the political 
context. 
The Egoli Gas and Modderfontein (Zendai) case studies provide examples of the 
importance of obtaining (often through numerous interactions and amending 
redevelopment proposals) community buy-in for a project. This factor was not clearly 
visible in the Newtown study. 
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From the findings of two from three case studies for each aspect, political and 
community support is expected to remain a relevant success factor for future 
brownfields projects. 
6.2.  Contribution of this research 
This research provides additional insight into the current situation of brownfields 
redevelopment in South Africa, furthering the understanding provided by Potts & 
Cloete (2012) and Seeliger & Turok (2015).  The case study findings provide 
indications towards generalisation for success factors that may apply to future 
brownfields projects. 
6.3. Recommendations for future research 
The lack of well-documented brownfields redevelopment case studies in South Africa 
deserves attention. A database of redeveloped brownfields in South Africa should be 
addressed.  In cases where data sources are silent regarding such case studies, 
interviews may be useful to provide insight into particular aspects of these case 
studies. It links to the need for definition, policy and an inventory of contaminated / 
brownfields sites as noted by Potts & Cloete (2012).   
The expected success factors identified in this study may then be tested against the 
broader case study database in order to achieve generalisation and improve the 
robustness of these factors.  With a greater database of brownfields 
redevelopments, statistical analysis can be added.  This will in turn inform 
brownfields redevelopment policy-making.   
It appears from the case studies that certain factors carry greater weight as 
determinants for whether redevelopment is successful or not. In further research, 
with more data, it will be necessary to determine the weighting of factors in each 
case study. 
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Appendix A: Data sources 
Data sources for Newtown 
 Newtown Urban Design Framework (GAPP 1999); 
 Inner City Position Paper (JDA 2001); 
 Newtown Cultural Precinct Urban Design Plan (GAPP 2001); 
 Newtown Cultural Precinct Design and Development Manual (GAPP 2003); 
 Johannesburg Spatial Development Framework (2003); 
 Urban Development Zone (UDZ) Tax Incentive (SARS 2003); 
 Greater Newtown Cultural Quarter Development Strategy (JDA 2004); 
 Analysis of the impact of the JDA's area-based regeneration projects on 
private sector investments (Rhizome Management Services 2009); 
 Joburg Inner City Urban Design Implementation Plan (JDA & CoJ 2009); 
 Regional Spatial Development Framework, Region F (2010); 
 Newtown: a Cultural Precinct – Real or Imagined (Master of Arts Thesis, 
Shand 2010); 
 Johannesburg Inner City End of Term Report (CoJ 2011); 
 Urban Regeneration in the Joburg CBD (Journal Article, Bethlehem 2013); 
 Inner City Transformation & Investment Trends, 2009 – 2014 (JDA 2015); 
 “What’s the Plan?” Inner City Booklet (JDA 2015); 
 Newtown North Urban Design Framework (GAPP & Urban Solutions 2005); 
 Newtown Redevelopment incorporating Newtown North – Engineering 
Services Investigation and Assessment Report (PDNA & Themba Consulting 
Engineers 2006); 
 Review of Newtown Urban Design Framework (GAPP 2015); 
 News Archive, City of Johannesburg Website (http://www.joburg.org.za/); 
 Johannesburg Development Agency website (http://www.jda.co.za); 
 Newtown Improvement District website (http://www.newtown.co.za/); 
 Rea Vaya website (http://www.Reavaya.co.za); and 
 Gautrain website (http://www.gautrain.co.za). 
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Data sources that could not be obtained: 
 Inner City Spatial Framework (1999); 
 Inner City Economic Development Strategy (1999); 
 “Newtown Cultural Precinct Plan – Town Planning Aspects and Incentives” (Steve 
Jaspan and Associates 2001); 
 Urban Cost Modelling for Newtown (Walker Maré Quantity Surveyors 2001); and 
 Infrastructure analysis for the Newtown area ((Themba Consulting Civil and 
Structural Engineers 2001). 
 
Data sources for Egoli Gas site 
 Johannesburg Spatial Development Framework (2003); 
 Regional Spatial Development Framework, Region F, 2010-2011; 
 Draft NEMA Basic Assessment Report (V&L 2011), with relevant specialist 
studies including: 
o Site Remediation Plan (Georem International 2011); 
o Risk-based Site Assessment (Infotox); 
o Draft Precinct Plan for a Mixed Use Development (GAPP); and 
o Egoli Gas Works Heritage Report (Tsica Heritage Consultants). 
 Annual Report of the Competition Commission of South Africa (2001); 
 Mail & Guardian newspaper; 
 Rea Vaya (http://www.Reavaya.co.za); 
 News Archive, City of Johannesburg Website (http://www.joburg.org.za/); 
 Egoli Gas (http://www.egoligas.co.za); and 
 The Citizen newspaper. 
Data sources that could not be obtained: 
 Township establishment application (Steve Jaspan and Associates, 2010). 
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Data sources for Modderfontein 
 “Disposal of wastewater from Modderfontein Factory: review of the biological 
nitrogen removal systems” – academic article published by four AECI 
employees (1983); 
 “Industrial Water Management – Changing Perspectives” – academic article 
published by two AECI employees (1987); 
 Annual Report AECI Limited (1999); 
 “South Africa to import urea” – (Engineering News 2000); 
 Johannesburg Spatial Development Framework (2003); 
 Environmental Impact Report for Isidleke Development, Modderfontein (Oryx 
Environmental, 2005); 
 AECI – Corporate Citizenship Case Study: Rehabilitation of Modderfontein’s 
Dam 4 (2007); 
 Scoping Report & Plan of study for EIA Relocation of the Detonator Destructor 
Facility (Willchem cc 2007); 
 Heartland Properties – Investors Presentation (2008); 
 Minutes of Modderfontein Community Liaison Meeting (2009); 
 Heritage Impact Assessment for Modderfontein Village Development (Bosman 
2010); 
 2010-2011 Regional Spatial Development Framework, Region E (CoJ 2011); 
 Heartland Properties – Investors Presentation (2012); 
 Integrated Report - Operational review - Property (AECI 2013); 
 Shareholder Circular - major transaction in respect of the acquisition of 
property assets in Modderfontein, South Africa (Shanghai Zendai Property 
Limited, 2013); 
 AECI, Heartland,  Zendai Transaction, Presentation (2013); 
 Proceedings of the Competition Commission on the land sale between AECI 
and Zendai (2014); 
 Article by Edward Nathan Sonnenberg on the AECI / Zendai agreement and 
the question of pollution (2014); 
 Modderfontein Regeneration: Final Workshop Report, 28-29 July 2015 
(Zendai, ARUP, Atkins); 
 “Modderfontein’s R84bn city on track” (www.financialmail.co.za 2015); 
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 Modderfontein Environmental Community Initiative 
(http://meci.co.za/minutes.html); 
 Press release regarding the signing on 26 trade agreements between China 
and South Africa (Republic of South Africa 2015); 
 Municipal Planning By-law in terms of SPLUMA (CoJ 2016); and 
 News Archive, City of Johannesburg Website (http://www.joburg.org.za/ 
2016); and 
 Archaeological Investigation Of A Historical Ash Dump Associated With The 
Modderfontein Explosives Factory (Pelser 2013). 
 
